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From Nigeria (2010) to Turkey (2016), and Mali (2020), coups continue to threaten 
government stability. In 2021, even the US democratic process was endangered when a mob 
stormed the capitol in a sui generis coup.  The following thesis draws attention to the previously 
unrecognized effect of compulsory military service and secret police on civil-military relations 
and coup risk. In the first chapter, co-authored with Pr. Tobias Böhmelt and Dr. Zorzeta Bakaki, 
we examine how conscription increases public trust for the armed forces in European 
democracies. We argue that conscription, more so than voluntary-recruitment systems, can 
reach out to and socialize larger segments of the society in line with the military’s values either 
directly - through personal involvement, or indirectly – from individuals directly exposed to 
the military to third persons. The second chapter explores how conscription increases the 
likelihood of a coup attempt in anocracies. The chapter advances the argument that conscription 
improves the ties of the armed forces with society and enables interest groups to collaborate 
with the armed forces against the anocratic government which is unable to overcome the 
political instability innate to those regimes. Third chapter investigates how secret police in 
autocracies decrease the willingness and opportunity of military officers to stage a coup. 
Specifically, secret police weaken societal-military ties by identifying and sanctioning 
dissidents through sophisticated espionage operations. Therefore, while conscription increases 
societal-military ties, secret police produce the opposite effect. The study concludes that 
conscription increases public trust to the armed forces in European democracies, however, the 
institution also produces an undesirable side-effect in anocracies, namely increased coup risk. 
To the contrary, secret police in autocracies is found to decrease the probability of a coup 
attempt against the government. Consequently, the thesis contributes to the literature on civil-
military relations by bringing attention to previously unappreciated aspects of civil-military 
relations. Likewise, the thesis demonstrates that the study of essential societal-military 
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On the 15th of November 2017, an army spokesman appeared on the Zimbabwean national TV 
reassuring the nation that there was definitely not a coup happening. Notwithstanding the 
military’s insistence that its actions were not aimed against President Mugabe, the intervention 
ended Mugabe’s 37-year rule and the army installed a transitional government. According to 
Luttwak’s classic definition on coup d’état, 'A coup consists of the infiltration of a small but 
critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its 
control of the remainder’ (1979, p. 27). Subsequently, the Zimbabwe case was beyond doubt a 
coup since a group within the state apparatus, that is the armed forces, displaced the 
government from power by force. Despite the ambiguity and mystic that surround coup 
attempts, they are hardly a unique phenomenon, even in the post-Cold War era. From Nigeria 
in 2010, to Mali in 2020, coups regularly make headlines as governments around the globe still 
fall prey to military praetorianism. Coups are not limited to absolute regimes or failed states, 
as even politically dominant leaders with strong popular support may lose power to a military 
coup. To illustrate this point, Evo Morales was the most popular politician in Bolivia when he 
was forced to resign from office by the military shortly after the disputed elections of 2019. 
Democracy in the USA was also threatened in 2021 when the capitol was stormed by a pro-
Trump mob in a sui generis coup1.  The guardianship dilemma is thus a timeless, indispensable 
aspect of civil-military relations when “the very institution created to protect the polity is given 
sufficient power to become a threat to the polity” (Feaver 1999, p. 214).  Hence, coups still 
pose a significant threat to civilian governments worldwide as the academic literature on coup 
                                                             
1 I use the term sui generis coup to describe the invasion of the US capitol since the mob did not have a 
concrete end goal or the means to effectively enforce a regime change, but it was still an attack 
encouraged by the executive against another government body and the overall democratic process. 
Many media outlets and politicians in the US refer to the attack as a coup (see Coleman, 2021; Graham, 
2021) and I am eager to see how the academic literature will classify the event. 
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risk continues to grow to accommodate the need to understand the factors that drive the 
probability of a coup attempt. This thesis draws attention to previously unrecognized factors 
that influence the likelihood of a coup attempt and civil-military relations in general, namely 
secret police organizations and compulsory military service. 
  According to Powell and Thyne (2011), between 1961 and 2000 fifty coups surpassed the 25 
battle-related deaths threshold of the Uppsala/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) armed 
conflict data set. Furthermore, nine of these cases resulted in more than 1,000 deaths and could 
thus be classified as a civil war based on the Correlates of War data set. Not only that, but the 
factors that influence coup risk, like civil-military relations and force structure, differ heavily 
from case to case. The Zimbabwe military is a strictly professional force whereas the Turkish 
and Bolivian armed forces rely heavily on conscription to fulfil their operational needs. On the 
other hand, authoritarian regimes in the former USSR, Asia, and the Middle East have 
established secret police units to keep in check political adversaries and the armed forces. To 
that end, Hugo Chavez formed a secret police organization in Venezuela to shield the regime 
from internal threats due to his adversarial relationship with the political establishment. 
Furthermore, military coups have different targets and priorities. While the Thai army 
displaced an interim government to impede democratization and solidify its grip over the 
political system, the military’s decision to move against Presidents Evo Morales, Hugo Chavez, 
and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was driven by their attempts to expand the powers of the executive 
and remake the status quo. Subsequently, coup risk is a timely affair since the factors that 
influence the military’s propensity to move against the government are enduring and 
governments around the world still fall prey to praetorianism. Coup attempts act like seismic 
events that affect not only an individual political system, but when they occur in geopolitically 
important states, their destabilizing effect echoes throughout the increasingly inter-connected 
international system.  
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  From my perspective, I decided to study this important topic because my own country, 
Greece, has had a violent history of military coups and still experiences the consequences of 
the 2016 coup in neighboring Turkey, namely in the form of political refugees and military 
officers seeking asylum in the country. What’s more, I approach the issues of coup risk and 
civil-military relations in general from two institutions that (in)directly affect me as a Greek 
citizen: compulsory military service and the secret police. All male Greek citizens are obligated 
to serve in the armed forces and I was raised up with terrifying stories about the Junta’s Military 
Police. As such, this study innovates by emphasizing on how underappreciated, yet essential 
features of civil-military relations, like compulsory military service, contribute to the 
probability of a coup attempt and civil-military relations. Specifically, the study examines a 
factor that enhances the links between society and its armed forces in the form of conscription 
as well as secret police organizations that disrupt those links in an effort to eradicate political 
dissent. In the first chapter I examine how conscription increases public support for the armed 
forces in democracies because of the increased ties between society and the military. Then in 
the second chapter I explore how conscription increases the likelihood of a coup in anocracies 
because of improved relations between society and its armed forces. Finally, in the third chapter 
I investigate how an autocrat may use the secret police to dismantle these ties with the 
identification and sanctioning of dissidents thus decreasing the willingness and opportunity of 
military officers to stage a coup. Hence, while conscription increases the ties between society 
and the armed forces, secret police have the opposite effect. Consequently, studying the two 
institutions and their effect on civil-military relations across different regime types is expected 
to produce meaningful results that will expand our overall understanding of civil-military 
relations. Therefore, the study contributes to the literature on civil-military relations by 
examining how conscription and the secret police affect public support for the armed forces 
and the probability of a coup attempt. 
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1.1 Literature Review  
Governments find themselves with the Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads since 
military might is necessary to preserve the state, but the military may also its capabilities to 
threaten government survival via a coup. To this end, the academic literature has explored in 
great length the socioeconomic and military factors that influence the likelihood of a coup 
attempt by the armed forces (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012; Pilster and Böhmelt, 
2011, 2012; Londregan and Poole, 1990; McMahon and Slantchev, 2015; Albrecht and Eibl, 
2018; Johnson and Thyne, 2018; Koehler and Albrecht, 2019; De Bruin, 2018, 2020; Leon, 
2014; Casper, 2017; Houle, 2016; Bell and Sudduth, 2017). The literature can be divided into 
two distinct categories; the factors that influence the willingness of the armed forces to topple 
the government and those that determine their opportunity to do so, like a government’s coup 
proofing policies. Socioeconomic factors such as high poverty rates, levels of economic 
development, welfare state, or political instability affect coup risk since the armed forces are 
sensitive to social conditions and threats to the status quo (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Belkin 
and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012; Houle, 2016, Albrecht and Eibl, 2018). Regarding military 
interests, both high military spending and a high degree of force mechanization mitigate the 
prospects of military intervention in politics (Huntington, 1991; Powell, 2012; Leon, 2014; 
Albrecht and Eibl, 2018; Choulis, et al., working paper). Higher force mechanization may 
increase “the cost estimations of potential inter-unit, fratricidal conflict resulting from failed 
coordination, which might deter officers and soldiers from attempting and joining an 
intervention in the first place”, and hence decrease coup risk due to increased opportunity costs 
for the military (Choulis et al., working paper, p. 3).  
  However, while the literature has examined thoroughly the sociopolitical factors that drive 
military intervention against the government, the effect of different military enlistment systems 
on praetorianism has eschewed academic scrutiny. Böhmelt, Pilster, and Tago (2017) assert 
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that states with a larger navy in relation to the army are more likely to experience a coup d’état 
since navy cadres originate from the middle class and naval bases are situated near the capital. 
Similarly, military academies are found to increase coup risk because they provide ample 
opportunities for officer networking (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2019). However, 
none of the existing studies has examined the effect of compulsory military service, also known 
as conscription, on coup risk. Von Bredow argues that conscription is used “as an 
organizational device to counteract anti-democratic political ambitions of the officer corps” 
(Von Bredow, 1992, p. 291, see also Adam 2012). Nevertheless, Ingesson et al. (2018) find no 
evidence in support of the position that conscription reduces coup risk in democracies. Hence, 
there is no clear link between regime type, conscription, and praetorian tendencies within the 
armed forces in the existing literature. Having said that, conscription in principle goes against 
certain essential features of coup proofing. Whereas governments exploit socioreligious 
cleavages and sectarian recruitment processes to isolate the armed forces from the rest of 
society (Brooks, 2019, p. 389), conscription has the opposite effect since it increases the 
military’s overall visibility and improves its relations with other social groups (Gandhi, 2008; 
Khuri and Obermeyer, 1974; Vasquez and Powell, 2019). On that account, the study 
contributes to the literature on civil-military relations by shedding light to previously 
unrecognized positive and negative side effects of conscription. Particularly, along with Pr. 
Böhmelt and Dr. Bakaki we find that European countries with a conscription-based recruitment 
system tend to be characterized by higher levels of support for the military. Additionally, the 
study examines the effect of conscription on coup risk but, unlike Ingesson et al. (2018), its 
scope is not limited to democracies since autocracies and anocracies are also included in the 
analysis. Most pertinently, I find robust evidence that conscription increases the probability of 
a coup attempt in anocratic regimes. 
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  Continuing, in a detailed examination of Baathist regimes, Makara concludes that neither 
Hafez al-Assad or Saddam Hussein experienced a coup, even after decisive military defeats, 
because both dictators had implemented meticulous coup proofing policies that had rendered 
coup attempts from the military impossible (2013, p. 335). Coup proofing involves the 
exploitation of ethnic, religious, and tribalist ties to fill the military ranks with loyal 
subordinates, a promotion system based on loyalty towards the political leadership instead of 
merit, the imposition of absolute and direct control from the political leadership over the 
military, the formation of paramilitaries to counterbalance the army, and the fragmentation of 
the military apparatus into rival organizations (O’Donnell, 1973; Nordlinger, 1977; Janowitz, 
1977; Horowitz, 1985; Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011, 
2012; Goldstone, 2011; Feaver, 1992; Nassif, 2015; Singh, 2014; Brown, Fariss, and 
McMahon, 2016; Albrecht and Eibl, 2018; Brooks, 2019; Dragu and Przeworski, 2019; 
Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster, 2019, De Bruin, 2018, 2020).  
  Accordingly, structural coup proofing captures the fractionation of the military apparatus in 
rival organizations and the establishment of pro-government paramilitary units to 
counterbalance the regular army (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015, p. 160-161; Belkin and Schofer, 
2003:598; Powell, 2012; Driscoll, 2015; Albrecht and Eibl, 2018). Hence, if army officers 
attempt a coup against the government, they would have to overcome the pro-government 
paramilitaries. As a consequence, when paramilitary units are present in a state, the costs of 
fighting in a potential coup attempt are significantly increased. Importantly, in many instances 
the pro-government paramilitaries receive better training and have access to more advanced 
equipment than the regular army thus further decreasing the chances of a successful coup 
attempt by military officers. To give an example, Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard was 
better equipped than the conventional Iraqi military (Quinlivan 1999, p. 145). However, coup 
proofing produces a series of pivotal negative externalities, like decreased military 
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effectiveness due to disruptions in military training, command hierarchy, and equipment supply 
of the regular armed forces (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011). Additionally, the extensive 
fragmentation of the security apparatus or even changes in an army’s ethnic composition may 
result in a reactionary coup by military officers (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015; Harkness, 2016). 
For instance, Idi Amin successfully expelled Milton Obote’s government in Uganda as the 
security apparatus was incapable of effectively responding to the coup attempt due to extreme 
fragmentation of military authority and the absence of a commanding paramilitary force loyal 
to the government (Decalo, 1989, p. 10-11). Similarly, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkruma 
was deposed by a preemptive Ewe-led military coup in 1966 because of his attempts to 
establish co-ethnic units and pro-government paramilitary organizations (Harkness, 2018, p. 
147; Austin, 1985; Hettne, 1980). The presence of paramilitaries may also incentivize extensive 
fighting among the warring factions and thus escalate coups into full-scale civil wars (De Bruin, 
2020).  
  Nevertheless, while the literature stresses the importance of counterbalancing for regime 
survival, the role of intelligence agencies on coup proofing, in particular the secret police, has 
not received similar attention despite operating differently than conventional paramilitaries. 
For Barros, authoritarian leaders supervise the entire state apparatus “by placing intelligence 
agents within the state hierarchy to monitor subordinates” (2016, p.  962-67). While 
paramilitaries, like presidential guards, imitate the organization, training, and operations of the 
regular army, secret police are intelligence services that utilize violent police tactics and 
surveillance operations to neutralize an autocrat’s political rivals. The operational repertoire of 
the secret police comprises of “searches, arrests, interrogation, torture, and indefinite 
detention” to extract information (Plate and Darvi, 1982, p.  11), as well as intelligence 
gathering operations to monitor dissidents (Plate and Darvi, 1982, Greitens, 2016, p. 45). 
Therefore, secret police forces rely on espionage to intervene in a coup’s planning and 
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coordination phase, whereas standard paramilitary units use conventional military means to 
increase the costs of a coup during its execution phase. Consequently, it is imperative to 
disaggregate the effect of secret police on the probability of a coup attempt from other 
paramilitary units. 
  With that in mind, the study contributes to the literature of civil-military relations by 
highlighting the previously overlooked influence of conscription and secret police on coup risk 
and public support for the armed forces. Specifically, conscription is found to increase public 
support for the armed forces in European democracies as well as the probability of a coup 
attempt in anocracies. On the other hand, secret police are found to decrease the likelihood of 
a coup attempt in autocratic regimes. However, the thesis’ overall contribution is not limited 
to its findings. The study further advances the civil-military relations literature by expanding 
existing, widely used data sets. To be precise, I expanded Toronto’s conscription variable 
(2017) based on information from the CIA Factbook data on conscription (2021) to include 
information from 2001 up to 2018. What’s more, you can find in the study the first large-n 
variable on secret police organizations with information from 1950 to 2018 in authoritarian 
regimes across the world which was constructed based on information from qualitative or 
small-n quantitative studies. Therefore, the study contributes to the civil-military relations 
literature through its findings but also by expanding existing data or introducing new data on 
secret police organizations that may further facilitate the study of autocratic survival.  
  Correspondingly, the thesis’ findings bring forth significant policy implications. While all-
volunteer forces may be more effective than conscription-based ones, the increased public 
support for the armed forces due to conscription may clear the way for the government to 
increase defense spending or initiate military alliances and military interventions without 
strong public opposition. Additionally, while conscription supplies the armed forces with cheap 
manpower and weakens parochial loyalties (Meyerle et al., 2011, p. 3), anocratic governments 
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must carefully design its application and monitor its implementation to avoid risks associated 
with an increased probability of a coup d’état. Moreover, the study highlights the fact that 
secret police improve the survival prospects of an autocratic leader by decreasing the 
probability of a government turn over via a coup. Not only secret police units decrease coup 
risk, but secret police agents are found to employ intelligence-oriented coup proofing 
operations, like informant networks, that set them apart from other paramilitary organizations 
and are intertwined with political repression and human rights abuse. Therefore, the study 
produces notable policy implications that profoundly affect how we consider the cost-benefit 
analysis of a conscription-based army compared to an all-volunteer army in addition to 
exploring the role of secret police in an autocratic regime. 
 
1.2 Chapter Summary 
Following a holistic overview of the literature on civil-military relations, with emphasis on 
coup d’état, I present a summary of each of the thesis’ three chapters as well as their 
contribution to the literature and potential policy implications arising from the findings. 
  The first chapter2 examines how conscription increases public support for the armed forces in 
European democracies. We argue that conscription, more so than voluntary-recruitment 
systems, can reach out to and socialize larger segments of the society in line with the military’s 
values. This is done along a direct and an indirect path: first, personal involvement with the 
armed forces tends to be linked to more support for the military. As conscription reaches more 
segments of the society than all-volunteer forces, support in the wider public should be more 
strongly pronounced. Second, there is a spill-over effect from individuals directly exposed to 
the military to third persons, an indirect effect. The increased interaction and interconnection 
                                                             
2 The chapter is co-authored with Pr. Zorzeta Bakaki and Pr. Tobias Böhmelt and it is published at the 
Defence and Peace Economics journal.  
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of the armed forces and the society is expected to facilitate the ideational identification between 
the two and, in the end, to lead to more positive views of the armed forces. Using a unique data 
set comprising information for 34 European states in 1997–2017, we find robust evidence that 
countries with conscription-based recruitment tend to be characterized by higher levels of 
support for the military. This result greatly adds to the debate about the type of military-
recruitment system countries should implement: abolishing compulsory military service is 
usually seen as increasing efficiency and performance; yet, a positive – and previously 
unknown – externality of conscription that we identify is a higher degree of support by the 
public, which is pivotal for, inter alia, defence-policy implementation, military interventions 
abroad, budget considerations, or the participation in military alliances. 
  In the second chapter, I investigate how conscription affects the probability of a coup attempt. 
This chapter suggests that conscription produces an unappreciated side-effect in domestic 
politics as it increases the likelihood of coup d’état in anocratic regimes. Utilizing data from 
1950 to 2018, the study measures the impact of conscription on coup risk in anocracies and 
non-anocracies and provides significant evidence that conscription increases the probability of 
a coup attempt in anocracies. It is worth noting that I do not argue that conscripts stage military 
coups. Instead, I advance the argument that conscription as an institution increases coup risk 
in anocracies because it improves the ties of the armed forces with society and enables the 
general public or interest groups to collaborate with the armed forces against the regime. This 
chapter furthers our understanding on the prospects of military intervention in politics and 
demonstrates how interest groups may use conscription to overcome collective action 
restrictions present in anocracies. 
  In the third chapter, I bring attention to the coup proofing capabilities of the secret police. 
Secret police are a key institution of the authoritarian security apparatus, but we know little 
about how they affect civil-military relations. I argue in this chapter that autocracies with secret 
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police are less coup prone versus other autocracies. Secret police disrupt a coup’s planning and 
coordination phase. Specifically, secret police agents employ surveillance operations and spy 
networks to decrease the willingness and opportunity of military officers to organize a coup 
attempt. To measure the effect of secret police on coup risk I introduce a novel variable on 
secret police organizations in autocracies for years 1950 to 2018. I find significant evidence 
that autocracies with secret police are less likely to experience a coup d’état compared to other 




2 Public Support for the Armed Forces: The Role of Conscription 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the “levée en masse” that originated during the French Revolutionary Wars, modern 
conscription, i.e., the compulsory enlistment of people in the military, has been employed by 
countries across the globe as the basis of large and powerful military organizations (Woloch, 
1986; Krebs, 2004). For a long time, conscription was the primary approach for many countries 
to meet the demands of their armed forces for active – and rather cheap – personnel, to create 
a sufficiently large reserve pool, and to deter foreign adversaries (Poutvaara and Wagener, 
2007a,b; Horowitz et al., 2017). Over the last few decades, however, to a large degree since 
the end of the Cold War, more and more states abolished conscription and, instead, 
implemented professional militaries with all‐volunteer forces, which derive their manpower 
from volunteers. Among other factors, domestic and international ones, a higher degree of 
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inefficiency3 and ineffectiveness of conscript-based armed forces are reasons frequently 
brought forward for such a change (see, e.g., Warner and Asch, 2001; Jehn and Selden, 2008; 
Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam, 2011; MacLean, 2008; Bove and Cavatorta, 2012; Bauer et al., 
2014; Asal et al., 2017; Cohn and Toronto, 2017; Toronto, 2017; Ingesson et al., 2018; 
Kestnbaum, 2002; Torun, 2019).  
While not necessarily questioning these arguments about efficiency and performance in 
favor of professional militaries, we argue that conscription might be linked to a positive – and 
previously unknown – externality: a higher degree of support for the armed forces among the 
general public. Eventually, our theory suggests that conscription is more likely than voluntary-
recruitment systems to reach out to and socialize larger segments of the society in line with the 
military’s values. Conscription deepens social and professional interaction, which reduces 
institutional, professional, and ideological cleavages between society and the military (Gandhi, 
2008, p. 50; Moskos, 1970). This is done along a direct and an indirect path: first, personal 
involvement with the armed forces tends to be linked to more support for the military. As 
conscription reaches more segments of the society than all‐volunteer forces, support in the 
wider public should be more strongly pronounced. Second, there is a spill-over effect from 
individuals directly exposed to the military to third persons, an indirect effect. The increased 
interaction and interconnection of the armed forces and the society is expected to facilitate the 
ideational identification between the two and, in the end, to lead to more positive views of the 
armed forces. Conscription is thus likely to have a substantial impact on how society interacts 
with and views the armed forces, with implications for how policymakers implement defense 
policies. 
                                                             
3 Compulsory service distorts the allocation of resources inside the military due to the oversupply of 
cheap unskilled labor (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1967). In addition, conscription is supposed to lead to an 
economic output loss due to misallocation of resources (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2007a,b; Warner and 
Asch, 2001, pp. 172-173). However, there are also counterarguments. Consider, for example, minority 
groups such as the Druze population in Israel. Conscription has a positive effect on future earnings of 
Druze men as a result of networking that conscription allows for (Asali, 2019). 
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Previous studies have examined public support for the military, but have done so less 
systematically, partly too descriptively, and mostly focused on a limited set of countries, which 
may have limited the generalizability of their findings. Hines et al. (2015), for instance, point 
to the importance of public opinion in supporting the military and their missions, but merely 
describe the public’s view of the British military and for deployments abroad as part of the War 
on Terror. This study lacks an explanation for why this might be the case, though. Horowitz 
and Levendusky (2011) show that conscription can be linked to lower support for war, but they 
do not examine the more general attitude toward the armed forces as such. 
We discuss more studies mirroring these in the next section, but by presenting robust 
evidence that countries with conscription-based recruitment systems tend to be characterized 
by a higher level of support for the military, we add to the academic and policy debates about 
the consequences of conscription. En route, we also contribute to discussions about whether to 
implement – or reinstate – conscription in the first place. Citizens’, and voters’, views set 
important constraints on policymakers in democratic forms of government and successful 
competition for office remains to be driven by what the larger public wants (e.g., Downs, 1957; 
Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). Therefore, democratic leaders have an incentive to take into 
account the public’s views about policy issues. Without public support, the chances to retain 
office may decrease. On one hand, public support for the armed forces is a key determinant for 
policymakers’ office-seeking. On the other hand, and arguably even more so, it is pivotal for 
defense-policy implementation, military interventions abroad, budget considerations, or the 
participation in military alliances. Our research then offers direct and relevant guidance for 
policy considerations in countries like Germany, where reinstating military conscription after 
having scrapped conscription in the past is openly discussed4. 
                                                             




2.2 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Conscription on Public Opinion 
Our central claim is that conscription-based recruitment systems induce that larger parts of the 
society are directly and indirectly involved in contributing to the staffing and functioning of 
the armed forces (Feaver and Kohn, 2001; Bacevich 2013). Wider societal segments can thus 
be reached and socialized5 along military values, and this leads to the outcome that conscription 
is plausibly more strongly linked to high levels of public support for the military.  
This argument is based on the idea that the end of compulsory military service may be linked 
to lower engagement between the armed forces and society, subsequently contributing to the 
emergence of a so-called “civil-military gap” (e.g., Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., 2012). 
Specifically, for example, Brooks (2019) suggests that ending conscription in 1973 and the 
following lower number of citizens who directly served or were indirectly exposed to the 
military explains the increasing civil-military gap in the US. Forster (2006) observes that 
abolishing conscription in large parts of Europe has not only lowered the interaction between 
the armed forces and society, but, has also generated a “without me” attitude toward the 
military (Forster, 2006, p. 97). Deverell et al. (2015, p. 389) point into the same direction, i.e., 
a strong socialization impact of conscript-based militaries and a higher degree of reaching out 
to society, when stating that the Swedish armed forces were “anchored in society by ways of 
public education, according to the motto “public anchorage.” […] This was largely achieved 
through conscription.” Strachan (2010) argues that compulsory military service, although 
historically the exception in the UK, softened the divide between the armed forces and the 
British society. Finally, Vennesson (2003) reports that younger and urban individuals 
somewhat distanced themselves from the military and its values since conscription ended in 
                                                             
5 Socialization is defined as the “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community” (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). The “community” in our case is the military. Norms or values are 
defined as “standard[s] of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). 
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France in 1996. This civil-military gap and the need of citizens to “experience military life” 
motivated President Macron’s efforts to gradually re-establish compulsory national service in 
2018 (Zaretsky 2018). Even outside Europe, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar established 
conscription for the first time in 2014 and 2015, respectively, to encourage patriotic sentiments 
and raise the prestige of the armed forces (Barany 2018, p. 133): conscription in the Gulf 
successfully inculcated patriotism among the youth and is “one of the key instruments of 
forging” a cohesive nation.  
In what follows, we take these arguments one step further by suggesting that conscription 
has a positive – and previously unknown – externality in that it is associated with a higher level 
of support by the public for the armed forces. In shedding light on how this type of military 
recruitment shapes people’s understanding, beliefs, and preferences toward the military, we 
identify two main channels of influence from conscription to public military support: a direct 
and an indirect one.  
In terms of the direct effect, conscription recruits large parts of the society for the armed 
forces who then acquire first-hand experience on the functioning of the military apparatus, its 
corporate identity, and the overall culture and ethos. The segments of the society that 
compulsory services reach out to and, in turn, socialize are likely to be larger than in the case 
of all‐volunteer forces. Familiarity with the military apparatus makes individuals believe in the 
need and importance of the armed forces, which plausibly raises their own level of support for 
the military. Citizens are transformed into soldiers primarily through military training and 
socialization (see also Checkel, 2005; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998)6. Soldiers then become 
accustomed with the core principles of the institution and are exposed to the corporate interests 
and ideology of the institution (Finer, 1988, p. 41; Geddes, 1999, p. 126; Eagleton, 1991). 
                                                             
6 Discussing conscription in the Soviet Union, Eichler (2012, p. 21) denotes that the primary function 
of military service was “that of educator and socializer [...] a key tool in the proper ideological 
socialization of Soviet men.” 
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Extensive training shapes the civic identity of recruits along military norms such as social 
responsibility and the professional identity of the armed forces (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 
1960; Nordlinger, 1977, pp. 14-16; Moore, 2009, p. 75). This facilitates the development of a 
group mentality and a sense of comradeship (Janowitz, 1960; Wong et al., 2003, pp. 9-11; 
Varin, 2015, p. 44). The exposure to new role models in the military prompts the draftees to 
reconfigure their identity (Elder, 1986, p. 236); conscripts develop a sense of belonging as they 
socialize within and with the military environment. This shared “education” in the military 
likely enhances the view toward the institution as more legitimate (Adams and Charrad, 2011, 
p. 7). Johnston (2001, p. 493) refers to this process more generally as “persuasion,” i.e., one 
socialization mechanism where interactions among actors lead to a real change of individual 
opinions and attitudes (see also Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2016, p. 51).  
In addition, social influence is a second mechanism of socialization, which does not require 
a change of preferences, but induces norm-conforming behavior through “the distribution of 
social rewards and punishments” (Johnston, 2001, p. 499). Regarding the latter, i.e., 
punishments, draft evasion frequently constitutes a direct threat to the political status quo and 
the legitimacy of conscription as a civic institution (Conway, 2012, p. 19). It may be 
accompanied by a social stigma and could be prosecuted by military and civilian courts (Varin, 
2015, p. 15). Conversely, individuals who have fulfilled their compulsory military service 
obtain a certain degree of social prestige7. In this context, Eichler (2012, p. 2) reports that public 
opposition against conscription by males is perceived as “unmanly” behavior by large parts of 
the Russian society. As a result, there is a significant ethical acceptance attached to military 
service as a civic obligation, while ex-conscripts support the institution that awarded them with 
social prestige (see also Johnston, 2001).  
                                                             
7 For instance, in pre-1967 Greece, service in the armed forces was dominated by the “pallikari-leventis-
philotimo self-image syndrome” of social and cultural origin, which declared the high levels of moral 
virtue and code of honor surrounding service men (Kourvetaris, 1971, p. 1046). 
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The crucial point of this direct avenue for how compulsory military service influences public 
support is then that conscription, in comparison to volunteer-recruitment systems, is able to 
reach out, draft, and eventually influence and socialize more elements and segments of the 
society, thus enabling the propagation of military norms and values more strongly into the rest 
of the social web through “citizens in uniform.”8 Conscription in the Turkish Armed Forces 
illustrates this as well: 53.1% of a recent survey’s respondents claim they expected to re-enlist 
in the army with “liking” the military being the most prominent reason (38%) (Yildirim and 
Erdinç, 2007, pp. 17-18). Poutvaara and Wagener (2009, p. 15) emphasize consistently that as 
conscription potentially reaches large parts of the society, it provides the armed forces with 
“the means to convey the importance of national defense and security to the minds of young 
draftees.”  
Next to the direct influence of conscription on public support for the armed forces, primarily 
via individuals’ experience, we also contend that there is an indirect mechanism. Conscription 
draws recruits from virtually all social and parochial groups into the military. This, in turn, 
enables the proliferation of the military ethos and culture to the entire social web (Khuri and 
Obermeyer, 1974, p. 62). That being said, it is also likely that the families, other relatives, and 
friends of recruits are exposed to military values during and after the service of conscripts and 
become familiar with the role and purpose of the armed forces. In turn, conscripts operate as a 
conduit that propagates military principles, mindset, and ethos to the rest of society by 
interacting with their social circles. For instance, by sharing their experience in the armed 
forces or by talking about the military identity, they function as “brokers” (e.g., Hafner-Burton 
et al., 2009) between the military and other segments in the society, which may increase the 
                                                             
8 Or “Staatsbürger in Uniform” as the guiding principle of the German Armed Forces as developed 
during the time of conscription. 
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degree of identification – and support – of the latter with and for the armed forces (see also 
Goodpaster and Huntington, 1977, p. 23).  
Clearly, the indirect channel via influencing family members, other relatives, or friends is 
given in all-volunteer forces as well, but, similar to our argument above, the potential to reach 
out to more segments of the society is more strongly given for conscription as more people 
from virtually all segments of the population are drafted with a compulsory military service. 
With conscription, every part of society contributes to the armed forces rather than a specific 
social crowd and groups across the entire social spectrum are incorporated into the military 
(Posen, 1993, p. 88). Military organizations that are based on conscription then likely have 
links with a wider social spectrum, and more social groups develop an “in-group mentality” 
toward the armed forces. The wider public may more strongly identify with the goals and 
activities of the military than in the case of all-volunteer forces, thus, increasing popular 
support towards the military.  
In sum, we claim that conscription leads to a higher level of public support for the armed 
forces via a direct and an indirect mechanism. The former pertains to the socialization of 
conscripts as such, while the latter refers to recruits functioning as brokers who influence then 
wider parts of the society. These two avenues may apply to professional and all-voluntary 
organizations as well9, but are potentially more strongly pronounced in the case of conscription 
where more personnel, across more diverse societal segments, is exposed to, influenced by, 
and socialized according to the armed forces. Along these, lines hypothesize that if states have 
conscription, the level of public support for the armed forces is likely to be higher. 
 
                                                             
9 Finally, there is a likely self-selection effect given only for all-voluntary forces: individuals choose to 
enrol, potentially as they already identify with the military, its values, and ethos. Self-selection is not a 
theoretical or an empirical issue in the case of conscription, however, where individuals are drafted by 




2.3.1 Data and Method 
We have compiled a unique data set comprising information on public opinion on the armed 
forces, conscription, and a series of control variables for 34 European states between 1997 and 
2017. The sample’s country-time coverage is driven by data availability of the core variables of 
interest, most crucially public support for the military, which we operationalize via trust toward 
the armed forces. The country-year is the unit of analysis in this time-series cross-section data set 
(N=542 observations). 
Our dependent variable, the public’s trust in the armed forces, is based on the Eurobarometer 
survey10. As of Eurobarometer 48 (completed fieldwork in 1997), the Eurobarometer has 
consistently, and for a sufficiently large set of countries, included “the army” as an option for the 
following item: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not 
to trust it.” Trust is an indicator that is directly tied to people’s agreement with and, thus, support 
for an institution, its functioning, ideology, ethos, and culture (see also Devos et al., 2002). After 
dropping the “don’t know” answers and missing values, we use this item to code the share of 





                                                             
10 Available online at: https://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp. Note that Iceland is part of our sample, 
but does not maintain a standing army. Omitting this country from our analysis does not alter the 






















Figure 1. Trust in the Armed Forces in Europe over Time 
Note: The variable Trust in Armed Forces captures the percent of the population that stated they trust the 
army as an institution.  
 
 
To this end, we aggregated the individual-level information to the country level by averaging 
across respondents. We employ the average value per country-year in case more than one 
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Eurobarometer survey existed in a given year and linearly interpolate missing years between 
countries. The final variable theoretically ranges in [0; 1], with higher values pertaining to a larger 
share of respondents who trust and, thus, support the military. For example, in the Eurobarometer 
88.3 (2017), 71.5 percent of the Spanish respondents or 93.4 percent of the Danish respondents 
mentioned that they trust the army as an institution. The final item’s mean value is 0.744 (standard 
deviation of 0.111) with a minimum of 0.313 and a maximum of 0.958. Figure 1 plots the public 
trust toward the armed forces for all states included in our analysis across the years for which 
data are available. 
Given the scale of our dependent variable, we estimate OLS regression models with panel-
level heteroskedastic errors to address country-specific idiosyncrasies11. To address temporal 
autocorrelation in our time-series cross-section data, we incorporate a log-transformed year 
variable as public opinion may follow a linear trend over time. Adding this variable further 
ensures that we can rule out a mere trend in the data as opposed to a systematic effect of 
conscription on trust toward the armed forces. We also specify for the model estimations that, 
within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation and that the coefficient of this process is 
common to all panels. Finally, the appendix presents models that are based on random and 
country-fixed effects to further control systematically for countries’ common exposure to similar 
exogenous (unit-level) factors and time-invariant, but idiosyncratic factors affecting people’s 
trust in the military. 
For our main explanatory factor, conscription, we employ a binary and a count variable in 
separate models. First, based on Toronto (2017; see also Asal et al., 2017), there is a binary 
variable coding whether a country’s military recruitment system is based on conscription (1) 
                                                             
11 For instance, the military is more embedded in some states, while others could have an ex-ante lower 
level of support for the armed forces due to, e.g., historical reasons. To illustrate this, consider the trust 
in the armed forces, which is at around 86 percent in the UK on average, but only at around 77.5 percent 




or volunteer (0). As described in the codebook of Toronto (2017), “the method of recruitment 
is how a state satisfies its military manpower requirements. It is considered to be ‘conscription’ 
if the principal means of induction into the [active (not reserve)] military is the use of force, be 
it through legal means (e.g., conscription) or extralegal means (e.g., impressment), or where 
individuals cannot realistically say ‘no’ to military service. The method of recruitment is 
‘volunteer’ if individuals enter the military as a matter of choice.”12 In our sample, 40 percent 
of all country-years are characterized by conscription (standard deviation of 0.491). Second, 
Toronto (2017; see also Asal et al., 2017) also provide information on the duration of an 
enlistment system in use or when it was changed. We re-coded this to create a variable counting 
the years since the last conscription-year, i.e., we capture the period of time in which all-
volunteer forces exist in a country.”13 This second core explanatory variable has a mean value 
of 2.78 years (standard deviation of 4.09) and ranges between 0 and 16 years. 
We also control for a series of other influences that may well be correlated with trust in the 
military at the domestic level. Specifically, we consider variables such as demographics, left-
right self-placement, and country-level economic characteristics that enjoy near-consensus 
support in the literature as main drivers of public opinion. First, we control for the position of 
the median voter using Eurobarometer data on respondents’ left-right self-placement on a scale 
                                                             
12 Moreover, according to the codebook of Toronto (2017), “[s]tates that allow for conscientious 
objection can still be considered to use conscription as the method of recruitment, as long as 
conscription is the principal means of satisfying the military manpower requirement. States that use a 
selective service system (e.g., a non-universal draft that distinguishes inductees from non-inductees 
based on economic necessity) are considered to use conscription as the method of recruitment as long 
as the military manpower requirement is still typically satisfied via the draft. Conscription is considered 
the principal means for satisfying the military manpower requirement as long as a nontrivial number of 
recruits are enlisted through force.” 
13 We only consider this variable when constraining the sample to countries that actually changed their 
recruitment system at some point in Toronto (2017). States that always had a volunteer system in place 
during the sample period are omitted from analyses that rely on our second core explanatory variable. 
This approach helps us to exploit more thoroughly variation in conscription as we not only examine 




of 1 (left) to 10 (right) (Schmitt and Schotz, 2005), using Tukey’s method (1977) to calculate 
the median from the individual-level data. In our sample, this variable has a mean value of 
5.325 (standard deviation of 0.508). 
Second, we include two variables i.e., unemployment and population size, which are log-
transformed to account for their skewed distributions, from the World Bank Development 
Indicators. First, public opinion may be linked to states’ economic development. We use 
unemployment, which is defined as the logged total number of unemployed people as a share 
of the total labor force14. Second, population size is likely to be linked to the degree of 
preference heterogeneity in a society, which in turn could affect the public’s trust in the 
military. We rely on a country’s midyear total population, which counts all residents regardless 
of legal status or citizenship (except for refugees not permanently settled). 
Before discussing our empirical findings, note that there might be an endogeneity issue to 
the extent that causality not only flows from conscription to public opinion, but also the other 
way round. For example, it may be plausible that public opinion has influenced whether states 
have conscription systems in the first place and whether they abolished them or not. However, 
theoretically, the study of conscription has taught us that whether a country has conscription or 
a different recruitment system is most often a result of socio-historical and geo-political reasons 
– public opinion is – if at all – a negligible factor (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2009; Mjoset and 
Van Holde, 2002; Asal et al., 2017; Moskos et al., 2000). Empirically, we estimated models 
with fixed and random effects that help addressing states’ self-selection into conscription based 
on (unobservable) unit-level or idiosyncratic influences, e.g., by capturing a country’s 
individual threat level that may shape which military recruitment system is in place, and the 
results are presented in the appendix. 
                                                             
14 Employing the level of GDP or GDP per capita instead produces virtually identical results. We prefer 




2.3.2 Empirical Analysis 
Table 1 summarizes our main models. Models 1-2 are “naive” estimations that merely comprise 
the year trend and the respective core explanatory variable but omit the controls. The latter are 
added in Models 3-4. We omit the controls in the first two estimations to demonstrate that our 
main findings are not affected by their inclusion or exclusion. Interpreting the results in Table 
1 is straightforward as the entries are marginal effects. The corresponding substantive-effects 
plots are presented in Figure 2.  
Conscription is positively signed and statistically significant in Models 1 and 3 of Table 1. 
Adding or dropping control variables does not affect the robustness of this finding. Similarly, 
and as expected, Volunteer Years is associated with a negatively signed coefficient, 
highlighting that more years passed since conscription are systematically associated with lower 
levels of trust in the military. Thus, we obtain robust evidence for our theoretical arguments: 
conscription does influence public opinion on the armed forces. Direct and indirect 
mechanisms surrounding compulsory military service seem to induce that conscription indeed 
heightens support for the armed forces, which is in line with our theoretical expectations.  
 Substantively, consider Figure 2 that depicts the marginal effect of Conscription and the 
predicted values of Trust in Armed Forces, our dependent variable, for values of Volunteer 
Years while holding all other variables constant at their means. On one hand, the left panel in 
Figure 2 emphasizes that conscription positively influences trust in the military. On average, 
the trust in the army as an institution is about 2 percentage points higher in countries with 
conscription-based recruitment systems. On the other hand, the point estimate of the predicted 
values decreases from about 76 percent to less than 70 percent when raising Volunteer Years 
to 16 years. That is, for 16 years with a volunteer system, the trust in the armed forces falls on 
average by about 7 percentage points.  
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 Linking these findings to our theory, we find strong support for our expectations. Although 
conscription-based recruitment systems may seem less efficient and effective than volunteer-
recruitment processes (see, e.g., Warner and Asch, 2001; Jehn and Selden, 2008; Horowitz, 
Simpson, and Stam, 2011; MacLean, 2008; Bove and Cavatorta, 2012; Bauer et al., 2014; Asal 
et al., 2017; Cohn and Toronto, 2017; Toronto, 2017; Ingesson et al., 2018; Kestnbaum, 2002; 
Torun, 2019), conscription reaches – directly and indirectly – broader aspects of the society, 
more deeply influences its members, and more strongly socializes the public than all-volunteer 
forces. 
 
Table 1. Conscription and Public Support for the Armed Forces 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Conscription  0.0198**   0.0191**  
 (0.0095)  (0.0097)  
Volunteer Years  
 
  -0.0044**   -0.0037* 
  (0.0020)  (0.0021) 
Population (ln)   0.0077 -0.0031 
   (0.0084) (0.0069) 
Unemployment (ln)     -0.0406***   -0.0321*** 
   (0.0095) (0.0112) 
Median Voter   -0.0005 -0.0019 
   (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Temporal Trend 2.0117 4.3869  4.3585** 3.7471 
 (2.1794) (2.7849) (2.1001) (2.8500) 
Constant -14.5691 -32.6026  -32.4440** -27.6075 
 (16.5752) (21.1755) (15.9716) (21.6941) 
Observations 542 378 527 378 
RMSE 0.0435 0.0391 0.0426 0.03891 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
  
 The “citizen in uniform” as a guiding principle of the German Armed Forces thus does have 
its validity, and our research shows that the intentions originally behind the use and 
development of this term have apparently been fruitful not only in Germany, but also other, 
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conscript-based countries. These findings provide important lessons. Public opinion on the 
armed forces is, therefore, likely shaped by conscription – a recruitment approach that has been 
deemed inefficient and ineffective in the past (see, e.g., Warner and Asch, 2001; Jehn and 
Selden, 2008; Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam, 2011; MacLean, 2008; Bauer et al., 2014; Asal 
et al., 2017; Cohn and Toronto, 2017; Toronto, 2017; Ingesson et al., 2018; Kestnbaum, 2002; 
Torun, 2019). Our work does not necessarily question that more professional-style, all-
volunteer armed forces lower costs and enhance effectiveness, but we do show that 
conscription has a positive side-effect, which has been previously overlooked but is one that is 
crucial – especially for democratic policymakers. 
Finally, the results concerning the control covariates are mixed. On one hand, the temporal-
trend variable is positively signed throughout the models in Table 2, but only reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance in one estimation. Thus, there seems to be at least 
some support for temporal trend in our data. On the other hand, Unemployment (ln) is the only 
substantive predictor that exerts a consistently significant impact on our outcome variable. 
Substantively, for a 10-percent increase in unemployment, the trust in the armed forces is lower 























Figure 2. Substantive Quantities of Interest 
Note: Dashed lines pertain to the 90 percent confidence intervals; estimates are based on Models 1-2.  
 
We probe the robustness of our findings with several additional analyses, which are 
presented and discussed in the supporting information. First, next to statistical significance, we 
assess the out-of-sample heuristics of our core predictors to demonstrate that Conscription and 
Volunteer Years have predictive power as well. Second, we estimate a series of random-effects 
and fixed-effects models to control more thoroughly for unobserved country-specific 
characteristics. Second, as the public’s view toward the military may have fundamentally 
changed with the 9/11 events and the subsequent War on Terror, we re-estimate our core 
models while incorporating a binary variable distinguishing the period before and after the 
2001 terrorist attacks. Finally, some values of Trust in Armed Forces are linearly interpolated. 
We omit these interpolated values for a robustness check and only employ actually observed 





Many states moved away from conscription and implemented all-volunteer forces over the past 
few decades, especially after the end of the Cold War. The primary motivation behind such 
policy changes is frequently to achieve more efficiency and a higher level of performance of 
the armed forces. We largely subscribe to these arguments but sought to shed light on a 
previously unknown consequence of conscription that may spark a new debate about the type 
of recruitment system countries should rely on. Specifically, we theoretically argued and 
presented robust empirical evidence that countries with compulsory military-recruitment 
systems tend to be characterized by a higher level of public support for the armed forces. 
According to our theory, there are direct and indirect mechanisms at play that make it likely 
that conscription and more support for the military are positively related to each other. The 
empirical findings, based on data from the Eurobarometer surveys since 1997, crucially support 
these claims. A series of robustness checks presented in the appendix further increases the 
confidence in the validity of our results. 
The policy implications of our work are both straightforward and important. The decision 
to implement a more professional, all-volunteer force may certainly be driven by considerations 
of efficiency and effectiveness, but conscription does have other, and previously overlooked, 
advantages as well. Clearly, the access to a large pool of cheap labor is one of the benefits of a 
compulsory service, but an effect we identify with our research is a higher level of public 
support for the armed forces. In particular democratic leaders will be interested in this finding: 
not only are their fate in office and electoral success driven by the views of the general 
audience, but also the successful implementation of policies as such. All else equal, the 
likelihood of military interventions abroad, budget implementations, or the participation in 
military alliances crucially hinge on whether the public approves of this or not. Democratic 
decision-makers may refrain from implementing unpopular policies as this might affect their 
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chances for re-election. But if a sufficient amount of public support for the armed forces is 
present, increasing the defense budget or selling the participation in alliances or interventions 
abroad to the domestic audience could be facilitated – and conscription seemingly does raise 
public support for the armed forces. 
Several avenues for research do exist. We outline three of them. First, future works may 
focus on and examine more thoroughly the conditions under which conscription leads to more 
support in the public. By the same token, our quantitative research design cannot distinguish 
among the two mechanisms we outlined. It thus seems an effort worth making to dig deeper 
and, arguably with more qualitative designs, unpack the avenues under which compulsory 
military service leads to more popular support. Second, our empirical focus lies on Europe, 
which is primarily driven by data availability. Our theory has, in principle, a much broader 
geographical scope and may apply to other, particularly democratic countries as well. Data 
limitations prevent us from analyzing more data here, but additional data collection efforts 
outside of Europe could overcome this issue. Third, due to the lack of data, we cannot 
disaggregate conscription systems. Some aspects may vary significantly among conscription 
systems. For example, states could design conscription systems not to be broadly representative 
to keep opportunity costs and political opposition from key groups low. While this particular 
problem may not be an issue for our sample of well-established European democracies, 
conscription could be coupled with alternative service in such a way that military service is 
nearly self-selecting – and this has likely applied to countries like Germany (see Haltiner, 
1998). While the fixed-effects estimation in the appendix deals with this issue to some extent, 
it may be an effort worth making and disaggregate conscription systems along various criteria. 
The lack of coding in existing data prevent us from doing this, but future data-collection efforts 
could help in this regard. 
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We conclude by summarizing that conscription is significantly and systematically linked to 
a higher degree of public support for the armed forces. This result greatly adds to the debate 
about the type of military-recruitment system countries should implement. A positive – and 
previously unknown – externality of conscription that we identify is a higher degree of support 
by the public, which is pivotal for defense-policy implementation, military interventions 
abroad, budget considerations, or the participation in military alliances, among others. 
 
 
2.5 Chapter One Appendix 
In this appendix, we provide a series of additional analyses that complement and further support 
the main article’s findings. These include: 
A.1. We examine the out-of-sample prediction power of our main specification. 
 
A.2. Random-effects and fixed-effects models. 
 
A.3. We control for the 9/11 terrorist attacks and corresponding, system-wide influences. 
 
A.4. We focus on non-interpolated data and only employ actually observed country-years. 
 
A.5. We added a series of controls for military engagement and threats. 
 
A.6. A regression model based on three-stage least-squares. 
 
A.7. Using the World Values Survey, we extend our analysis to non-European and non-
democratic countries. 
 





Out-of-Sample Prediction: 4-Fold Cross-Validation 
We assess the predictive power of the core explanatory variables. A model may fit well within 
a given sample, but could perform worse when confronted with new data. This can potentially 
undermine making correct and useful predictions (see Ward et al. 2010). To explicitly consider 
out-of-sample heuristics, we conducted a 4-fold cross-validation quasi-experimental exercise, 
which we repeated 10 times for the full model (Model 3 and Model 4) and the same model 
while omitting Conscription and Volunteer Years. First, we randomly divide our sample into 
four segments of about the same size. We then used three random segments to estimate the 
parameters, while the fourth segment was retained for assessing the predictive power of Model 
3-4 in the main text or the constrained model on the pooled subsets. Therefore, there were three 
data segments to build the model and create predictions, while a last (randomly chosen) part 
was not considered for estimating the model in the first place, but is merely employed for 
assessing the predictive power. To do so, we provide the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) 
that pertains to the expected value of the squared difference between the observed values of 
the outcome variable and the predicted ones. 
We calculated this measure for Models 3 and 4 from the main text and a constrained model 
that omits our core explanatory variables. As indicated above, we repeated the cross-validation 
10 times and, thus, obtained 10 different values for the MSPE. We calculated the average values 
to arrive at global values. The results are summarized in Table A.1. For the fully specified 
model based on Conscription, the average MSPE across all 10 iterations of the cross-validation 
is 0.0092, while Model 4’s MSPE stands at 0.455; for the constrained model, the average MSPE 
is at around 0.0097. Thus, the predictive power of our core variables of interest is established 





Appendix Table 1. Out-of-Sample Prediction: 4-Fold Cross-Validation 
 
 Full Model - 
Conscription 




Estimation 1 0.0091 0.0091 0.0097 
Estimation 2 0.0092 0.0091 0.0097 
Estimation 3 0.0092 0.0090 0.0097 
Estimation 4 0.0092 0.0091 0.0097 
Estimation 5 0.0092 0.0091 0.0097 
Estimation 6 0.0092 0.0090 0.0097 
Estimation 7 0.0093 0.0090 0.0096 
Estimation 8 0.0093 0.0091 0.0097 
Estimation 9 0.0092 0.0090 0.0097 
Estimation10 0.0093 0.0091 0.0096 
Mean 0.0092 0.0091 0.0097 
 
Note: Table entries are mean squared prediction errors (MPSE). 
 
Random-Effects and Fixed Effects Models  
Our main models are parsimonious in that we rely on a limited number of controls only. To 
further control for influences that may affect the public’s views on the military, which may be 
unobserved and thus difficult to control for, we also specified random-effects and fixed-effects 
variants of our main model based on Conscription. These estimations also address the 
endogeneity issue outlined in the main text. Moreover, an assumption we make is that draft 
evasion is generally looked down upon. In some countries (e.g., Finland, Turkey), draft evasion 
is difficult and socially stigmatized. In others, draft evasion may be the norm and those who 
do their service in the military are generally regarded as lower-status than those who do 
alternative services. That is, our theorizing would make sense only for countries such as 
Greece, Turkey, Finland, and the Baltic states, where conscription was/is large-scale, 
comprehensive, and associated with a perceived security threat; but it may apply less so to 
countries like Denmark, Germany, Austria, or Spain. Fixed and random effects address this 




Appendix Table 2. Random-Effects and Fixed-Effects Models 
  Model A1 Model A2 
Conscription  0.0224**  0.0168* 
 (0.0093) (0.0099) 
Population (ln) 0.0160 0.0864 
 (0.0108) (0.0767) 
Unemployment (ln)   -0.0404***   -0.0403*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0086) 
Median Voter -0.0037 -0.0042 
 (0.0061) (0.0062) 
Temporal Trend   5.8594***   5.0479*** 
 (1.0718) (1.3292) 
Constant   -43.9831***  -38.9200*** 
 (8.1280) (9.4210) 
Observations 527 527 
Random Effects Yes No 
Fixed Effects No Yes 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Controlling for the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks 
The events surrounding the 2001 terrorism in the US are frequently seen as a watershed 
moment, which may have critically influenced, and changed, how security is perceived 
worldwide. It is plausible that the public mood towards the armed forces may have equally 
altered and we assess this possibility with a dummy variable receiving a value of 1 for the years 
2001 and onwards in our data set (0 otherwise). As before, we re-estimate our core model on 
Conscription when adding this new item. According to Table A.3, the years after the 2001 
attacks are, on average, characterized by a significantly lower level of trust in the army, but our 






Appendix Table 3. Controlling for 9/11 Terrorism 
  Model A3 
Conscription  0.0171* 
 (0.0097) 
Population (ln) 0.0072 
 (0.0085) 
Unemployment (ln)   -0.0384*** 
 (0.0094) 
Median Voter -0.0007 
 (0.0056) 
Temporal Trend   6.4523*** 
 (2.2397) 
9/11 Terrorism   -0.0286*** 
 (0.0110) 




Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Employing Non-Interpolated Data Only 
We interpolated missing values for Trust in Armed Forces for the main article’s models. It is 
plausible that public opinion shifts in such linear ways, but there is no guarantee that our 
underlying assumption for this approach is indeed valid. Hence, we re-estimated our models 
while using non-interpolated data only, i.e., country-years that are not covered by the 
Eurobarometer in the first place are now omitted. Table A.4 summarizes these revised models: 









Appendix Table 4. Non-Interpolated Data Only 
  Model A4 Model A5 
Conscription   0.0344***  
 (0.0113)  
Volunteer Years   -0.0049** 
  (0.0020) 
Population (ln) 0.0039       -0.0030 
 (0.0059) (0.0058) 
Unemployment (ln)   -0.0466***  -0.0322** 
 (0.0107) (0.0145) 
Median Voter 0.0025 0.0012 
 (0.0074) (0.0075) 
Temporal Trend  4.9703** 3.6925 
 (2.1916) (2.8427) 
Constant  -37.0446** -27.2102 
 (16.6584)  (21.6290) 
Observations 392 280 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Additional Control Variables 
Originally, we opted for a more parsimonious set of controls due to the relatively small sample 
size. However, public opinion towards the armed forces may be linked to the military’s 
engagement abroad and at home and the threat potential a country faces. We thus estimated an 
additional model, which controls for engagements in military operations at home or abroad 
(based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) armed conflict data)15, internal unrest 
(based on the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index), and battle-related deaths per 
country (based on the UCDP’s battle-related deaths data). More specifically, the conflict-
involvement item captures whether a country was involved in an armed conflict at home or 
abroad (e.g., the War on Terror) as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (1) or not 
                                                             
15 Available online at: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.  
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(0) in a given year. The State Fragility Index16 captures domestic instability along four 
dimensions: security, political, economic, and social. Higher values pertain to a more fragile 
society. Finally, the UCDP also provides data on a country’s battle-related deaths in a given 
conflict. We employ this information as a count variable of casualties per country-year. 
Table A.5 summarizes our findings. The main result is robust and while some of the 
additional controls may have the expected sign in terms of their impact, none of them is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
 
Appendix Table 5. Additional Controls 
  Model A6 
Conscription  0.0185* 
 (0.0097) 
Population (ln) 0.0065 
 (0.0088) 
Unemployment (ln)   -0.0388*** 
 (0.0096) 
Median Voter -0.0004 
 (0.0056) 
Conflict Involvement -0.0257 
 (0.0345) 
Battle-Related Deaths 0.0095 
 (0.0070) 
Domestic Instability -0.0033 
 (0.0092) 
Temporal Trend  4.4813** 
 (2.0835) 




Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
                                                             
16 Available online at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2017c.pdf.  
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Assessing Reverse Causality Using Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression (3SLS) 
We estimated a model using 3SLS to determine whether there is a problem due to simultaneity. 
We explored possible specifications by running multiple models similar to that in the main 
article. In 3SLS, instruments for endogenous variables are generated by regressing each such 
variable on all exogenous variables in the system. Here, the endogenous variables are 
conscription and public support for the armed forces. The regression model summarized in 
Table A.6 is then a re-estimate of our main specification in the paper using 3SLS. Note that the 
variables included in the equations must differ in some aspects for the model to be identified. 
Those items included in one, but not the other equation then influence the other equation’s 
outcome indirectly through their dependent variable. We use country and year fixed effects 
here. 
Model A7 summarizes the results from the 3SLS equation on public opinion – the results 
are virtually identical to those discussed in the main text. Interestingly, the public opinion item 
is negatively signed in the conscription equation, implying that less support for the military 
makes it less likely that conscription is being implemented. That said, the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant, which suggests that causality flows from conscription to public 









Appendix Table 6. 3SLS Model 
  Model A7 
Conscription      0.0585*** 
 (0.0104) 
Population (ln) 0.0024 
 (0.0030) 
Unemployment (ln)   -0.0540*** 
 (0.0091) 
Median Voter 0.0088 
 (0.0090) 
Temporal Trend      4.9477*** 
 (1.7188) 




Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Additional Analysis based on the World Values Survey 
Our main analyses are based on a sample of established European democracies as we employ 
the Eurobarometer to capture public views of the armed forces. Although perhaps at the 
expense of being able to generalize our findings to apply to all countries across the globe, our 
sample comprises European states that are rather similar in several aspects at the macro level, 
which may affect individuals’ attitudes, e.g., economic development, geographic proximity, or 
regime type. To this end, homogeneity among cases should be given, which makes it less 
difficult to tease out the impact of conscription.  
However, we also considered using data from the World Values Survey (WVS),17 which 
consists of nationally representative surveys conducted in almost 100 countries which contain 
almost 90 percent of the world’s population, using a common questionnaire. In some of the 
                                                             
17 Available online at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.  
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WVS rounds, an item is included that asks about respondents’ confidence in the armed forces 
(“a great deal,” “quite a lot,” “not very much,” and “none at all”). We first deleted all missing 
values and “don’t know” answers of this item before merging the “a great deal” and “quite a 
lot” replies to one single value (the same with “not very much” and “none at all”). Afterwards, 
we aggregated this information to the country level by calculating the average for each country-
year. The final variable captures the percentage of the survey population that expressed 
confidence in the military per country-year. Although the sample based on the WVS does 
comprise non-European states and non-democratic countries (see Table A.7), the overall 
sample size is significantly lower than the one for our main estimations as, as indicated, this 
question is not included in all WVS rounds: eventually, we have data for 227 country-years. 
Due to the more heterogeneous nature of this sample, we control for regime type by including 
the polity2 score from the Polity IV data18 and additionally incorporate fixed effects for 
countries and years next to the statistically significant predictors from our main article’s core 
model. Table A.8 shows that our core finding remains robust, and that controlling for states’ 











                                                             
18 Available online at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.  
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Appendix Table 7. Countries Included in the WVS Analysis 
Albania Haiti Puerto Rico 
Algeria Hungary Qatar 
Argentina India Romania 
Armenia Indonesia Russia 
Australia Iran Rwanda 
Azerbaijan Iraq Serbia 
Bangladesh Italy Singapore 
Belarus Japan Slovakia 
Bosnia Jordan Slovenia 
Brazil Kazakhstan South Africa 
Bulgaria Kuwait South Korea 
Burkina Faso Kyrgyzstan Spain 
Canada Latvia Sweden 
Chile Lebanon Switzerland 
China Libya Taiwan 
Colombia Lithuania Tanzania 
Croatia Macedonia Thailand 
Cyprus Malaysia Trinidad and To 
Czech Rep. Mali Tunisia 
Dominican Rep. Mexico Turkey 
Ecuador Moldova Uganda 
Egypt Montenegro Ukraine 
El Salvador Morocco United Kingdom 
Estonia Netherlands United States 
Ethiopia New Zealand Uruguay 
Finland Nigeria Uzbekistan 
France Norway Venezuela 
Georgia Pakistan Vietnam 
Germany Peru Yemen 
Ghana Philippines Zambia 
Guatemala Poland Zimbabwe 
 
Note: Not all countries are included in each round of the WVS, but they have rather varying 







Appendix Table 8. World Values Survey Analysis 
  Model A8 




Temporal Trend  6.1729 
 (5.2142) 
Constant  -46.3483 
 (39.6066) 
Observations 209 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 




The analyses in the main paper are based on a binary conscription data, which we updated until 
2017 in light of Toronto (2017). However, not all conscription or volunteer systems are created 
equal. For example, many European countries, e.g., Germany and Belgium, were only 
conscripting fractions of the draft class in the years prior to moving to volunteer recruitment, 
making these conscription systems anything but universal, much less random or evenly 
distributed across society. We sought to address parts of this issue with additional analyses in 
the main text on the time elapsed since conscription (if any), and the findings from these models 
are generally in line with our expectations. However, we also collected data on some of the 
characteristics of states’ conscription systems to unpack the “black box” of militaries’ 
recruitment systems.  
To this end, we first compiled data (in months) on the actual length of a country’s 
conscription. The duration of the non-voluntary service varies, at times drastically across, 
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countries. Given our argument, longer service durations of conscripts should be linked to a 
stronger socialization process and, ultimately, be linked to a higher level of support for the 
armed forces in the public. We used secondary sources to code these data, including the 
Military Balance of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.19  
In our sample, non-voluntary service durations vary from 0 (all-voluntary forces) to 24 
months (e.g., Cyprus in 2012). According to Model A9, we then do obtain a positive and 
significant effect for Conscription Duration, much in line with our theoretical expectations. For 
each additional month of conscription service, public support for the armed forces increases by 
0.0018 units, all else equal. 
 








Conscription Duration   0.0018*  
 (0.0010)  
Share of Conscripts        0.0706*** 
  (0.0250) 
Population (ln) 0.0084 0.0084 
 (0.0085) (0.0087) 
Unemployment (ln)      -0.0408***      -0.0426*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0099) 
Median Voter -0.0000 -0.0017 
 (0.0056) (0.0058) 
Temporal Trend  4.3388**  5.0861** 
 (2.1063) (2.2258) 
Constant  -32.3072**  -37.9838** 
 (16.0227) (16.9277) 
Observations 527 504 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
                                                             
19 Available online at: https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance.  
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Second, using again the Military Balance of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies,20 we compiled data on the share of conscripts of the total armed forces. All-voluntary 
forces do obviously not have any conscripts, but among those with conscription systems, the 
share of conscripted soldiers of all military personnel varies greatly. For example, only 2.3 
percent of Spain’s military personnel in 2000 stemmed from conscripts, while about a quarter 
of Germany’s armed forces came directly out of conscription before the country moved to an 
all-volunteer force. When re-estimating our core model with this item, Share of Conscripts, the 
main finding remains robust, which further increases the confidence in the argument and the 















                                                             
20 Available online at: https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance.  
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In 2014, the Boonsongpaisan government in Thailand was removed from office by a coup 
d’état orchestrated by the Thai army. Political parties in Thailand had been calling for years for 
the abolishment of conscription in an effort to curb the military’s influence over Thai society 
(Sripokangkul et al., 2019). The Thai case is not unique. During the last decade several coups 
occurred in anocracies with conscription, like Egypt (2013) and Sudan (2019). These coups 
raise an interesting question: does the recruitment system of the armed forces influence coup 
risk? If yes, does regime type play a role? In fact, many Latin American countries share 
Thailand’s extensive history of military coups and a conscription-based army. Like Thailand, 
their political systems oscillated between democratic pluralism and autocratic coercion, ending 
up with anocratic forms of government. To illustrate this point, Peru experienced two coups 
between 1992 and 2000 while having an anocratic government, before finally abolishing 
conscription in 2003. Similarly, the abolishment of conscription in Guatemala, Argentina, and 
Honduras corresponded with less military involvement in politics. 
  I aspire with this study to shed light to a previously unrecognized side-effect of conscription. 
More specifically, I argue that conscription is expected to increase coup risk in anocracies. 
However, the study’s sample is not limited to anocracies since I also assess the effect of 
conscription across other regime types. Specifically, I claim that conscription is expected to 
increase the probability of a coup attempt in anocracies compared to democracies or autocracies 
with conscription (hereafter non-anocracies) because the factors that drive the increased coup 
risk in the unconsolidated, anocratic regimes are not present in democracies and autocracies.  
  Anocracies are semi-democracies with repressive institutions that restrict collective action 
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and render them less inclusive than established democracies (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 33; 
Vreeland, 2008, p. 401; Regan and Bell, 2010, p. 748). However, as conscription draws the 
general public into the armed forces, interest groups may use compulsory service to improve 
their ties with the officer corps and collaborate with military officers to influence government 
policy. Consequently, conscription may produce an undesirable side-effect in anocratic 
regimes and weaken the grip of the government over the armed forces. The January coup in 
Gabon and the recent disposition of Evo Morales by the Bolivian army serve as a reminder that 
civilians cannot underestimate the threat of a military intervention. It must be noted that I do 
not argue that conscripts organize the coup attempts and conscription still produces a series of 
military benefits that justify its implementation in anocracies despite this negative externality. 
Approximately a quarter of contemporary states have anocratic political systems and 
conscription is important for national security. I argue instead that politicians need to be wary 
of the increased coup risk associated with conscription in anocracies to neutralize its effect. 
  Research on coup d’état has profoundly enriched our understanding on the effect of civil-
military relations and socioeconomic factors on regime survival (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; 
Powell, 2012; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011, 2012; Londregan and Poole, 1990; McMahon and 
Slantchev, 2015). Coups constituted two out of the three unconstitutional exits of dictators 
between 1945 and 2002 (Svolik, 2009, p. 477-478). Taking this into account, civilian leaders 
coup proof their regimes by ethnically stacking the officer corps, fragmentating military 
authority, and establishing loyal paramilitary organizations (Brown, Fariss, and McMahon, 
2016; Quinlivan, 1999; Horowitz, 1985; Nordlinger, 1977; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011, 2012; 
Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster, 2019; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Janowitz, 1977; 
O’Donnell, 1973; Goldstone, 2011; Feaver, 1992; Nassif, 2015). So, while governments 
exploit socioreligious cleavages and sectarian recruitment processes to isolate the armed forces 
from the rest of society (Brooks, 2019, p. 389), conscription has the opposite effect as it 
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improves the ties between the two groups (Gandhi, 2008; Khuri and Obermeyer, 1974; Vasquez 
and Powell, 2019).  
  Conscription is viewed in the academic literature as a proponent of democratization. 
Conscription can be employed “as an organizational device to counteract anti-democratic 
political ambitions of the officer corps” (Von Bredow, 1992, p. 291). It is also linked with 
expanded voting rights during wartime and can act as a social melting pot to form a national 
identity (Ingesson et al., 2018; Woloch, 1986; Krebs, 2004; Galston, 2004; Peled, 1998; 
Kestnbaum in Mjøset and Van Holde (ed.), 2002; Meyerle et al., 2011; Safrai, 2019). On a 
similar note, coups carried out by conscript-based armies are more likely to democratize a 
political system than those carried out by voluntary armies (Vasquez and Powell, 2019). 
Having said that, conscription imposes an implicit income tax on draftees and the army must 
constantly accommodate new temporary recruits (Warner and Asch, 2001; Hansen and 
Weisbrod, 1967), although conscript-based armies are less financially taxing than all-voluntary 
ones (Ross, 1994).  States of French legal origin are also more likely to conscript than common 
law countries because they have lower fixed and administrative costs (Mulligan and Shleifer, 
2005). Similarly, conscription is more likely to be present in states with strong unions because 
the institution “protects union‐members from low‐skilled, younger competitors” (Anderson, 
Halcoussis, and Tollison, 1996). Recent studies also find that democracies are less likely to 
conscript (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto, 2017), contrary to past findings (see Ross, 1994). 
  Continuing, Adam argues that conscripts are more attached to civilian interests than military 
corporate interests (2012). Under this notion, in the event of a coup conscripts will experience 
a welfare loss like other civilians (Adam, 2012, p. 717). Therefore, conscripts are expected to 
support the civilian government instead of the army. However, this calculation does not take 
into consideration unconsolidated regimes. The expected relationship between civilian and 
military identity should hold true only for institutionally developed democracies in which the 
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civilian government truly represents the citizenship21. Adam (2012) himself states that 
countries with democratically elected governments and active conscription have experienced 
military coups. However, in cases like pre-1967 Greece, the regime was anocratic instead of 
democratic. Consequently, the impact of conscription on praetorianism in anocracies has 
escaped so far, the attention of the academic community. 
 
3.1.1 Conscription and the Socialization of Citizen-Soldiers in the Armed Forces 
Samuel Huntington (1957) first argued that highly professionalized militaries specialize on 
military affairs and acknowledge civilian pre-eminence. Conscription inevitably strays away 
from the Huntingtonian paradigm as civilians serve alongside the professionals. Conscription 
funnels the military with people from the entire social spectrum, especially those from the more 
diverse middle and lower classes. These civilians are alien to the military discourse and must 
socialize in this new institutional environment. 
  Three factors innate to conscription transform civilians to soldiers: draconian training, societal 
norms, and military or civilian courts (Varin, 2015, p. 37). Military training facilitates “the 
socialization and indoctrination of the recruit by breaking down a man’s civic identity and 
rebuilding a soldier in the image of the army” (Moore, 2009, p. 75). Harsh physical and mental 
training formulate the military identity of conscripts and cement their obedience to the 
military’s strict hierarchical culture. Military officers acquire expertise in warfare with training 
and through this process they also develop their group identity and behavioral code (Janowitz, 
1960, p. 55). This identity embodies military corporate interests such as hierarchy, discipline, 
high quality recruits and access to state-of-the-art technology (Geddes, 1999, p. 126). 
                                                             
21 It should be noted that Ingesson et al. (2018) found no support for the position that conscription 
reduces coup risk in democracies. 
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Institutional autonomy is also among the most essential traits of military identity (Finer, 1988, 
p. 41).  
  Conscription provides the military with its rank-and-file soldiers and junior officers and 
conscripts serving under the command of combat-officers are trained to follow the strict 
hierarchical structure of the military. Due to extensive training and isolation from the civilian 
world, conscripts adopt a cohesive group mentality in which their individual actions are 
important to the unit’s success (Varin, 2015, p. 44; Wong et al., 2003, p. 9-11). Moreover, as 
conscripts are under the tutelage of army officers, they are expected to develop a culture of 
obedience and loyalty towards their superiors. Additionally, societal norms targeting draft-
avoiders and the judicial punishment of dissidents emphasize the importance of conscript 
obedience to the military.22 The disciplinarian nature of the military formulates a cohesive 
group identity for new recruits, like conscripts (Janowitz, 1960, p. 13). Subsequently, through 
vigorous training and discipline conscripts obtain elements of the military corporate identity.  
  Accordingly, conscript armies generate higher levels of congruence between the military and 
society as civilians serve alongside professionals. Since civilians coexist with military officers, 
professional and social barriers are distorted, and the military is more likely to get involved in 
sociopolitical disputes (Goodpaster and Huntington, 1977, p. 23). To this end, conscription in 
Europe is found to increase public trust towards the armed forces (Choulis, Bakaki, and 
Böhmelt, 2019). The authors argue that conscription increases public support for the armed 
forces directly - via socialization and training of conscripts in the army - and indirectly – via 
the conscripts’ families. Although the authors focus primarily on European democracies, they 
provide evidence in the study’s appendix that this relationship extends beyond Europe and to 
                                                             
22 During the latter half of the 19th century, the market-based, exemptions system was abandoned in 
favor of universal military service. In France, the military replacement system was abolished after the 
defeat against Prussia in 1870 (Rouanet and Piano, 2019). 
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some extent it also applies in anocracies. Therefore, it is necessary to address the impact of 
conscription in anocratic civil-military relations as it may differ from other regime types. 
3.1.2 Anocratic Governments and the Military 
The literature has not produced an unequivocal definition of anocracies. Anocracies can be 
described as “semi-democracies…partly open yet somewhat repressive” (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 
33) and most have “politically weak central governments” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, p. 75-81). 
Hence, anocracies have some democratic institutions that differentiate them from autocracies, 
but those institutions are not inclusive enough as those in democracies (Regan and Bell, 2010, 
p. 748). Additionally, in anocracies dissidents have the capacity to organize, but, unlike 
democracies, nonviolent collective action is “too restricted to be effective” (Vreeland, 2008, p. 
401). The non-inclusive nature of anocratic political institutions therefore inhibits the creation 
of popular movements which shield democratic governments from military interventions 
(David, 1985, p. 5). Subsequently, anocracies are in the cusp between democracies and 
autocracies and correspond to values between +5 and -5 in the Polity Index.   
  State repression is present in anocracies, but, unlike the impregnable nature of an autocratic 
state, elites can still assert their demands and exert pressure to the government. The governing 
coalition is not restricted to an ethnic or religious group since governing elites are capable of 
recruiting members to the ruling coalition beyond a small circle (Regan and Bell, 2010, p. 748). 
Also, unlike autocracies, anocracies lack a powerful central authority which can exclude actors 
from the decision making (Gates et al., 2006, p. 895). The competition within the ruling 
coalition means that the state is not centralized enough to efficiently deliver social welfare to 
please popular demands (Regan and Bell, 2010, p. 748). Accordingly, centrifugal political 
forces enable the accumulation of grievances and the government cannot completely oppress 
social dissidence or deter challengers (Benson and Kugler, 1998, p. 199; Fearon and Laitin, 
2003, p. 85-86; David, 1985, p. 5). Therefore, anocracies share both democratic and autocratic 
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institutional traits. They have elected governments, but the electoral process may be rigged and 
the authority of the elected representatives may be circumscribed by extra-parliamentary 
actors. As a result, anocracies lack the centripetal force of democratic parliaments or autocratic 
elites as multiple political actors compete for power. Therefore, in anocracies opportunities for 
political participation coexist with authoritarian institutions and this mix may induce to the 
regime a degree of sociopolitical instability (Choi and Raleigh, 2015, p. 161). 
  In a very clear way, anocracies are unconsolidated regimes since they do have open elections 
and parliamentary institutions, but the powers of elected representatives are circumscribed by 
extra-parliamentary actors in a non-democratic manner. For instance, the Turkish political 
system is registered as an anocracy post-2014 due to the increased state repression, the conflict 
between AKP and the secular state, and a considerable executive aggrandizement under 
president Erdoğan (Ozbudum, 2012, p. 71-72; Sakallioğlu, 1997, p. 154). In a similar manner, 
the pre-1967 parliamentary system of neighboring Greece was afflicted by the intrusive role of 
the palace and the army in politics as well as profound accusations of electoral fraud (Veremis, 
1997, p. 9). Despite open elections, the Greek Communist party was banned, and the population 
was deeply polarized between the Right and Left (Veremis, 1997, p. 9). In simple terms, even 
though Greece had an established parliamentary system, the parliament shared decision-
making powers with the palace, the military, the deep state, and foreign actors (Xydis, 1974; 
Kassimeris, 2006, p. 62-65). Similarly, Thailand up until 2014 had open elections and a 
separation of powers, but the political system was still commanded by small elite groups and 
the armed forces (Thabchumpon et al., 2014). Political repression and social unrest were also 
widespread phenomena (Merieau, 2019). Subsequently, all three cases had anocratic political 
systems because the authority of the elected representative bodies was restrained by extra-




  Finally, it is worth reminding that the military is crucial for regime survival in non-
democracies even if it military officers do not directly occupy government offices (Geddes, 
Frantz, and Wright, 2014, p. 149; Wintrobe, 2012). Anocratic governments need the military 
to control phenomena of social unrest since the regime is unable to please popular welfare 
demands. However, conscription weakens the military’s repressive capability, since conscripts 
are less likely to repress other civilians since their military identity is not permanent (Posen, 
1993, p. 88). Therefore, a conscript-based military in an anocracy may renege on its 
commitments to the ruling class and side with the people in the event of popular uprising. 
Subsequently, anocratic governments find themselves with the Sword of Damocles hanging 
over their heads. They need the armed forces to repress civil unrest, but at the same time the 
military constitutes a real threat to the regime.  
 
3.2 Conscription in Anocracies 
Anocracies experience higher coup risk when conscription is present because conscription 
enables the armed forces to dissipate pro military ideology to large parts of society23 and is one 
of the few organizations that can collaborate with interest groups to influence government 
policy24.  
  Conscription is essential to civil-military relations since it allows the military to abandon its 
professional isolation contrary to other security agencies, like paramilitary forces. As Samuel 
Finer denotes, the armed forces suffer from lack of legitimacy, “that is to say, their lack of a 
                                                             
23 Ideology is interpreted as a set of ideas attached to a specific social group or class (Eagleton,1991). 
24 There are cases of anocracies with powerful leaders, like Erdoğan’s Turkey or Putin’s Russia, that do 
effectively control the armed forces due a strong executive. Such cases demonstrate that anocratic rulers 
are capable of the assertive rule, like autocrats. However, recent coups (Turkey 2016, Zimbabwe 2017) 
highlight that rival elites, like the Gulenists, cannot be excluded in an anocratic political system, unlike 
autocratic regimes. Similarly, the strong concentration of power to the executive further alienates the 
population from the government, thus limiting an anocratic governments representativeness and 
legitimacy to rule. 
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moral title to rule” (1988, p. 12). The military profession functions independently from the rest 
of society and has few ties to other social groups. Conscription reverses this trend as it 
“increases society’s ties with the armed forces” (Vasquez and Powell, 2019, p. 16). For 
instance, the Turkish Armed Forces (hereafter TAF) developed a cohesive image as the 
guardian of the Turkish nation since every male Turk served in them (Sakallioğlu, 1997, p. 
154). Then, the increased legitimacy allowed them to operate as the final arbiter of the Turkish 
political system (Heper, 2002, p. 142). Conscription was also successfully used by the Japanese 
army during the Meiji-Showa era to indoctrinate the population into the military way and 
promote militarist values in the Japanese society (Huntington, 1957, p. 128). Likewise, 
conscription sustains the considerable militarization of the Thai society and cultivates “blind 
acceptance of military culture” (Sripokangkul et al., 2019, p. 40). Only the abolition of 
conscription will neuter “the belief that the military is the most important Thai institution, and 
thus, untouchable” (Sripokangkul et al., 2019, p. 58).  
  Choulis, Bakaki, and Böhmelt (2019) find substantial evidence that conscription increases 
public trust towards the armed forces in European democracies, and to some extent 
anocracies25. With conscription, the military apparatus and its ideology can reach all social 
groups (Khuri and Obermeyer in MacArdle Kelleher(ed.), 1974, p. 62). It increases the 
“visibility” of the armed forces as coexistence of civilians and professionals in the army brings 
more attention to issues of national security (Gandhi, 2008, p. 50; Poutvaara and Wagener, 
2009, p. 15). Zordan Barany succinctly summarizes this position when he claims that “Draft-
based militaries tend to attract more active societal scrutiny, given that a large proportion of 
citizens will have served or had a relative who served in the armed forces” (2017, p. 16). Then, 
                                                             
25 In the study’s appendix, the authors examine the effect of conscription on public support for the 
military globally based on information from the World Values Survey. Contrary to the main text, many 
of the states that are included in this appendix model are anocracies. 
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the circulation element innate to conscription26 disseminates the military line to all the parts of 
society (Khuri and Obermeyer, 1974, p. 62). The Japanese male population became 
increasingly obedient to the military and its ideology due to indoctrination during conscription 
(Huntington, 1957, p. 128). Evidence from Turkey also suggest that ex-conscripts are tied to 
the armed forces since military service grants them high social prestige (Varoglu and Bicaksiz, 
2005, p. 594-95; Caya, 2015, p. 188). For this reason, the transition of TAF to an all-volunteer 
model is highly unlikely since that would result in the “severance of the link between ordinary 
Turkish folk and the defense organization” (Varoglu and Bicaksiz, 2005, p. 595). Similarly, in 
a survey by Yildirim and Erdinc (2007), 53.1% of conscripts in the Turkish army wished to re-
enlist after completing their service. Liking the military and enjoying military life was the most 
popular justification at 38% (Yildirim and Erdinc, 2007, p. 17). Hence, conscription is found 
to increase the ties between society and the armed forces.  
  Continuing, the conscription-based military is one of the few organizations in anocracies 
through which members of interest groups can collaborate with military officers to influence 
government policy. Common service in the army may enable members of interest groups to 
organize and establish networks with the officer corps since conscripts constitute the military’s 
rank and file and combat officers. Therefore, conscription increases the ties of the general 
public to the officer corps and civilian groups may thus collaborate with the armed forces to 
advance or protect their interests against the government. From this position, interest groups 
can prob the military to influence government policy. As a result, conscription increases the 
ties between the armed forces and different interest groups within the general public that would 
benefit from changing or retaining the status quo. In the event of a coup, those interest groups 
are more likely to support the military than the government since they have converging interests 
                                                             
26 I use the term “circulation” with regards to the perpetual replacement of conscripted soldiers with 
new recruits as they complete their compulsory military service. 
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and serve to the army as conscripts. For instance, during the 1909 military movement in Greece, 
middle ranking officers cooperated with trade unions and the bourgeois to force the parliament 
to adopt a set of economic and political reforms for their benefit. Hence, Greek middle ranking 
officers intervened “to favor given civilian party-personality configurations” (Couloumbis, 
1974, p. 353). Since the parliament was unable to implement the necessary liberal reforms and 
the government was paralyzed, interest groups threw their support behind the military in which 
they served as conscripts to force a change in the status quo27. 
  For its part, the civilian government does not abolish conscription because it supplies the 
armed forces with cheap labor and reservists to repel foreign threats (Poutvaara and Wagener, 
2007, p. 8). What’s more, countries that adopt conscription are more likely to participate in 
military alliances (Horowitz, Poast, and Stam, 2017). Moreover, conscription satisfies key 
military corporate interests since it increases the size of the armed forces and the occupancy 
rate of military units. As such, civilian governments may establish conscription or extend the 
duration of compulsory service to appease the army. Additionally, even if the government is in 
favor of abolishing conscription, it may confront significant military opposition since the 
institution increases the military’s visibility and public trust to the organization. Not only that, 
but the abolishment of the institution or even reductions to the duration of service would create 
issues for the occupancy rate and overall sustainability of military units. A reduction in the 
number of military units would also decrease the number of available high-ranking officer 
positions and thus generate intra-military competition. It is therefore highly likely that the 
military leadership would oppose efforts to abolish conscription and would apply significant 
                                                             
27 In the event of a coup d’état conscripts are expected to follow orders since they make up the rank-
and-file and lower officership of a military. This relationship of obedience is evident in the 2016 Turkish 
coup. At least a thousand conscripts were arrest in the coup’s aftermath (Arango and Yeginsu, 2016). 
Most claimed that they thought they were participating in a military exercise and they were following 
orders from their superior officers (Arango and Yeginsu, 2016). Therefore, the coup itself is staged by 




pressure to the government to preserve the institution. Consequently, anocratic governments 
are not expected to abolish conscription because of moderate benefits to national security and 
strong military opposition. 
  To summarize, the coexistence of electoral competitiveness with executive assertiveness in 
anocracies generates political instability as the state cannot satisfy or repress popular demands 
(Benson and Kugler, 1998; Choi and Raleigh, 2015; Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Regan and Bell, 
2010). Hence, citizens in anocracies do not have the same attachment to the government as 
democratic citizens. As more parts of society are conscripted, they become familiar with the 
politicized military identity and common service may enable members of the general public, 
especially interest groups, to reinforce their ties with military officers and thus collaborate to 
influence government policy. The military’s increased ties with society and its attachment to 
interest groups means that the officer corps will be more willing to intervene against the 
government to promote popular demands while fewer groups will be willing to defend the 
government against the army. Hence, conscription in anocracies increases the willingness of 
the army to intervene in politics as well as its opportunity to do so since less groups will support 
the government in the event of a coup. It is also worth clarifying that conscripts do not directly 
stage the coup, but conscription creates circumstances that increase the probability of a coup 
d’état by middle and senior ranking military officers. Subsequently, coup risk is higher in 
anocracies when conscription is present because it reduces the potential costs of a coup. We 
can thus hypothesize that anocracies with conscription are more likely to experience a coup 
attempt compared to anocracies without conscription. Additionally, conscription is expected 





3.3.1 Data and Method 
Data and Dependent Variable 
For the empirical section of the paper, I employ a logistic regression model and a compilation 
of variables from the coup d’état academic literature to examine the period from 1950 to 2018. 
I use a binary coup attempt variable as the dependent variable, and I assign a value of 1 if at 
least one coup attempt took place in a country in a given year. This variable is based on 
Powell’s and Thyne’s 2011 coup attempt variable and includes coups by the military or other 
elites within the state apparatus. Of the 10,609 country-years observations in the data set, 411 
take a value of 1, which corresponds to 3.9% of the observations. 
 
Independent Variable 
The main explanatory variable is the Draft* Anocracy interaction term. Firstly, I use Toronto’s 
military draft variable. The original variable contained observations up to 2000. I have 
expanded the variable to incorporate the years 2000-2018 based on information from the CIA 
Factbook data (2021) on conscription. The draft variable is a binary variable and receives a 
value of 1 if a country had conscription in effect in a given year. Out of the 10,154 country-
years observations in the variable 4,915 observations (48.4%) are assigned a value of 1. Out of 
the 200 countries in the data set, 73 (36.5%) have never established a conscription system28 
and 45 (22.5%) have conscription for the entire period. Finally, 80 (40%) of the countries have 
abolished or instituted conscription at least once in the data.  
                                                             
28 Mostly small island states in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. In addition, I include in the 




    I employ the Polity IV Project index covering years 1946-2018 to formulate the anocracy 
binary variable. Countries with a +6 score are registered as democracies and countries with a -
6 score are registered as autocracies. As such, countries with scores between +5 and -5 are 
registered as anocracies. The Anocracy binary variable has 9,380 country-years observations 
and 2,252 cases (24%) receive a value of 1 whereas 7,128 cases (76%) take a value of 0. I also 
employ Vreeland’s xpolity index (2008) which is an updated version of the polity index and its 
values range between 7 and -6 covering years 1970-2008. According to Vreeland’s regime 
specification, countries with a +5 or higher score are registered as democracies and countries 
with a -3 or lower score are registered as autocracies (Vreeland, 2008, p. 416-418). As such, 
countries with scores between +4 and -2 are registered as anocracies. This regime specification 
captures the degree of competitiveness or openness of executive recruitment and the number 
of restrictions to the executive (Vreeland, 2008, p. 405). For this reason, traits like selection in 
the executive recruitment (-2 points) or executive parity (+4 points) almost guarantee that a 
regime will be autocratic and democratic respectively. Under this specification, hereditary 
regimes with few caveats to the executive are registered as autocracies, whereas politically 
competitive regimes with check and balances are registered as democracies. Non-hereditary 
yet non-entirely competitive regimes with moderate limitations to the executive are categorized 
as anocracies since they share both autocratic and democratic institutional traits. I include the 
main models based on the xpolity in Table 3a since it’s the more detailed index of the two and 
I also include polity-based sample models in Table 3b to account for decades 1950s, 1960s, 
and 2010s. To summarize, the relationship between coup attempt and draft*anocracy is 
specified as: 
                           Coup Attemptt = α + βDraft*Anocracyt + γXt-1 + ε, 
where t captures the year, α,β,γ are the parameters, X encapsulates the control variables and is 




The military’s decision to overthrow the government is influenced by a range of socioeconomic 
factors that might drive a potential increase in coup risk in anocracies instead of conscription. 
The cooperation of the bourgeois, trade unions, and middle ranking officers in the 1909 military 
movement in Greece highlights the important of economic prosperity for government survival 
in anocratic regimes. If the economy is underperforming, then it is highly possible that interest 
groups will collaborate with the armed forces to change the government to improve economic 
prospects. I use two GDP variables with information from Gleditsch (2002) and the World 
Bank to measure the effect of wealth on coup risk. The Change in GDP per capita variable 
captures the percent year-to-year change in GDP. The GDP per capita variable captures income 
per citizen and is logged and lagged by a year. Both are based on real income data in 2005 
prices (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2018). Additionally, since the literature expects 
anocracies to suffer from political instability due to the mix of democratic and autocratic 
institutional traits it is imperative to control for the effect of instability on coup risk. I capture 
political unrest with Banks’ Instability Index (2011). The instability variable captures 
“assassinations, purging of governmental officials, guerrilla activity, protests, riots, and 
strikes” (Böhmelt et al., 2018, p. 1125). The size of the armed forces also influences coup risk 
(Powell, 2012). I measure its effect with the Military Personnel variable found in the National 
Military Capabilities v5.0 data set of the Correlates of War project. Lastly, both variables are 
logged and lagged by a year. 
  Moving on, defense spending is a fundamental military corporate interest and budget 
reductions incentivize military intervention in politics (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011, p. 103). Hence, 
budget concerns may better explain military willingness to intervene in anocratic politics than 
conscription. Therefore, I use Powell's (2012) operationalization for the Change in Military 
Expenditure and Soldier Quality variables to control for this effect. For the variables, I use the 
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information from the National Military Capabilities v5.0 data set which covers the period 
between 1816 and 2012. Both variables are logged and lagged by a year. In addition, the 
presence of pro-government paramilitary units affects the military’s ability to overthrow the 
government since the opportunity costs associated with a coup attempt are increased (Böhmelt 
and Pilster, 2015). Taking this information into account, I employ the coup-proofing variables 
from Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) to examine whether the presence of paramilitary forces in 
anocracies neutralizes the effect of conscription on coup risk. The Counterbalancing variable 
contains the number of effective ground-combat forces and is lagged by one year (Pilster and 
Böhmelt, 2011). The variable “incorporates information on both the number of rivaling military 
organizations and their respective strengths to capture the degree which a state divides its 
military manpower into rivaling organization” (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011, p. 339-40). 
Counterbalancing2 is the squared term of this variable and is used to capture a potential 
curvilinear effect of coup proofing on coup risk (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015). Finally, I include 
the Years Since Last Coup spell variable along with its square and cubic terms to control for 
the pacifying effect of time on coup risk and temporal dependence. 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum VIF 
Coup Attempt 10609 0.038 0.192 0 1 - 
Draft 10154 0.484 0.499 0 1 1.11 
Anocracy 9380 0.240 0.427 0 1 1.1 
Change Mil Expenditure 8066 0.428 22.07 -1 1965 1 
Military Personnel 9303 3.346 1.945 0 8.666 1.31 
Soldier Quality 8077 8.792 1.64 0 14.69 2.44 
Instability 8598 3.144 3.577 0 10.85 1.19 
Change GDP per capita 9033 0.023 0.25 -0.796 20.79 1 
GDP per capita 9223 8.313 1.213 4.889 13.35 2.61 
Counterbalancing 7040 1.66 0.643 1 5.936 1.1 




3.3.2 Empirical Analysis 
Table 3a summarizes the regression results. The analysis comprises of four models to fully 
capture the impact of conscription on coup risk in anocracies across time and different 
socioeconomic conditions. Model 5 includes the main explanatory variable and the interaction 
term. Model 6 examines the effect of the control variables on coup risk independently of the 
main explanatory variable. Model 7 includes both the interaction term and the control 
variables. Finally, in model 8 I add the coup proofing variables. In Table 3b I replicate these 
models by replacing the xpolity with a polity index sample, and the number of observations 
is substantially increased as a result, however, no significant differences are observed between 
the two tables with respect to the regression results. The effect of draft*anocracy interaction 
term is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level across all models, 
although the interaction term requires a visual representation to determine its actual impact on 
coup likelihood. However, the statistical significance of the term is a good first indicator. In 
contrast, the anocracy variable itself has a negative sign but does not have a consistently 
significant effect on coup attempt.  
  Due to the logit nature of the models, I employ a predictive probabilities graph to visually 
represent the effect of the interaction term on coup attempt. Figure 3 captures the change in 
predicted probabilities of the interaction term in models 7 and 8 of Table 3a as draft changes 
from 0 to 1 and anocracy changes from 0 to 1 as well. The predictive margins graph displays 
the positive effect of the draft*anocracy interaction term on coup risk. Specifically, the 
probability of a coup attempt is 2.5 percentage points higher in anocracies with conscription 
compared to non-anocracies with conscription. Additionally, the probability of a coup attempt 
is 3 percentage points higher in anocracies with conscription than anocracies without 
conscription and the confidence intervals of anocracies with and without conscription do not 
overlap. Therefore, conscription is found to significantly increase coup risk in anocratic 
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regimes. This effect is statistically significant and consistent across all examined models. 
What’s more, the confidence intervals of anocracies with conscription are clearly separated 
from the confidence intervals of non-anocracies with conscription.  
  Furthermore, conscription appears to reduce coup risk in non-anocracies, but the results are 
rather inconclusive as confidence intervals do overlap in this case. In the Appendix, I also 
include a model with draft*democracy and draft*autocracy interaction terms with anocracies 
as the baseline category. The results of this disaggregated model mirror the main text model 7a 
results. On top of that, in Appendix tables 23 and 24 I disaggregate coup d’état in anocracies 
between those carried out by senior and junior officers29. Conscription has a positive and 
statistically significant effect in both cases. Subsequently, conscription in anocracies is found 
to increase the likelihood of a coup attempt across all officer ranks. All in all, the findings of 
the empirical analysis support the research hypothesis as conscription in anocracies 
significantly increases the likelihood of a coup attempt compared to anocracies without 
conscription. Its effect is also substantially different from the effect of conscription in non-
anocracies since conscription is found to increase the likelihood of a coup attempt in anocracies 








                                                             
29  Coups carried out by officers above the colonel rank are registered as senior officer coups and coups 




Table 3a. The Relationship between Coup Attempt and the Draft: Anocracy Interaction Term 




                                     Model 5a         Model 6 Model 7a Model 8a 
Draft -0.293   -0.309 -0.362                   
0.194 
 (0.194)  (0.206) (0.225)            
(0.073)*** 
Anocracy -0.280                   -0.488                 -0.559                  
 (0.250)            
(0.073)*** 
 (0.247)**            
(0.073)*** 
254           
(0.073)*** 
Draft*Anocracy  0.873                    1.170                   1.300                   
 328            
(0.073)*** 
 327            
(0.073)*** 
335            
(0.073)*** 
Change Military Expenditure   0.000  0.000  0.000                   
0.194 
  (0.000) 00  00            
(0.073)*** 
Soldier Quality  -0.168 -0.160 -0.235                  
0.194 
  (0.076)** (0.075)** 98            
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel  -0.090 -0.068 -0.091                   
0.194 
  (0.052)* (0.050) 57           
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita  -3.548 -3.635 -3.830                   
0.194 
  (0.743)*** (0.782)*** 820            
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita  -0.263 -0.273 -0.210                   
0.194 
  (0.083)*** (0.084)*** 9            
(0.073)*** 
Instability    0.100  0.102  0.113                  
0.194 
  (0.023)*** (0.024)*** 25            
(0.073)*** 
Counterbalancing    -0.821                   
    682            
(0.073)*** 
Counterbalancing2     0.190                    
    169            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.261 -0.212                 
0.194 
-0.202                  
0.194 
-0.203                  
0.194 
 (0.069)*** (0.066)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.066)***            
(0.073)*** 
68            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.014  0.011                   
0.194 
 0.011                   
0.194 
 0.011                   
0.194 
 (0.006)** 05           
(0.073)*** 
05           
(0.073)*** 
05            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000                   
0.194 
-0.000                   
0.194 
-0.000                   
0.194 
 (0.000)* 00            
(0.073)*** 
00            
(0.073)*** 
00            
(0.073)*** 
Obs. 5,375 4,836 4,836 4,618 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -700.036 -606.051 -601.230 -556.814 
Wald2 84.23 157.73 176.64 167.93 
Prob>2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time Period 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
ROC Curve 0.778 0.829 0.835 0.845 
AUC-PR Curve 0.107 0.141 0.144 0.161 
     
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, ** significant 





Table 3b. The Relationship between Coup Attempt and the Draft: Anocracy Interaction Term 
- Polity Sample 
 
 
                                     Model 5b         Model 7b Model 8b 
Draft -0.303 -0.211                   
0.194 
-0.504                    
 (0.185) (0.198)            
(0.073)*** 
(0.236)**           
(0.073)*** 
Anocracy  0.125                   -0.188                   -0.389                    
 (0.167)            
(0.073)*** 
187           
(0.073)*** 
226            
(0.073)*** 
Draft*Anocracy  0.869                   0.970                     1.247                    
 240            
(0.073)*** 
2 0            
(0.073)*** 
329            
(0.073)*** 
Change Military Expenditure  -0.000                   
0.194 
-0.000                    
  00            
(0.073)*** 
00            
(0.073)*** 
Soldier Quality  -0.181                  
0.194 
-0.313                    
  55            
(0.073)*** 
99            
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel  -0.097                   
0.194 
-0.101                    
  48            
(0.073)*** 
60            
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita  -3.224                   
0.194 
-3.504                    
  632            
(0.073)*** 
82            
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita  -0.237                   
0.194 
-0.205                    
  8            
(0.073)*** 
91            
(0.073)*** 
Instability    0.097                  
0.194 
 0.099                    
  20            
(0.073)*** 
22            
(0.073)*** 
Counterbalancing   -0.903                    
               754            
(0.073)*** 
Counterbalancing2                      0.238                    
   194            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.173 -0.152                  
0.194 
-0.096                    
 (0.037)*** (0.049)***            
(0.073)*** 
52            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.004  0.005                   
0.194 
 0.002                    
 (0.002)** 0            
(0.073)*** 
0            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000                   
0.194 
-0.000                    
 (0.000) 00            
(0.073)*** 
00            
(0.073)*** 
Constant -1.991  1.215                   
0.194 
 2.877                    
 (0.171)*** 599            
(0.073)*** 
1 14           
(0.073)*** 
Obs. 9,011 6,752 5,138 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -1319.386 -1015.967 -651.547 
Wald2 221.26 330.71 220.32 
Prob>2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time Period 1950-2018 1951-2011 1970-2011 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, ** significant 








  Figure 3. Interaction Term of Draft: Anocracy 
Note: The graphs present the predicted probabilities of coup attempt given the values of Draft and 




  When it comes to the control variables and their impact on coup risk, we observe some 
interesting findings. First and foremost, change in military expenditure produces no statistically 
significant effect across the models. The effect of military size on coup risk is negative yet 
insignificant in the xpolity models, with the exception of the controls only model, but becomes 
significant in the polity sample models in accordance with previous studies (Powell 2012). On 
the other hand, soldier quality has a statistically significant and negative effect on coup risk 
across all models. Moving on to the socioeconomic variables, both are statistically significant 
across all models. A positive change in the GDP per capita heavily reduces coup risk. Likewise, 
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wealthier countries are less likely to experience a coup attempt. Non-surprisingly, the political 
instability variable increases coup risk and is statistically significant across the board. Finally, 
the coup proofing variables are statistically insignificant, hence the presence of paramilitaries 
does not seem to affect military intervention in politics when we consider for conscription and 
anocratic governments.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The famous William Lyon Mackenzie once said, “Conscription if necessary, but not 
necessarily conscription”30. Honoring this spirit, the purport of this study is not to discredit the 
benefits of conscription or to contest its democratizing effect. Instead, this academic endeavor 
sheds light to a previously unaccounted negative externality of conscription in anocracies. The 
outcome of the empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that conscription in anocracies 
increases the probability of a coup attempt compared to non-anocracies. In the Appendix, I also 
include a series of robustness checks to examine in depth the causal relationship between the 
variables and the available data. It is worth mentioning that this study as well as the 
conscription literature in general suffer from the unavailability of data with respect to the 
number of conscripts serving in military forces around the world. Toronto’s binary 
operationalization of conscription is indeed very useful, but more information on the number 
of conscripts per country would strongly benefit the study’s insights. Contemporary military 
force data sets, like Military Balance, have insufficient information on the number of conscripts 
serving in the armed forces of non-Western states. Future research on civil-military relations 
should emphasize on the need to produce a large-n data set on the manpower contribution of 
conscripts and roles they perform in armed forces around the world. 
                                                             
30 Meaning that conscription is a very divisive issue that must be approached by the government with 
caution to avoid polarizing the population. 
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  Finally, the findings of this study produce wider policy implications. The end of the Cold War 
saw an increasing number of countries abolishing conscription as threats to national security 
dwindled. However, the volatile first two decades of the twenty-first century have renewed the 
public debate on conscription. The ex-Afghani President Hamid Karzai contemplated possible 
benefits of reinstituting conscription in Afghanistan. This proposal aimed to enhance military 
strength, reduce dependence on foreign aid, and increase interaction between different parts of 
the fragmented Afghan society31. The Afghani case brings forward some aspects of re-
establishing conscription in contemporary anocracies. Conscription fulfils manpower demands 
cheaply and weakens parochial loyalties (Meyerle et al., 2011, p. 3). However, despite its 
operational allures, conscription is found to increase coup risk in anocracies. I do not argue 
against the implementation of conscription. In contrast, the establishment of conscription may 
be of vital importance to national security and thus its implementation or extension may be 
necessary for regime stability or state survival. Instead, the study highlights the fact that 
unconsolidated regimes with anocratic governments should approach conscription as a 
strategic trade-off. Its introduction requires careful planning and significant premeasures to 
limit negative externalities, like increased coup risk, that may destabilize the regime and 











                                                             






3.5 Chapter Two Appendix 
 
The appendix contains robustness checks for the logit models presented in Table 3a. Below I 
list those robustness checks in the order they are positioned in the appendix. 
 
 Appendix Table 10 presents a model without the P5 countries. 
 Appendix Table 11 introduces a Heckman-type probit two-stage selection model on coup 
attempts and coup outcomes. 
 Likewise, Appendix Table 12 contains the analysis of a Bivariate Two-Stage model on 
draft and coup attempts. 
 Appendix Table 13 includes internal and external threats variables. 
 I then employ a three-stage least-squares regression model to check for reserve causality 
between coups and conscription (Appendix Table 14). 
 I also run a model where I omit countries that show no variation in the draft variable, 
never established or always had conscription for the duration of the data set (Appendix Table 
15). 
 Appendix Table 16 depicts the results of region and year fixed-effects models. 
 I present the separation plot of the main text model 7 in Appendix Figure 6. 
 Moreover, the results of an out-of-sample 4-fold cross-validation are located in Appendix 
Table 17. 
 In Appendix Table 18, I disaggregate non-anocratic regimes into autocracies and 
democracies with anocracies as the baseline. 
 Taking all into consideration, I include models of the main explanatory variables without 
the interaction term in Appendix Table 19. 
 Appendix Table 20 contains the results of regime sub-samples. 
 In Appendix Table 21 I include country fixed-effects models. 
 I present a model with an alternative conscription variable in Appendix Table 22. 
 I disaggregate coups into senior and junior officer coups in Appendix Tables 23 and 24. 
 I run a series of models with different values of time polynomials in Appendix Table 25. 
 Appendix table 26 introduces models with additional control variables. 





Non-P5 countries  
Major powers do not traditionally experience turbulent civil-military relations or inside 
challenges to their domestic political status quo. The armed forces of major powers are focused 
on the projection of power and the defence of national interests in the international system and 
a possible confrontation with the political leadership would have a significant impact on the 
position of the state as a major power in international politics. Therefore, the armed forces of 
major powers are expected to be less involved in politics and instead focus on their professional 
duties. For the purposes of this research, I treat the permanent five members of the UN Security 
Council as the major powers in the international system. The civil-military relations of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and France resembles the model of the Huntingtonian 
objective control in civil-military relations (1959) while in case of USSR/Russia and China 
their civil-military relations correspond to the Marxist-Leninist dependent-coalitional and 
symbiotic models of civil-military relations respectively (Perlmutter and LeoGrande, 1982). 
All in all, major powers are not expected to experience a political intervention from the armed 
forces and are thus excluded from this iteration of main text model 7. Nonetheless, the 
Draft*Anocracy interaction term is still statistically significant at the 99.99% confidence level 















Appendix Table 10. Non-P5 Countries 





















Change Military Expenditure  0.000 
 (0.001) 
Soldier Quality -0.149 
 (0.075)** 
Military Personnel -0.054 
 (0.052) 
Change GDP per capita -3.630 
 (0.773)*** 
GDP per capita -0.278 
 (0.085)*** 
Instability  0.097 
 (0.024)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.259 
 (0.069)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.017 
 (0.005)***  
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** 
Obs. 4,642 




Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 











Appendix Figure 1. Predicted probabilities graph of the impact of Draft*Anocracy on Coup 
Risk based on model A11 
 
Note: The interaction of draft with anocracy. Graph presents predicted probabilities for a coup attempt 
given the values of Draft and conditional on Anocracy. The vertical bars pertain to 90 percent 
confidence intervals.  
 
Heckman-Type Probit Two-Stage Selection Model 
Mirroring Powell’s 2012 model, I run a Heckman type two-stage selection model to examine 
the outcome of coup attempts. The dependent variable of the selection stage is the coup attempt 
binary variable. The dependent variable of the outcome stage is a binary coup success variable 
which takes a value of 1 in the event of a successful coup and 0 in all other cases. In the 
selection stage, out of 4,836 observations we identify 168 selected observations (3.47%), to be 
estimated in the outcome stage. Ultimately, the findings of the two-stage model demonstrate 
that there is no relationship between the interaction term and coup outcome. Additionally, 
based on the results of the model it seems that states that experience increases in military 
expenditure are more likely to experience a successful coup attempt. Lastly, the effect of the 
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Draft*Anocracy interaction term is positive and statistically significant in the selection stage 
of the model. 
 
Appendix Table 11. Sample-Selection Model 




Draft -0.159  0.202 
 (0.093)* (0.279) 
Anocracy 
 







 0.585  0.036 
(0.162)*** (0.569) 
Change Military Expenditure -0.000  0.779 
 (0.000) (0.224)*** 
Soldier Quality -0.081 -0.159 
 (0.037)** (0.125) 
Military Personnel -0.032 -0.101 
 (0.024) (0.097) 
Change GDP per capita -1.761  0.080 
 (0.366)*** (1.085) 
GDP per capita -0.128 -0.032 
 (0.042)*** (0.169) 
Instability  0.048  0.023 
 (0.010)*** (0.037) 
Years Since Coup -0.095  
 (0.030)***  
Years Since Coup2  0.004  
 (0.002)**  
Years Since Coup3 -0.000  
 (0.000)*  
Obs.  4,836 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  -708.841 
Athrho  0.125 
Rho  0.125 
Wald2  17.36 










Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 






Bivariate Two-Stage Model 
The academic literature points out that conscription is not randomly assigned in states, but 
certain socioeconomic factors may influence the likelihood that a state will adopt a conscription 
recruitment system in the armed forces (Asal, Conrad, Toronto, 2017). States institute 
conscription to deter or counterbalance foreign adversaries. To this end, we may observe 
conscription being adopted in states whose internal political system is pressured by foreign 
threats and confront a case of selection bias. To control for sample selection bias, I employ a 
bivariate two stage probit model. The dependent variable of the selection stage is the draft 
binary variable, mainly whether conscription is present in a country. The second equation with 
coup attempt as the dependent variable is estimated simultaneously with the first equation while 
controlling for the correlation in the equations’ error processes (Beardsley 2008:731). I use the 
temporal years since last coup variable only in the selection stage as an instrument variable 
(Beber, 2012). The time passed since the last coup in a state may influence the probability of a 
state adopting conscription and affect coup risk through the direct effect of the draft variable. 
Moreover, the results of the bivariate two stage model are identical to the results of the main 
text model and the Draft*Anocracy interaction term has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on coup attempt. 
Appendix Table 12. Bivariate Two-Stage Model 
 




Draft*Anocracy   1.336 
  (0.500)*** 
Change Military Expenditure -0.015 -0.000 
 (0.057) (0.002) 
Soldier Quality -0.058 -0.115 
 (0.029)** (0.037)*** 
Military Personnel  0.008 -0.073 
 (0.019) (0.027)*** 
Change GDP per capita  0.000 -1.832 
 (0.086) (0.384)*** 
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GDP per capita -0.062 -0.165 
 (0.031)** (0.043)*** 
Instability  0.005  0.065 
 (0.007) (0.010)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.010  
 (0.002)***  
Obs.  4,836 
Log Likelihood  -1945.317 






Athrho  -0.524* 






Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Appendix Figure 2 – Average Marginal Effects graph on the impact of Draft*Anocracy on 
Coup Attempt based on model A13 
 
Note: Graph presents the average marginal effects of the Draft*Anocracy variable on the probability 




Assessing the Internal and External Threat Environment 
Research has demonstrated that civil conflicts increase the probability of a coup attempt 
(Quinlivan, 1999; Svolik, 2003; Böhmelt et al., 2018). Intra- and inter-state disputes increase 
the importance of the armed forces for the survival of the state apparatus and may provide the 
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sufficient incentives and resources for the armed forces to intervene into the political arena. 
Prior research has also shown that intra- and inter- state disputes increase the likelihood of the 
adoption of a draft system by a state (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto, 2017). When states confront 
severe internal and external threats, they are expected to be more likely to establish a 
conscription system in order to mobilize all the available human resources to combat those 
threats32. In the model below, I re-examine the effect of the Draft*Anocracy interaction with 
the inclusion of the Civil Conflict and Militarizes Interstate Dispute variables (Böhmelt, 
Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2018). The Draft*Anocracy interaction term still exerts a positive 
and significant effect on the probability of a coup attempt. Additionally, mirroring Böhmelt’s, 
Escribà-Folch’s, and Pilster’s (2018) results, civil conflict significantly increases the 
probability of a coup attempt while militarized interstate disputes have no effect. 
 
Appendix Table 13. Internal and External Threat Environment 









(0.218)           
(0.073)*** 
Anocracy -0.621                   




 1.284                    
 345            
(0.073)*** 
Change Military Expenditure  0.000                    
 00            
(0.073)*** 
Soldier Quality -0.176                    
 4            
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel -0.129                    
 6            
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita -3.412                  
 721            
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita -0.201                    
 88            
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.070                    
 27            
(0.073)*** 
Civil Conflict  0.881                    
 216            
(0.073)***                                                              
32 Israel is a prime example of a country with a universal conscription system both for males and females 
due to high levels of internal and external threats. 
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Militarized Interstate Dispute -0.166                    
 (0.156)           
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.225                    
 0            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.012                    
 05            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000                    
 00            
(0.073)*** 
Obs. 4,835 




Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 3. Predicted probabilities graph of the impact of Draft*Anocracy on Coup 
Risk based on model A14 
 
 
Note: The interaction of draft with anocracy. Graph presents predicted probabilities for a coup attempt 
given the values of Draft and conditional on Anocracy. The vertical bars pertain to 90 percent 





Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression  
I employ a three-stage least-squares regression to examine the case of reverse causality between 
the Coup Attempt and the main independent variable. Since the research hypothesis is a 
conditional one and the main independent variable is an interaction term, I examine the effect 
of coup d'état on conscription in a sub-sample of anocratic regimes. The endogenous variables 
in this case are Coup Attempt and Draft and each of the two endogenous variables is regressed 
with the exogenous variables of the model. The exogenous variables of the first stage with 
Coup Attempt as the endogenous variable are excluded from the second stage and vice versa. 
Therefore, in the second stage I include, alongside the Coup Attempt variable, the Change in 
Military Expenditure and Military Personnel variables. Correspondingly, these two control 
variables are excluded from the first stage of the model. Below I present the 3SLS regression 
for years 1970-2008.  
The results of the first stage of the 3SLS model are similar to the results of main text model 
7. Conscription in anocracies has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood 
of a coup attempt. Additionally, coup attempt in anocracies is found to have no effect on the 
establishment of a conscription recruitment system while countries with large armies are more 
likely to conscript. Consequently, I do not find evidence that the onset of a coup d'état in 
anocratic regimes has an impact on the establishment of conscription.  
 
 
  Appendix Table 14. Three-Stage Least-Squares Regression Model 
  Model A15 
Coup Attempt 
    Model A15 
        Draft 
Coup Attempt         -0.173 
         (0.112) 
Draft  0.030  
 (0.017)*  
Change Military Expenditure          -0.003 
         (0.010) 
Soldier Quality -0.012  
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 (0.009)  
Military Personnel          0.049 
         (0.023)** 
Change GDP per capita -0.174  
 (0.089)*  
GDP per capita -0.005  
 (0.010)  
Instability  0.003  
 (0.002)  
Years Since Coup -0.006  
 (0.004)  
Years Since Coup2  0.000  
 (0.000)   
Years Since Coup3 -0.000  
 (0.000)   
Obs.  761 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Omitting Countries Without Variation 
Out of the total 200 countries in the data set, 118 either did not a conscription recruitment 
system for the entirety of the period examined or they always had conscription. I re-estimate 
the main model and I include only the 80 countries that exhibit variation in the draft variable. 
Although the impact of the Draft*Anocracy interaction term on coup risk is less poignant in 
this model, it is still positive and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Nevertheless, the results of the predicted probabilities graph are similar to main text model 7. 
As a result, conscription is found to increase the probability of a coup attempt in anocratic 








Appendix Table 15. Variation Only 





















Change Military Expenditure -0.138 
 (0.290) 
Soldier Quality -0.270 
 (0.120)** 
Military Personnel -0.028 
 (0.107) 
Change GDP per capita -2.967 
 (1.353)** 
GDP per capita -0.176 
 (0.130) 
Instability  0.078 
 (0.038)** 
Years Since Coup -0.366 
 (0.107)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.029 
 (0.010)***  
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 
 (0.000)** 
Obs. 2,259 





Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 















Appendix Figure 4. Predicted probabilities graph of the impact of Draft*Anocracy on Coup 
Risk based on model A16 
 
 
Note: The interaction of draft with anocracy. Graph presents predicted probabilities for a coup attempt 
given the values of Draft and conditional on Anocracy. The vertical bars pertain to 90 percent 
confidence intervals.  
 
 
Region and Year Fixed-Effects 
The presence of a conscription recruitment system in a country is determined by regional 
factors such as regional instability, natural resources, a colonial past, or the instigation of intra- 
and inter-state conflict that might spill over to neighboring states. It is highly probable that the 
impact of conscription on coup likelihood in anocratic regimes is driven by these region-
specific characteristics. To control for the degree that these region-level characteristics have an 
impact coup risk, I run a region-fixed effects variation of main text model 7 based on the region 
variable from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Similar to the main text model, the effect of 
conscription in anocracies on the probability of coup attempt is positive and statistically 
significant at the 99.99% confidence level. I also include an identical model with errors 
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clustered at the regional level and the effect of draft*anocracy on coup attempt remains robust. 
Additionally, I control for year fixed effects to control for year specific effects on coup attempt 
and once again draft*anocracy has a positive and statistically significant effect on coup attempt. 
 
 Appendix Table 16. Region and Year Fixed-Effects  









(0.204) (0.162) (0.195) 





















 1.151  1.151  1.090 
(0.399)*** (0.162)*** (0.402)*** 
Change Military Expenditure -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.008) 
Soldier Quality -0.129 -0.129 -0.087 
 (0.083) (0.073)* (0.090) 
Military Personnel -0.032 -0.032 -0.080 
 (0.071) (0.023) (0.062) 
Change GDP per capita -3.655 -3.655 -3.840 
 (0.794)*** (0.563)*** (0.799)*** 
GDP per capita -0.222 -0.222 -0.310 
 (0.120)* (0.038)*** (0.100)*** 
Instability  0.096  0.096  0.102 
 (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.195 -0.195 -0.186 
 (0.056)*** (0.055)*** (0.057)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.010  0.010  0.010 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** 
Obs. 4,836 4,836 4,424 







Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes No 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Region Clustered Errors No Yes No 
     
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 







Appendix Figure 5. Predicted probabilities graph of the impact of Draft*Anocracy on Coup 





Separation Plot  
I include in the appendix a separation plot of main text model 7 to examine the predictive 
capacity of the regression models. More specifically, the separation plot compares the presence 
of events and non-events, in our case coup attempts and coup free years, with the predictive 
values of the model in an ascending order from left to right (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks, 2011: 
994). If the predictive capacity of the model is low, then the events (red vertical lines) and non-
events would be spread evenly across the right column side (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks, 2011: 
994). In our case, we observe a concentration of coup attempts in the right side, despite the 
presence of a few outliers in the middle, further confirming the model’s strong predictive 
capabilities. 




Appendix Figure 6. Separation Plot Based on Main Text’s Model 7 
 
 





Out-of-Sample 4-Fold Cross-Validation 
Controlling for out-of-sample error I employ a four-fold cross-validation approach to avoid 
data overfitting. “This approach involves randomly dividing the set of observations into k 
groups, or folds, of approximately equal size (James et al., 2013)”. To start with, I randomly 
divide the sample into four equal-in size parts. The first three parts work as training sets in 
order to calculate the model parameters, while the fourth part is utilized as the testing set to 
evaluate the performance of the main text model 7 and of a model only with control variables 
included as predictive tools. To determine the out-of-sample predictive capacity, we rely “we 
rely on the area under the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve, which ranges from 
a low value of 0.5 if there is no improvement in predictive power over a random guess to 1.0 
for perfect classifications of outcomes” (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2018, p. a2). To this end, I 
compare main text model 7 with a control only model, while also including the Draft and 
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Anocracy variables but not the interaction term. Both models have the same amount of 
observations. The average value of each column in the 4-Fold Cross Validation process shows 
that the Draft*Anocracy interaction term increases slightly the predictive capacity of the model. 
   
 
Appendix Table 17. Out-of-Sample 4-Fold Cross Validation 
 Cycle Run Main Text Model 7 Model without Draft*Anocracy interaction term 
1 0.835 0.830 
2 0.819 0.816 
3 0.835 0.830 
4  0.819 0.822 
5 0.835 0.830 
6 0.825 0.813 
7 0.835 0.830 
8 0.817 0.816 
9 0.835 0.830 
10 0.827 0.816 
Average Value 0.828 0.823 
 




For the purports of this paper, I have aggregated autocracies and democracies into the category 
of non-anocracies. I anticipate that conscription will have a negative effect on coup risk in both 
regime types. In the case of autocracies, the high concentration of authority in an assertive 
centralized government is expected to enable the civilian government to control the 
indoctrination practices in the armed forces and thus conscription leads to the diffusion of pro-
government ideology and line of thought into the rest of society. For instance, in the People’s 
Liberation Army, the proliferation of Marxist and Leninist thought within the military ranks is 
a crucial aspect of conscript training (Heaton Jr., 1980, p. 123), as new recruits are socialized 
through ideological studies and political indoctrination programs (Shambaugh, 1991, p. 562-
565).More specifically, the ratio of military and political training for conscripts in the PLA is 
6:4, meaning 24 and 16 days of military and political training respectively out of a total 40 days 
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in the induction period, including subjects such as military discipline and party ideology 
(Blasko in Kamphausen, Scobell, Tanner, 2008, p. 106-107). In the case of democracies, 
conscription is expected to decrease coup probability as citizen are represented in the political 
decision-making through their elected representatives, and a military intervention into politics 
would negatively impact their living conditions due to rent seeking by the junta (Adam, 2012).  
  In accordance with the previous statement, conscription in democracies diffuses democratic 
elements into the armed forces and facilitates objective civilian control (Huntington, 1957). To 
examine these claims, I run a model with two interaction terms, Draft*Democracy and 
Draft*Autocracy, with anocracies as the baseline. Conscription in anocracies still has a positive 
effect on coup probability and the confidence intervals for anocracies with and without 
conscription are clearly separated. Conscription is found to have a statistically significant 
negative effect on coup probability in autocracies, but the two confidence intervals do overlap, 
so the relationship is rather ambiguous. In the case of democracies, while the effect is negative 
and statistically significant, the two confidence intervals are almost identical. As coup d'état in 
democratic regimes is an extremely rare phenomenon, it is plausible that conscription has no 
effect on coup probability in democracies as these regimes are already shielded from coups by 
other institutional and political means, like a strictly professional, democratic cohort and 
politically engaged citizens. Finally, while the probability of coup attempt is similar in 
anocracies and democracies without conscription, the probability of coup attempt in anocracies 








           Appendix Table 18. Autocracy and Democracy with Anocracy as the baseline Model 



























Change Military Expenditure -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Soldier Quality -0.142 
 (0.071)** 
Military Personnel -0.091 
 (0.053)* 
Change GDP per capita -3.267 
 (0.742)*** 
GDP per capita -0.195 
 (0.084)** 
Instability  0.113 
 (0.023)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.190 
 (0.066)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.010 
 (0.005)** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 
 (0.000)* 
Obs.   4,836 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -593.735 
Wald χ2 213.73*** 
  
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 









Appendix Figure 7. Predicted probabilities graph of the impact of Draft*Autocracy and 
Draft*Democracy on Coup Risk 
 
 
Note: The interaction of draft with anocracy. Graph presents predicted probabilities for a coup attempt 
given the values of Draft and conditional on Anocracy. The vertical bars pertain to 90 percent 
confidence intervals. The predicted probability of 0 marked with grey horizontal line. 
 
 
The Explanatory Variables without the Interaction Term 
I also include models with the effect of the main explanatory variables on coup risk without 
the interaction term with coup attempt as the dependent variable. The effect of the draft variable 
on coup risk is statistically insignificant in the first model. This finding is in accordance with 
the theoretical argument as conscription is expected to increase coup risk only in anocracies. 
Likewise, the anocracy variable itself has no statistically significant effect on the probability 
of the coup risk as displayed in the second model. All in all, the results of both models suggest 
that the draft and anocracy variables do not have an impact on coup risk when they are 
separated. Only the interaction of the two variables is expected to have a positive and 




Appendix Table 19. Model with Draft and Anocracy as the Independent Variable 
  Model A21 Model A22 
Draft  0.003  
 (0.170)  
Anocracy   0.136 
  (0.177) 
Change Military Expenditure -0.000  0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Soldier Quality -0.207 -0.145 
 (0.074)*** (0.072)** 
Military Personnel -0.085 -0.071 
 (0.051)* (0.050) 
Change GDP per capita -3.335 -3.535 
 (0.716)*** (0.729)*** 
GDP per capita -0.260 -0.275 
 (0.078)*** (0.085)*** 
Instability  0.091  0.090 
 (0.021)*** (0.023)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.161 -0.212 
 (0.047)*** (0.066)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.007  0.012 
 (0.003)** (0.005)** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)** (0.000)* 
Obs. 5,998 4,969 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -686.077 -640.688 
Wald2 176.36 164.43 
Prob>2 0.000 0.000 
   
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Regime Sub-Sample 
I divide the sample into three sub-samples based on regime type. Thereupon, the sample is 
divided into democracies, autocracies, and anocracies. I use these models to examine the effect 
of conscription in each regime separately. Once again, the results demonstrate the conscription 
increases the probability of a coup attempt in anocracies. Similar with the other models, 
conscription has a negative effect on coup risk in democracies and autocracies, but the effect 
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is statistically insignificant. Based on the sub-sample results, we can conclude that conscription 
increases the probability of a coup attempt in anocracies, but the effect is non-significant in 
democracies or autocracies, although there have been past cases of coups in democracies with 
conscription (Adam, 2012). Therefore, unlike popular belief, conscription does not seem to 
decrease coup risk in democracies, thus putting in doubt the democratizing effect of conscripts 
on the democratic armed forces. 
 
 Appendix Table 20. Regime Sub-Samples 
                        Anocracy         Democracy Autocracy 
Draft  0.831 -0.329 -0.192 
 (0.305)*** (0.394) (0.240) 
Change Military Expenditure  0.252  0.091  0.001 
 (0.347) (0.515) (0.001) 
Soldier Quality -0.268  0.085 -0.149 
 (0.165) (0.207) (0.088)* 
Military Personnel -0.017 -0.080 -0.126 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.080) 
Change GDP per capita -4.473 -5.374 -2.735 
 (2.067)** (1.855)*** (0.849)*** 
GDP per capita -0.205 -0.367 -0.144 
 (0.216) (0.220)* (0.104) 
Instability  0.079  0.249  0.104 
 (0.045)* (0.099)** (0.030)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.126 -0.168 -0.313               
0.194 
 (0.102) (0.176) (0.091)***            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.006  0.010  0.022                  
0.194 
 (0.006) (0.011) 08          
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000                   
0.194 
 (0.000) (0.000) 00            
(0.073)*** 
Obs. 761 2,064 2,011 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -144.803 -91.04 -350.49 
Wald2 33.66 51.22 85.01 
Prob>2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time Period 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
   
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
                           




Each country has a unique set of socioeconomic characteristics and historical experiences that 
might influence coup risk. To control for the event of this country-specific characteristics I run 
a set of country fixed-effects models. A potential issue with a country fixed-effects model is 
that states with a perfect classification of outcomes are omitted from the analysis (Escribà-
Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster, 2019). Therefore, states that have never experience a coup d’état 
are omitted and we thus observe a substantial loss of observations in the aforementioned 
models. In addition, country fixed effects are not the optimal way to estimate variables whose 
values do not change rapidly over time (Plümper and Troeger, 2011), such as the anocracy and 
draft variables. Therefore, I exclude all countries that do not present a variation in draft from 
this model. However, even with the inclusion of the country fixed effects and the significant 
reduction of the sample, the interaction term has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on coup attempt across the models. Nevertheless, in the marginal effects graph for model A24 
we observe that the 90% confidence intervals of anocracies with and without conscription do 
slightly overlap. The confidence intervals do not overlap if we use the 84% CI. Payton, 
Greenstone, and Schenker (2003) argue that the 95% CI are too conservative for an error rate 
test of a=0.05, and instead the 84 % CI are the preferred choice. In more detail, “the 95% 
intervals are too wide, resulting in a procedure that declares differences at a proportion much 
less than the desired α = 0.05 rate.” (Payton, Greenstone, and Schenker, 2003). Therefore, in 
the 84% CI the confidence intervals of anocracies with and without conscription are clearly 
separated. In any case, in model A25 I also control for counterbalancing. Both 
counterbalancing variables are statistically significant and have a negative effect on coup 
attempt in accordance with the existing literature (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015). Furthermore, the 
Draft*Anocracy interaction term has a positive effect on coup attempt and is statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level. Most importantly, the 90% confidence intervals for 
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model A25 in Appendix Figure 8 are clearly separated thus re-affirming the position that 
conscription in anocracies increases coup risk. Finally, in A26 I include clustered errors at the 
country level and the results remain robust. 
Appendix Table 21. Country Fixed-Effects 
  Model A23 Model A24 Model A25 Model A26 
Draft  0.054 -0.579 -0.711 -0.579 
 (0.374) (0.439) (0.470) (0.449) 
Anocracy -1.408 -1.467 -2.250 -1.467 
 (0.725)* (0.769)* (0.914)** (0.831)* 
Draft*Anocracy  1.703  1.852  2.857  1.852 
 (0.801)** (0.867)** (1.009)*** (0.851)** 
Change Military Expenditure    0.012 -0.047  0.012 
  (0.320) (0.349) (0.313) 
Soldier Quality  -0.396 -0.275 -0.396 
  (0.221)* (0.258) (0.194)** 
Military Personnel  -0.299 -0.416 -0.299 
  (0.320) (0.367) (0.332) 
Change GDP per capita  -3.349 -4.588 -3.349 
  (1.326)** (1.495)*** (1.355)** 
GDP per capita  -1.240 -2.018 -1.240 
  (0.568)** (0.664)*** (0.604)** 
Instability    0.025  0.015  0.025 
  (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) 
Counterbalancing   -2.451  
   (1.325)*  
Counterbalancing2    0.703  
   (0.306)**  
Years Since Coup  -0.364 -0.407 -0.364 
  (0.107)*** (0.119)*** (0.095)*** 
Years Since Coup2    0.034  0.040  0.034 
  (0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** 
Years Since Coup3  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Obs. 1,079 938 849 938 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -280.956 -225.630 -197.376 -225.630 
LR 2 38.11 76.39 88.69  
Prob>2 0.287 0.000 0.000  
Country Clustered Errors No No No Yes 
     
 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, ** 
significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Appendix Figure 8. Average Marginal Effects of the impact of Draft*Anocracy on Coup 
Risk based on Country Fixed-Effects, Models A24 and A25 
 
Note: The interaction of draft with anocracy. Graph presents average marginal effects for a coup 
attempt given the values of Draft and a value of Anocracy = 1. The vertical bars pertain to 90 percent 
confidence intervals.  
 
Alternative Conscription Variable 
In this robustness check I use an alternative conscription variable to further examine the effect 
of conscription on coup risk in anocracies. For this reason, I generate a duration of compulsory 
military service variable for the anocratic sub-sample with information from the Military 
Balance data set (2019). The variable captures the duration of compulsory military service in 
months and its maximum value is 36 months. In contrast, anocracies that do not conscript 
receive a value of 0. I then re-run main text model 7 with the duration variable instead of the 
binary draft variable in an anocratic sub-sample. With regards to the model’s findings, the 
longer the duration of compulsory military service the higher is the probability of a coup 
attempt in anocracies. Therefore, we can conclude that conscription increases coup risk in 
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anocracies even if we do not use the binary draft variable and instead replace it with a duration 
variable. Additionally, more months of compulsory military service correspond to higher levels 
of coup risk. 
 
Appendix Table 22. Months of Service 
                     Model A27         
Months of Service  0.028                
 (0.010)***            
(0.073)*** 
Change Military Expenditure  0.341 
 289  
Soldier Quality -0.354 
 (0.188)* 
Military Personnel -0.173 
 (0.138) 
Change GDP per capita -3.045 
 (2.020) 
GDP per capita  0.005 
 (0.221) 
Instability  0.057 
 (0.048) 
Years Since Coup -0.214                
0.194 
 (0.125)*            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.013                   
0.194 
 (0.009)           
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000                   
0.194 
 (0.000)            
(0.073)*** 
Obs. 648 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -126.891 
Wald2 48.38 
Prob>2 0.000 
Time Period 1970-2008 
  
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Senior and Junior Officer Coup 
In this set of models, I examine which cohort of the officer corps carries out the coup attempt. 
To this end, I divide coup d’état in the anocratic sub-sample in those staged by senior officers, 
officers above the colonel rank, and those staged by combat officers, officers from the colonel 
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rank and below. I then run models similar to those in the main text only this time with combat 
officer coup and senior officer coup as the dependent variables. I also run a second set of 
models with the polity2 variable to increase the sample size since the observations in the xpolity 
sample are significantly below the 1,000 observations threshold commonly used in logistic 
regression models. Regarding coups by combat officers, the draft variable has a positive and 
statistically significant effect across all models. On the other hand, conscription is found to 
increase the probability of a coup attempt by senior officers in the polity2 sample, but not in 
the xpolity sample, calling attention to the low number of observations. The results indicate 
that the effect of conscription on coup risk in anocracies is not limited to combat or senior 
officers. The increased prestige and social ties of an army with conscripts enables both senior 
and combat officers to stage a coup attempt against the anocratic civilian government. We can 
therefore conclude that conscription increases the probability of a coup attempt by combat 
officers and we also have strong evidence that this relationship extends to senior officers as 
well. 
 Appendix Table 23. Combat Officer Coup 
  Model A28 Model A29 
Draft 
 
 1.331  0.518 
 (0.562)** (0.302)* 
Change Military Expenditure -0.319  0.016 
 (0.378) (0.130) 
Soldier Quality -0.241 -0.365 
 (0.213) (0.114)*** 
Military Personnel -0.290 -0.328 
 (0.167)* (0.117)*** 
Change GDP per capita -1.845 -1.127 
 (2.005) (1.358) 
GDP per capita -0.427 -0.282 
 (0.255)* (0.176) 
Instability  0.074  0.099 
 (0.078) (0.041)** 
Years Since Coup -0.255 -0.149 
 (0.214) (0.098) 
Years Since Coup2  0.017  0.007 
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 (0.012) (0.005) 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 668 1,556 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -64.333 -210.482 
Wald2 41.64 61.80 
Prob>2 0.000 0.000 
   
   
   
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Appendix Table 24. Senior Officer Coup 
  Model A30 Model A31 
Draft 
 
 0.596  1.068 
 (0.558) (0.325)*** 
Change Military Expenditure  0.510  0.156 
 (0.312) (0.204) 
Soldier Quality -0.477 -0.319 
 (0.250)* (0.112)*** 
Military Personnel -0.119 -0.028 
 (0.237) (0.126) 
Change GDP per capita -3.375 -1.716 
 (2.186) (1.406) 
GDP per capita -0.062 -0.235 
 (0.335) (0.193) 
Instability  0.116  0.080 
 (0.060)* (0.040)** 
Years Since Coup  0.019  0.007 
 (0.115) (0.061) 
Years Since Coup2 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.002) 
Years Since Coup3  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 688 1,556 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -92.94 -258.829 
Wald2 19.77 32.89 
Prob>2 0.031 0.000 
   
   
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 




Different Values of Time Polynomials 
In this set of models, I control for different values of time polynomials. In model A32 I only 
include the basic Years since Coup variable without its square and cubic versions and in A33 
I completely remove time polynomials from the model. Once again, the effect of 
draft*anocracy on the probability of a coup attempt remains positive and statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level, hence its effect is not influenced by the time 
polynomials and temporal trends.  
Appendix Table 25. Different Values of Time Polynomials 

























 1.198  1.150 
(0.336)*** (0.382)*** 
Change Military Expenditure -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Soldier Quality -0.165 -0.258 
 (0.075)** (0.089)*** 
Military Personnel -0.075 -0.164 
 (0.051) (0.068)** 
Change GDP per capita -3.695 -3.971 
 (0.799)*** (0.814)*** 
GDP per capita -0.267 -0.401 
 (0.085)*** (0.114)*** 
Instability  0.110  0.152 
 (0.023)*** (0.026)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.069  
 (0.011)***  
Obs. 4,836 4,836 





   
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 






Additional Control Variables 
Since coup risk is a multi-facet phenomenon, I control for further factors that may influence its 
relationship with draft and anocratic forms of government. To this end, I control for the 
presence of a left-wing government in power since one would expect the conservative armed 
forces to be more likely to move against a left-wing government than a right-wing one due to 
conflicting ideologies. To control for a government’s left-wing ideology, I use the Database of 
Political Institutions from the World Bank (2017) which has information on governments 
around the globe between 1975 and 2015. Nevertheless, the left-wing government variable has 
a statistically insignificant effect. Continuing, I control for the effect of leadership transition 
on coup risk with the lagged by a year version of the leadership transition variable from the 
Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) 4.0 data (2016), although its effect is 
statistically insignificant. Likewise, in model A36 I examine whether the effect of 
Draft*Anocracy persists without controlling for other forms of political instability besides 
coups. Furthermore, in model A37 I control for the number of citizens per soldier in the army 
in a given country. Instead of measuring the absolute size of the armed forces, this variable 
captures how large is an army in comparison to the country’s population. One would expect 
that the larger the share of people in the army, the larger the army’s influence would be in this 
state. Nonetheless, the variable has a statistically insignificant effect on coup attempt. Finally, 
the effect of draft*anocracy on the likelihood of a coup attempt remains positive and 












                      Model A34          Model A35 Model A36 Model A37 
Draft -0.437 -0.451 -0.301 -0.328                   
0.194 
 (0.220)** (0.224)** (0.206) (0.218)            
(0.073)*** 
Anocracy -0.541                 -0.509                 -0.475                -0.478                 
 (0.261)**            
(0.073)*** 
(0.263)*            
(0.073)*** 
(0.250)*            
(0.073)*** 
248           
(0.073)*** 
Draft*Anocracy  1.309                  1.294                 1.100                   1.185                   
 348            
(0.073)*** 
34            
(0.073)*** 
327            
(0.073)*** 
332            
(0.073)*** 
Change Military Expenditure  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                   
0.194 
 00  00  00  00            
(0.073)*** 
Soldier Quality -0.175 -0.171 -0.159 -0.161                 
0.194 
 (0.098)** (0.095)* (0.072)** 84            
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel -0.046 -0.057  0.006  
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.048)  
Change GDP per capita -3.734 -3.749 -3.109 -3.687                   
0.194 
 (0.868)*** (0.864)*** (0.782)*** (0.788)***            
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita -0.261 -0.254 -0.314 -0.277                  
0.194 
 (0.105)** (0.104)** (0.081)*** 105            
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.093  0.092    0.093                  
0.194 
 (0.026)*** (0.026)***  2            
(0.073)*** 
Left-Wing Government -0.126                     
 (0.254)               
Leadership Transition   0.059                       
  (0.203)              
Citizens per Soldier     0.029                   
0.194 
    (0.093)           
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.220 -0.218                 
0.194 
-0.255                  
0.194 
-0.206                  
0.194 
 (0.080)*** (0.081)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.075)***            
(0.073)*** 
67            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.012  0.012                   
0.194 
 0.014                  
0.194 
 0.011                   
0.194 
 (0.006)** 06           
(0.073)*** 
06           
(0.073)*** 
05            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000                   
0.194 
-0.000                   
0.194 
-0.000                   
0.194 
 (0.000)* 00            
(0.073)*** 
00            
(0.073)*** 
00            
(0.073)*** 
Obs. 4,305 4,229 4,9 2 4,836 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -504.526 -503.514 -628.210 -601.790 
Wald2 153.69 150.34 170.37 175.2 
Prob>2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 






Linear Probability with Country and Year Fixed Effects 
For the final appendix model, I include a model with country and year fixed effects as well as 
a time trend variable to further control for the effect of country and year specific factors on the 
relationship between draft*anocracy and coup risk. Major political events like international 
crises, wars, or regime collapses may generate protracted political instability that influences 
coup risk. Indeed, years 1975-1977, 1989, and 1992 have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the probability of a coup attempt. Additionally, the year trend variable has a negative 
effect on coup attempt and coups become less prevalent over time. Once again, the 
draft*anocracy interaction term has a positive and statistically significant effect on coup 
attempt. 
Appendix Table 27. Linear Probability with Country and Year Fixed Effects 
                              Model A38         
Draft -0.021 
 (0.014) 
Anocracy -0.066                 
 (0.025)***           
(0.073)*** 
Draft*Anocracy  0.096                 
 29            
(0.073)*** 
Change Military Expenditure -0.000 
 00  
Soldier Quality -0.005 
 (0.007) 
Military Personnel -0.009 
 (0.012) 
Change GDP per capita -0.004 
 (0.008) 
GDP per capita -0.028 
 (0.013)** 
Instability  0.001 
 (0.001) 
Years Since Coup -0.001               
0.194 
 (0.002)            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.000                   
0.194 
 (0.000)**           
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000                   
0.194 
 (0.000)*            
(0.073)*** 








Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
4 Secret Police and Coup D’état in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In 1973, prominent officers of the Greek navy organized a coup against the military junta. 
However, spies of the Greek Military Police-Special Interrogation Unit uncovered the plot and 
arrested the conspirators before they were able to go ahead with their plans (Couloumbis, 1974, 
p. 359). The Military Police was the Greek Junta’s secret police and guarded the regime from 
enemies within the state or wider society. Likewise, the KGB spied on the entire Russian 
society, from intellectuals to ethnic minorities, on behalf of the Soviet Communist Party 
(Shelley, 1996, p. 19; Richelson, 1986, p. 246-47). Overall, secret police are used by autocrats 
to repress dissidents, to protect the physical integrity of the government, and to maintain 
political order (Berman and Waller in Berman and Waller, 2006, p. xv)33. However, it is unclear 
whether secret police contribute to regime stability or their violent operations instigate 
dissidents to organize against the regime. Up until this point, the lack of large-n data sets, has 
limited our ability to systematically examine the effect of secret police on political repression, 
protests, and coups across autocracies on a global scale. By introducing a new large-n data set 
                                                             
33 Despite what the name suggests, the existence of the secret police is widely known to the public. Plate 
and Darvi accentuate this oxymoron when they ask, “Is there a single Soviet citizen in the entire 
U.S.S.R. who does not know the KGB?” (1982, p.  9). Instead, it’s the organization’s inner workings 
and the identity of its agents that remain a secret. 
104 
 
on secret police across autocracies, we can now systematically explore the effect of these 
organizations on socio-political conditions in autocratic regimes globally.  
  In this study, I argue that secret police are intertwined with low coup risk in autocratic 
regimes. Secret police employ a range of coup proofing operations, such as spy networks and 
the surveillance of military officers, that decrease the willingness and opportunity of military 
officers to stage a coup. To assess this relationship, I introduce a novel variable on secret police 
organizations in authoritarian regimes for the years 1946 to 2018. This variable is a product of 
data collection from qualitative and small-n quantitative studies across the secret police 
literature. The study’s findings stress the decreased probability of a coup attempt in autocratic 
regimes with secret police compared to autocratic regimes without secret police. In what 
follows, I present anecdotes of secret police activities in autocracies and discuss how selective 
recruitment establishes ties of loyalty between secret police and the autocrat. Then I examine 
how secret police intelligence operations impede the planning and organization of a coup 
attempt and triangulate the theoretical claims with anecdotal evidence to demonstrate how 
secret police negatively affect coup risk. In the empirics, I introduce the large-n secret police 
variable and quantitatively assess the effect of secret police on coup risk in autocracies. Finally, 
I discuss the empirical findings and present the study’s concluding remarks. 
  The study has important policy implications since it highlights how security organizations, 
like the secret police, may facilitate autocratic survival. In 2018, 18 out of the 65 authoritarian 
states across the world had secret police. A close inspection of Figure 1 also reveals that secret 
police are present in some of the most notable autocratic regimes, like the People’s Republic 
of China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, by examining the impact of secret police on 
coup risk the study advances the discussion on authoritarian stability. Crucially, the study 
contributes to the debate on structural coup proofing by disaggregating different types of 
internal security forces that can counterbalance the regular armed forces.  
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Figure 4. Map of authoritarian states with an active secret police organization in 2018 based on the 
Polity Index. Red color indicates authoritarian regimes with secret police while orange color indicates 
authoritarian regimes without secret police. The rest of the states in the map are either democracies or 
states with a missing value as their population is less than half a million people.   
 
  Secret police are political police forces meaning that they are established specifically to 
repress political opponents, root political dissidents out of the state, and overall neutralize 
political activity through terror34 (Berman and Waller, 2006). The term “secret police” is by 
design general to encourage inclusion and generalizations (Plate and Darvi, 1982, p. 11), and 
as a result one cannot find a conclusive secret police definition in the literature. For the 
purposes of this study, I define secret police as an internal security force that employs violent 
police tactics and intelligence operations against political opponents and dissidents. The 
operational repertoire of secret police forces consists of “searches, arrests, interrogation, 
torture, and indefinite detention” to extract information (Plate and Darvi, 1982, p. 11). 
                                                             
34 Secret police are predominantly found in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes (Berman and Waller in 
Berman and Waller, 2006, p. xv). The division of power and the overall inclusive legal and 
constitutional framework that define a democratic regime do not allow for the existence of secret police 
organizations. However, there have been instances throughout the history when a democratic 
government has used internal security agencies to spy on the opposition or other civilian interest groups. 
Harry S. Truman warned that the FBI under Hoover leaned towards the direction of a secret police due 
its extensive surveillance operations and political blackmailing.  
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Additionally, secret police organizations specialize in intelligence gathering operations, such 
as informant networks, to monitor dissidents (Plate and Darvi, 1982; Greitens, 2016, p. 45)35. 
In summary, secret police are internal security agencies that answer directly to the regime 
leadership instead of other security organizations and use intelligence gathering operations and 
ultra-violent policing practices to prosecute an autocrat’s political opponents. With regards to 
the violent methods associated with secret police operations, the Greek Military Police operated 
under the dogma “Whoever enters this facility, will leave as a friend or cripple” (Karanikas, 
2010). All in all, secret police include some of history’s most notorious internal security forces 
like the KGB, the Stasi, the Chilean DINA, the Greek Military Police-Special Investigations 
Unit, and the Mukhabarat among others. 
4.2 The Autocratic Security Apparatus and Coup Risk 
The modus operandi of the secret police is different from that of military intelligence or 
paramilitary units. Specifically, military intelligence agencies focus on external threats, 
whereas secret police target internal threats, such as political dissidents or the opposition. In 
the Soviet Union, KGB agents were tasked with internal security while the GRU (military 
intelligence) performed exclusively foreign intelligence operations. Importantly, secret police 
answer directly to the autocrat (Shelley 1996), whilst military intelligence is part of the regular 
military apparatus and reports to senior military officials. For this reason, military intelligence 
is monitored by the secret police like the rest of the military apparatus. Case in point, the GRU 
was infiltrated by KGB spies to monitors its activities (Caron, 1971, p. 67). Conversely, like 
the secret police, paramilitaries operate outside of regular military command and have close 
                                                             
35 To give an example, even President Yeltsin or Chairman Gorbachev did not eschew the scope of 
KGB’s surveillance operations (Albats, 1995, p. 276-8). Likewise, when conventional means proved 
fruitless against mountainous guerilla groups, the Bulgarian communist regime used secret police 
agents to infiltrate those groups and destroy them from the inside (Baev and Grozev in Persak and 
Kamiński, 2005, p. 60). 
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ties to the regime, however, paramilitaries have equipment and organization similar to the 
regular army and are partially militarized to “balance against regular military units” (Böhmelt 
and Clayton, 2018, p. 203; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011; Quinlivan, 
1999). Therefore, while paramilitaries like the Republican Guard imitate the organization, 
training, and operations of the regular army, secret police are internal police forces that utilize 
intelligence and ultra-violent methods to root out an autocrat’s political rivals. 
  For its part, the military is a crucial actor for autocratic survival (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright, 
2014; Wintrobe, 2012). The military protects the regime from internal and external threats but 
remains a potential threat to the autocrat.  Dictators were forced out of office via coup in two 
out of three unconstitutional exits between 1945 and 2002 (Svolik, 2009, p. 477-478) and suffer 
from twice as many coup d’états compared to democratic leaders (Brooker, 2000). The coups 
in Turkey (2016), Libya (2016), Zimbabwe (2017), and Sudan (2019), serve as a contemporary 
reminder that the military is still a threat to autocratic survival.  
  With regards to coup risk, the literature draws attention to the significant influence of 
sociopolitical factors on coup risk. Factors such as high poverty levels or robust economic 
development have a positive and negative effect on coup risk respectively (Londregan and 
Poole, 1990; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012). Additionally, higher social spending 
and political liberalization also decrease the likelihood of subaltern coups (Albrecht and Eibl, 
2018). Simultaneously, political liberalization may trigger a coup by senior officers (Albrecht 
and Eibl, 2018). Specifically, mass protests signal regime illegitimacy and may prompt an 
intervention by the senior military leadership in defense of the status quo (Johnson and Thyne, 
2018; Koehler and Albrecht, 2019). On the other hand, severe foreign threats induce military 
loyalty since in the event of a coup the armed forces would have to defeat both pro-government 
forces and foreign rivals (McMahon and Slantchev, 2015). Regarding military capabilities, 
both high military spending and a high degree of force mechanization mitigate the prospects 
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of military intervention in politics (Powell, 2012; Albrecht and Eibl, 2018; Choulis et al., 
working paper). Civil wars also make states coup prone, but war-time coups are less likely to 
succeed (Bell and Sudduth, 2017). Consequently, when examining coup risk, one must 
consider a wide array of sociopolitical factors besides the security apparatus. 
  To counter praetorianism in the armed forces, autocrats also establish loyal paramilitary 
organizations or exploit sectarian politics to prevent the coordination of potential usurpers in 
the military (Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011, 2012; 
Singh, 2014; Brown, Fariss, and McMahon, 2016; Albrecht and Eibl, 2018; Brooks, 2019; 
Dragu and Przeworski, 2019). However, the coup proofing effectiveness of paramilitary 
organizations is an on-going debate. Counterbalancing with paramilitaries is found to decrease 
both the probability of a coup attempt and the likelihood of a successful outcome (Powell, 
2012; Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015; Albrecht and Eibl, 2018)36. Greitens makes the case that states 
with socially exclusive and fragmented security apparatuses are less likely to experience a coup 
because fragmentation renders the security agencies unable to coordinate (2016, p. 18-19). 
Nevertheless, evidence suggest that excessive fragmentation of the security apparatus may 
increase coup risk because military forces are too fragmented and too weak to resist a coup 
(Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015). Case in point, Idi Amin successfully expelled Milton Obote’s 
government in Uganda as the security apparatus was incapable of effectively responding to the 
coup attempt due to extreme fragmentation of military authority and the absence of a 
commanding paramilitary force loyal to the government (Decalo 1989, p. 10-11). Similarly, 
efforts to change an army’s ethnic composition may result in a reactionary coup as the army 
attempts to defend its corporate interests (Harkness, 2016). Indeed, more recent studies 
downplay the effect of counterbalancing on coup risk and instead emphasize on its negative 
                                                             
36 Although, coup proofing through paramilitary organizations is also found to decrease the state’s 
military effectiveness (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011).  
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effect on coup success (De Bruin, 2018). The presence of coup proofing organizations, like 
presidential guards, militarized police, or militias, decreases the probability of a successful 
coup but may also incentivize extensive fighting and thus escalate coups into civil wars (De 
Bruin, 2020). Consequently, it is imperative to disaggregate internal security forces to 
distinguish between paramilitary organizations that contribute to lower coup risk and those that 
do not.  
   
  With respect to intelligence-based coup proofing policites, autocrats supervise the entire state 
mechanism “by placing intelligence agents within the state hierarchy to monitor subordinates” 
(Barros, 2016, p. 962-67). However, autocratic dependence on intelligence officers may induce 
a principal-agent problem. To this end, Scharpf and Gläßel (2019) make the case that secret 
police organizations have some of the most loyal cadres among the autocratic security 
apparatus. This increased loyalty towards the regime can be traced back to selective 
recruitment. Secret police tend to be staffed with underachievers since “the arduous nature of 
secret police work offers underachievers the opportunity to signal their value to the regime” 
(Scharpf and Gläßel, 2019, p. 2; Zakharov, 2016). In addition, for the authoritarian leadership 
“underachievers are beneficial because they must diligently work toward the autocrat’s 
interests to retain their career chances.” (Scharpf and Gläßel, 2019, p. 5). Subsequently, secret 
police agents belong to the hardcore supporters of an autocratic government as their 
professional interests are tied to the regime’s survival.  
  It is also worth noting that the violent nature of secret police work, such as torture or state 
sponsored killings, further cements the ties of loyalty. If the regime collapses, secret police 
agents will be targeted due to their violent history against the opposition. Because of this 
violent past, secret police are the first security agency to be dissolved after a regime collapse 
(Berman and Waller in Berman and Waller, 2006, p. xvii). For example, after the fall of the 
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Iron Curtain in Europe the files of the secret police became public and former agents were 
excluded from the new security apparatus (Milosavljevic and Pavicevic, 2002; Berman and 
Waller in Berman and Waller, 2006, p. xvii; Marx in Bruinsma and Weisburd, 2014). 
Therefore, secret police agents are expected to be loyal to the regime and defend the 
government from a military coup to preserve their professional interests. 
  The rest of the study is divided into three sections. In the theory, I explore the underlying 
causal mechanism that links the operations of the secret police with a decrease in the probability 
of a coup attempt. In the empirics, I introduce the research design and examine the results of 
the regression analysis. Finally, I present the study’s conclusions and policy implications that 
arise from the findings in the last section. 
4.3 Secret Police Coup-Proofing Operations 
Secret police decrease the probability of a coup in autocracies because their operational 
repertoire enables an early intervention to a coup’s preparation stage. Secret police gather 
intelligence through spy networks and surveillance operations that mitigate the ability of 
military officers to go undetected when planning a coup. Inparticular, secret police agents spy 
on other security agencies, like the armed forces, to collect information on the government’s 
opponents (Gieseke in Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 169). As such, secret police operations 
increase the probability that dissatisfied military officers will be detected before the coup 
attempt materializes. To the contrary, paramilitaries lower the coup risk by increasing the costs 
associated with the execution of a coup attempt since in the event of a coup the army would 
have to defeat similarly equipped units in the battlefield37. Paramilitary organizations, such as 
a presidential guard, can deter usurpers, but they cannot spy on the entire state apparatus to 
                                                             
37 To give an example, Omar Bongo’s presidential guard was stronger than the regular Gabonese army 
as it possessed more troops, better equipment, and ethnic criteria of recruitment guaranteed its loyalty 
to the dictator (Decalo, 1989, p. 562, Barrows in Foltz and Bienen, 1985, p. 106). 
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stop a coup during its planning stage. For operations of this scale, a regime needs a political 
yet non-accountable internal intelligence agency. Therefore, paramilitaries increase the costs 
of a coup in its execution phase, whereas secret police rely on espionage to intervene in the 
planning and coordination phase. In the following paragraphs I review the intelligence 
operations of the secret police and discuss how they affect the willingness and opportunity of 
military officers to stage a coup. 
  The operational repertoire of the secret police includes a large network of informers, many of 
them professional spies, that provide information on dissidents or other disloyal cadres in the 
state apparatus (Dragu and Przeworski, 2019, p. 79). Scharpf and Gläßel emphasize the 
importance of informer networks claiming that “Secret police forces run extensive spying 
networks to surveil and detect conspiring enemies within the elite, the security apparatus, and 
society at large.” (2019, p. 1). Consequently, the extensive espionage networks are the 
cornerstone of every secret police. Lenin’s Cheka, the predecessor of all contemporary secret 
police organizations, sustained “an empire-wide system of secret informants to report the 
slightest dissent” (Waller in Berman and Waller, 2006, p.  3, see also Ferdinand, 1991, p. 135-
6).  Likewise, Stasi’s spy networks were of such a large-scale that the organization had 
informants within the ministries, the armed forces, and even itself (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 
2018, p. 156, see also Rosenzweig and Le Forestier 1992). Accordingly, in some branches of 
the Red Army, one out of three servicemen served as a KGB informer (Richelson 1986, p. 
234). Informers were either paid for their services or were forced to cooperate with the secret 
police through blackmail (Deletant in Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 314)38. To demonstrate 
the size of these networks, the Romanian Securitate’s network of informers grew from 42,187 
in 1951 to around 450,000 people in 1989 (Deletant in Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 314-15). 
                                                             
38 To put it simply, “Charges against them for offences committed were dropped in return for 
collaboration” (Deletant in Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 314). 
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In a similar manner, NKVD’s massive espionage network had approximately 500,000 
informants by mid-1930s (Gregory, 2009, p. 39). To conclude, the informant networks of the 
secret police penetrate every state institution and act as a constant source of information for 
dissidents, especially dissatisfied military officers. If the latter attempt to organize a plot against 
the government, then the informants will notify secret police agents and they will intervene to 
arrest them. 
  In conjunction with informer networks, secret police employ surveillance operations within 
state institutions to detect disloyal public servants or military officers. Secret police agents bug 
telephones or other communication devices to intercept communications and get information 
on potential plots against the regime (Dragu and Przeworski, 2019, p. 79, Kramer, 1985, p. 51). 
For example, Pinochet used the secret police to spy on other officers of the ruling coalition in 
an effort to consolidate his power (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018, p. 161). Similarly, KGB 
servicemen were deployed down to the company level to perform counterintelligence 
operations and monitor military officers (Caron, 1971, p. 67). Even the GRU was infiltrated by 
KGB spies (Caron, 1971, p. 67). Westwards, East German secret police officers were tasked 
with monitoring the People’s Police and the National People’s Army for disloyal cadres 
(Gieseke in Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 169; Herspring, 1999, p. 565). Even in the People’s 
Republic of China, authority over domestic security was soon transferred from the People’s 
Liberation Army to the secret police (Ferdinand, 1991, p. 140). Overall, secret police agents 
permeate the military hierarchy and spy on military officers to uncover plots against the 
government. It is therefore difficult for conspirators to recruit other officers for the plot without 
being detected by secret police officers or without recruiting a spy into their ranks. Thereby, 
the coordination necessary for a coup becomes an arduous task since communications inside 
the armed forces are monitored by the secret police. Consequently, secret police decrease the 
opportunities available to military officers to stage a coup.  
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  At an individual level, secret police also decrease the willingness of military officers to 
conspire against the government. Secret police espionage deters the growth of praetorianism in 
the military since military officers will eschew conspiracies against the government to avoid a 
grueling interrogation by the secret police. Most pertinently, if an officer is found to conspire 
against the government, his career prospects and physical integrity will be endangered. Thus, 
the operations of the secret police not only impede the coordination of potential plotters but 
also deter the association of individual military officers with anti-government activities in fear 
of implications to their careers and livelihoods. To illustrate this point, career advancement in 
the East German state was subjected to Stasi’s vetting process and indications of anti-
government activity would be detrimental for one’s career (Rosenzweig and Le Forestier 
1992). As a result, secret police in authoritarian regimes also decrease the willingness of 
military officers to join a plot against the government.  
  With regards to the principal-agent problem, despite their powerful position in the 
authoritarian security apparatus, secret police rarely disobey the ruler. Members of the secret 
police are some of the most loyal cadres within the authoritarian state due to selective 
recruitment. As a rule, dictators prefer to exchange competence for loyalty (Egorov and Sonin, 
2011; Zakharov, 2016). Low skilled subordinates are less likely to betray the autocrat since 
they have few outside options compared to “competent viziers” (Egorov and Sonin, 2011; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). As such, secret police are staffed with underachievers that 
want to prove their value to the ruler to advance their careers and have few career opportunities 
outside of the security apparatus (Scharpf and Gläßel, 2019; Egorov and Sonin, 2011). In 
Czechoslovakia, officers of the secret police had poor education as the organization recruited 
primarily blue-collar workers (Blažek and Žáček in Persak and Kamiński, 2005, p. 106). 
Likewise, the Gestapo was forced to recruit marginally qualified personnel due to its rapidly 
expanding operational needs (Browder, 1996, p. 67). Stalin’s praetorians were also poorly 
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educated (Gregory, 2009, p. 58). Hence, the poor socioeconomic background of secret police 
agents reaffirms the view that they have limited career options outside of the organization and 
are thus invested in the status quo. It is worth reiterating that due to the profession’s violent 
nature if the regime collapses then secret police agents will suffer severe repercussions, like 
exclusion from the new security apparatus or even criminal charges39 (Milosavljevic and 
Pavicevic, 2002; Berman and Waller in Berman and Waller, 2006, p. xvii; Marx in Bruinsma 
and Weisburd, 2014).  
  As a consequence of their limited outside options and potential punishment in case of regime 
collapse, secret police officers become very loyal to the autocrat and the status quo. In Chile, 
the secret police reported daily to Pinochet and only indirectly to the rest of the military Junta 
(Policzer, 2009, p. 86). In the Brazilian Junta, DOI agents enjoyed operational autonomy and 
their operations “became illegal, even by the military’s own rules” (Stepan, 1988, p. 27). 
Similarly, Soviet party members could not command NKVD officers and the agency had full 
autonomy over its operations and appointments (Shelley, 1996, p. 31).  
  It must be noted that despite poor education or the absence of prior life attainments, secret 
police do not lack high intra-organizational discipline that promotes operational competency 
(Plate and Darvi, 1982). In East Germany, secret police agents mirrored the discipline of 
professional soldiers and had established the esprit de corps of an elite unit (Gieseke in Persak 
and Kamiński, 2005, p. 174). Thus, secret police agents may be underachievers, but the 
organization has the necessary infrastructure in the form of policing schools to train them, and 
overall organizational success is “more often attributable to the powers they wield than to 
agents’ brilliantly performed work” (Plate and Darvi, 1982, p. 34, 50-51). Therefore, through 
selective recruitment an autocrat can overcome the principal-agent problem and establish a 
loyal security organization in the form of the secret police.  
                                                             
39 See the trials of senior Greek Military Police personnel after the fall of the Greek Junta in 1974. 
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  To summarize, secret police in autocratic regimes undertake a series of coup-proofing 
strategies, such as spy networks and surveillance operations, that decrease the willingness and 
opportunity of military officers to stage a coup. These coup-proofing operations affect both 
senior and middle ranking officers since secret police monitor the activities of senior officers 
and permeate the combat ranks with informants. For example, during the Bulgarian 1965 coup 
attempt, the secret police intercepted communications of hardliners in the higher echelons of 
the army plotting to overthrow the government of Todor Zhivkov and arrested them before the 
coup was materialized (Conquest in Andrews and Ra’anan, 1969). Similarly, informants of the 
Greek Military Police uncovered a plot of middle ranking navy officers against the junta in 
1973 and the conspirators were arrested before they were able to go ahead with their plans 
(Couloumbis, 1974, p. 359). Likewise, a CIA-led coup in 1996 against Saddam Hussein failed 
because Mukhabarat agents had infiltrated the conspirators and had even hijacked a CIA secure 
satellite communications unit to get hold of the coup plans (Ritter, 2005). Subsequently, the 
coup proofing operations of the secret police create serious communication and coordination 
obstacles to military officers that want to overthrow an autocrat. Accordingly, the study’s 
research hypothesis is the following:  
Autocratic regimes with a secret police organization are less likely to experience a coup d’état 
compared to autocratic regimes without secret police. 
4.4 Empirics 
4.4.1 Data and Method 
 
For the empirical analysis, I run a series of logistic regression models to examine the effect of 
secret police on the probability of a coup attempt in autocracies. To this end, I employ Powell’s 
and Thyne’s Global Instances of Coups from 1950-Present data set (2011). I use country-years 
as the unit of analysis and the global coverage of the data set greatly improves the scope of the 
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empirical analysis. I also utilize the Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions data set by 
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) to identify autocratic regimes. A regime is registered as 
autocratic when the “executive achieves power through undemocratic means and, with his inner 
circle establishes new rules for choosing leaders and policies” (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 
2014). The data set includes information for 280 autocratic regimes between years 1946-2010. 
The data set also distinguishes between monarchical, single-party, personalist, and military 
autocratic regimes which will prove to be useful for robustness checks.  
Dependent Variable 
I use the coup attempt variable from Powell and Thyne (2011) as the study’s dependent variable 
to explore the effect of secret police on coup risk in autocratic regimes. Coup attempt is a binary 
variable in which a value of 1 corresponds to a coup attempt or 0 otherwise. Of a total of 4,412 
country-year observations in the sample, coup attempt is assigned a value of 1 in 270 cases or 
6.11% of the total observations. All other cases are assigned a value of 0. Finally, due to the 
binary nature of the coup attempt variable, I use a binary time-series cross-sectional logit 
regression to estimate the effect of secret police on coup attempt.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Coup Attempt 4,412 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Secret Police 4,429 0.341 0.474 0 1 
Military Expenditure 2,553 5.982 2.075 -2.855 12.57 
Change Mil Expenditure 4,457 0.026 0.177 -1.244 2.773 
GDP per capita 4,263 7.772 1.016 5.293 13.35 
Change GDP per capita 4,457 0.013 0.118 -1.594 3.081 
Military Personnel 4,167 3.800 1.728 0 8.665 
Instability 3,980 3.291 3.645 0 10.85 





Until now, no large-n secret police variable is present in the civil-military relations literature. 
While the Military Balance data set (2019) has information on the size of various paramilitary 
organizations across the globe, secret police are under-reported in the data since there are no 
available information on their size while the regime is still in power. As a result, the data set 
includes information only for a very limited number of secret police organizations located in 
former Communist states and for a limited number of years. Likewise, De Bruin’s Intelligence 
variable in the State Security Forces data set (2020) has information on intelligence services 
and secret police in 22 states. However, the variable captures primarily intelligence services, 
like the Federal Bureau of Investigations or the Slovak Information Service, which are not the 
same as secret police. Nevertheless, the data set is very useful, since it includes information on 
various paramilitary organizations that could potentially be classified as secret police based on 
their policing activities and institutional role. Plate and Darvis (1982) explicitly examine secret 
police organizations, mostly non-European ones, but the analysis ends in 1982. 
  To overcome data limitations, I make use of small-n studies from the secret police literature 
to construct the first large-n secret police variable. A detailed list of secret police organizations 
and relevant sources can be found in the chapter’s appendix. The variable is a binary one and 
I assign a value of 1 if a secret police organization is present in a country in a given year or 0 
otherwise. I register a paramilitary organization as secret police if it fulfills a series of relevant 
criteria. Specifically, a security organization is coded as secret police if a) it is a political police 
force, indicating that it targets primarily political opponents and dissidents, b) it operates 
independently from other police organizations and answers directly to the regime leadership, 
c) the identity of its members and its operations are secret, d) it is an internal intelligence service 
that specializes on political intelligence and surveillance operations, e) it carries out violent 
policing practices, such as arbitrary searches, arrests, interrogations, torture, disappearances, 
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and surveillance. Consequently, although regular police organizations may carry out 
clandestine operations, like the ones of an anti-narcotics department, their targets are not the 
regime’s political opponents but criminal operations.  
  Plate and Darvi make the case in the 1980s that only a dozen of security institutions in the 
world could be considered as hard-core secret police organizations owing to the fact that other 
internal-security organizations, like the ones in Western democracies, may use some violent 
methods, such as surveillance, but not to the relevant degree or intensity and thus do not belong 
in the same category as secret police (1982, p. 11). For instance, the Malaysian Special Branch 
used to monitor citizens affiliated with the communist party, but its primary goal was foreign 
intelligence and fighting the communist insurrection instead of terrorizing political dissidents 
with ultra-violent practices. To the contrary, the Greek Junta’s Military Police and Saddam’s 
Mukhabarat were used as political police forces denoting that they were tasked with political 
intelligence and repression of dissidents. Both answered directly to the regime leadership and 
used informant networks and ultra-violent methods to terrorize the population. Specifically, 
both agencies surveilled the population and used torture, arbitrary arrests, blackmailing, and 
other violent acts to extract information against dissidents. Moreover, the regular police may 
carry out violent acts, but the identity of its members is not secret as it recruits officers from 
the broader society. Additionally, the regular police in authoritarian regimes is not independent 
from other security agencies and does not have jurisdiction over the secret police.  
  In appendix table 39, I also examine the determinants of secret police to ascertain whether 
secret police are more prevalent in some autocratic regimes than others. One could argue that 
secret police are more likely to be present in consolidated autocracies that are ruled by an all-
powerful institution with a firm grip on society, like a communist party. Similarly, secret police 
are strongly associated as a concept with the USSR and other communist regimes in Europe 
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during the Cold war. However, single party and communist regimes are found to be no more 
likely to have secret police than other authoritarian regimes. 
  Regarding the variable itself, I lag the secret police variable by a year because the organization 
would need some months to set up the spy networks and to infiltrate the armed forces and the 
rest of the state. As such, I expect the causal mechanism to come into effect a year after the 
establishment of the secret police. Therefore, of a total of 4,429 observations, secret police are 
present in 1,512 (34.13%) of the authoritarian country-years. Specifically, out of 117 
autocracies in the data, 55 (47%) had secret police for at least a year compared to 62 (53%) of 
autocracies that have never established one. The variable includes secret police from every 
world region and candidate cases were discovered through mentions in the secret police 
literature and relevant data set on paramilitary forces. After registering the cases, I examined 
each specific case and removed those that did not meet the five secret police criteria, such as 
the Malaysian Special Branch, the Haitian Macoute, the Turkish National Intelligence 
Organization, or the Jordanian Public Security. In-text information regarding the active years 
of each secret police have been verified with online sources. In some instances, like the Greek 
Military Police, an organization may pre-exist an autocratic regime and is thus registered as 
secret police only after being repurposed by the new government. It must also be noted that the 
available data only allow for a binary iteration of the variable since information on the size of 
each organization or the informant networks is rare outside of certain case studies40. 
Importantly, since I relied predominantly on English literature, there is potential source bias 
for secret police in Europe and the Americas, especially since secret police in the Warsaw pact 
                                                             
40 To demonstrate this point, reports on the size of Iranian Savak between 1974-6 vary from 3,120 to 
30,000 and 60,000 and up to 3 million Iranians may have potentially worked for the organization 
(Halliday, 1979, p. 80; Plate and Darvi, 1982, p. 385). Nonetheless, the data will be updated with a 
smaller-n, numeric version of the secret police variable as more information becomes available. I also 
recognize that regional experts and other academics may have excellent recommendations of security 
agencies that could be classified as secret police but are missing from the list and I am looking forward 
to their suggestions. 
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countries were particularly featured in the literature. However, the isometric regional 
distribution observed in Figure 5 indicates that the wide array of sources has largely mitigated 
a possible pro-European bias. It should be mentioned that studies on secret police, like Plate 
and Darvi (1982), Berman and Waller (2006), and Scharpf and Gläßel (2019), tend to not limit 
themselves to European affairs but put a large emphasis on secret police outside of Communist 
Europe thus helping reduce potential pro-European bias. Finally, for a detailed list of the secret 
police organizations included in the variable as well as the literature used to construct it please 




Figure 5. Regional Distribution of Autocracies with Secret Police  
 
Control Variables 
A state’s socioeconomic conditions and the composition of its armed forces are also crucial 
determinants of coup risk. More accurately, a state’s level of economic development has a 
profound impact on the probability of a coup attempt (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012). 
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more likely to experience a coup attempt (Londregan and Poole, 1990). Likewise, high GDP 
coincides with high state capacity. Thereby, autocracies with enough resources to invest in the 
security sector may be more likely to establish a secret police organization compare to poorer 
states. As such, the effect of secret police on coup risk may be driven by high state capacity. 
To control for economic development, I use the GDP per capita variable by the World Bank 
and Gleditsch (2002). I also capture the yearly trend of an economy with the Change in GDP 
per capita variable. Both variables are based on real income data in 2005 prices and are logged 
and lagged by a year (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2018). On a similar note, political 
instability is found to have a positive effect on the probability of a coup attempt (Powell, 2012; 
Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2018). Social unrest weakens the government’s position 
in power and its legitimacy to rule. Extensive political instability might signal to the military 
that the government does not have the support of the population to resist a coup d’état. As a 
result, the military may intervene and take control of the government to restore public order 
and protect its corporate interests. Simultaneously, illegitimacy may prompt an autocratic 
government to establish a secret police to protect its position in power. To control for the effect 
of political instability on coup risk I use the logged and lagged version of Bank’s Instability 
Index (2011). 
  Another important set of factors that influence coup risk is the composition and corporate 
interests of the armed forces. Defense budget is the most prominent military corporate interest. 
It exerts a direct effect on a military’s ability to carry out its professional duties and affects the 
living conditions of its personnel. Hence, budget cuts are expected to increase a military’s 
disposition to move against the government (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011). If an autocrat expects 
resistance to defense budget cuts, then the establishment of a secret police may mitigate such 
a threat. To control for military spending and budgetary reductions, I use the Military 
Expenditure variable from the Correlates of War v5 data set on National Capabilities (2012). I 
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also generate a Change in Military Expenditure variable to capture yearly changes in the 
military budget. I then employ a logged and lagged by a year version of both variables. 
Additionally, states with large armies are found to be less likely to experience a coup (Powell, 
2012). To this end, I control for army size with the logged and lagged version of the Military 
Personnel variable in the COW data set (2012). 
  Furthermore, to reduce their vulnerability to a coup from the armed forces, dictators employ 
a series of coup proofing policies. To this end, authoritarian leaders exploit ethnic, religious, 
or blood ties to establish loyal paramilitary organizations to counterbalance the armed forces 
(Quinlivan, 1999; Horowitz, 1985; Nordlinger, 1977; Pollack, 2002; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; 
Böhmelt and Pilster, 2011, 2015; Brown, Fariss, and McMahon, 2016; Brooks, 2019). To rule 
out the possibility that the secret police variable captures the same effect as paramilitaries, I 
use Böhmelt’s and Pilster’s counterbalancing variable (2011). The counterbalancing variable 
receives a value of 1 if only a single effective ground-combat military organization is present 
in country whereas higher values denote the existence of more rivaling military organizations 
(Böhmelt and Pilster, 2011, p. 340)41. If secret police operate similarly to other paramilitaries, 
the inclusion of the counterbalancing control variable is expected to nullify its effect on coup 
risk. Like the rest of control variables, counterbalancing is logged and lagged by a year. Finally, 
I employ a series of spell variables that capture a state’s coup free years to control for temporal 
dependence and time’s pacifying effect on coup risk. For models with additional control 
variables, such as the degree of totalitarianism and threat environment, please refer to the 
chapter’s appendix. 
                                                             
41 The Böhmelt and Pilster counterbalancing variable is based on information from the Military Balance 
data set and as a result secret police are under-reported. 
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4.4.2 Empirical Analysis 
The results of the regression analysis provide unique insight on the effect of secret police on 
coup risk. The secret police variable has a negative and statistically significant effect on coup 
attempt across all main text models. The effect is consistent even when the sample size is 
decreased with the inclusion of the counterbalancing variable. Hence, neither socioeconomic 
nor military variables neuter the effect of secret police on coup attempt. To visualize this effect, 
I include a graph of first differences estimates for secret police in Figure 6. More precisely, 
autocratic states with a secret police are less likely to experience a coup by 4 percentage points 
(-6.9 and -1.1% bounds) in model 10, by 4.4 percentage points (-7.4 and -1.4% bounds) in 
model 11, and by 2.7 percentage points (-4.8 and -0.5% bounds) in model 12.     
 
Table 5. The relationship between Secret Police and Coup Attempt in Authoritarian Regimes 
                          Model 9         Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Secret Police -0.838              -0.777             -0.853              -0.617               
 (0.211)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.261)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.270)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.254)**            
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure   0.022                 
0.194 
 0.027                    0.028                 
  62            
(0.073)*** 
99        96        
Change Mil Exp   0.261               
0.194 
 0.274                 0.281                   
  366           
(0.073)*** 
(0.327)           
(0.073)*** 
(0.377)           
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita  -0.107               
0.194 
-0.069                -0.204               
  116         
(0.073)*** 
125           
(0.073)*** 
125           
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita  -1.884               -2.105                -2.436             
  647           
(0.073)*** 
669            
(0.073)*** 
812            
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel     -0.115                   -0.141                 
   120          122          
Instability    0.104                    0.100                
               (0.029)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.033)***            
(0.073)*** 
Counterbalancing                                         0.011              
    3            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.248 -0.222              -0.164                 -0.171                  
 (0.042)*** (0.051)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.047)***          
(0.073)*** 
54          
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.011  0.008                  
0.194 
 0.005                     0.006                   
 (0.003)*** 0            
(0.073)*** 
02            
(0.073)*** 
0            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000                   
0.194 
-0.000                    -0.000                    
 (0.000)*** 00            
(0.073)*** 
00            
(0.073)*** 





Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, ** 





Figure 6. First Difference estimates for Secret Police 
 
Note: Dash lines represent 95% confidence intervals while holding all other variables at 
observed values. 
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  Taking all this information into consideration, secret police in authoritarian regimes appear to 
decrease the military’s ability to orchestrate a coup d’état. Both the regression analysis and the 
first differences graph provide support to the study’s research hypothesis since the effect of 
secret police on coup attempt is negative and statistically significant. Consequently, autocracies 
with secret police are found to be less likely to experience a coup d’état compared to autocracies 
without secret police. Hence, it comes as no surprise that the Egyptian leadership formally re-
instated the secret police less than a year after its ostensible de-activation in 2013 (Kingsley, 
2013). Regarding control variables, political instability is found to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on coup risk whereas, economic development has the opposite 
effect. However, contrary to previous findings, military size, and wealth have an insignificant 
effect on coup risk, potentially because this is an autocratic sub-sample and the sample is based 
on the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz data on autocracies (2014) instead of the polity2 index. 
Additionally, the counterbalancing variable has an insignificant effect on coup risk thus 
providing further evidence that secret police operate differently from other paramilitaries. 
Secret police intervene in a coup’s planning stage whereas counterbalancing paramilitaries 
deter aggression against the government because they increase costs during a coup’s execution 
phase. In appendix table 42, I replicate model 12 but instead of Böhmelt’s and Pilster’s 
counterbalancing variable (2011) I use De Bruin’s (2018) counterweight count variable and the 
results remain the same. Therefore, the results give support to De Bruin’s (2018) findings that 
counterbalancing paramilitaries do not decrease coup risk. Instead, the establishment of a new 
counterbalancing institution may correspond to increased coup risk (De Bruin 2018). We can 
conclude from these findings that secret police have a distinct effect on coup risk compared to 
other paramilitaries and, unlike counterweights, secret police decrease the likelihood of a coup 
attempt against the government by intervening in a coup’s planning and coordination stage. 
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  Apart from the main text models, I also include a series of robustness checks in the chapter’s 
appendix to elaborate on the relationship between secret police and coup attempt. Accordingly, 
I control for endogeneity with a two-stage bivariate model in which secret police is the 
dependent variable in the selection stage and time polynomials function as the exclusion 
restrictions. Likewise, I include models with additional control variables, like autocratic regime 
duration, threat environment, and interstate rivalry. What’s more, the appendix introduces a 
variation only model in which cases that do not display variation in the secret police variable 
are excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, I also estimate country fixed effects models along 
with region and year fixed effects models. Nevertheless, the negative and statistically 
significant effect of secret police on coup attempt persists throughout the robustness checks. 
To summarize, for a more thorough analysis on the relationship between secret police and coup 
attempt please refer to the chapter’s appendix. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Secret police lie at the heart of the security apparatus in many authoritarian regimes. This study 
makes a novel contribution to the coup literature by drawing attention to the negative effect of 
secret police on coup risk. The operational repertoire of secret police includes spy networks 
and surveillance operations that penetrate every level of the military chain of command. These 
espionage operations severely limit the ability of military officers to coordinate and plan a coup 
without alerting the internal security forces. Additionally, secret police operations within the 
army deter individual officers from participating in plots against the government, due to the 
threat of severe sanctions by the secret police. Therefore, secret police decrease the willingness 
and opportunity of military officers and other regime insiders to stage a coup d’état by 
intervening in the coup preparation stage.  Subsequently, secret police are a vital aspect of the 
authoritarian security apparatus, but authoritarian rulers may be unable to establish them if they 
do not possess the relevant institutional know-how. Most pertinently, an autocrat may refrain 
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from establishing a secret police to avoid a strong reaction by the armed forces or other 
members of the governing coalition that would perceive this move as an effort to consolidate 
power.  
  The study produces important policy implications. Essentially, since secret police shield the 
regime from a coup, autocrats are able to allocate resources to the armed forces without fearing 
internal repercussions. Major authoritarian powers with secret police, like Iran, also have 
sizeable armed forces with state-of-the-art equipment. It may also be noted that the study makes 
a novel contribution to the literature on structural coup proofing. More precisely, the study 
contributes to the debate on counterbalancing by disaggregating internal security agencies and 
highlighting that secret police improve the survival prospects of an autocratic leader by 
decreasing the probability of an authoritarian turn over via a coup. Therefore, secret police are 
vital to authoritarian survival from internal threats, especially those from the armed forces. 
Consequently, the establishment of a secret police is a worthy investment for an autocrat as the 
prospects of autocratic survival increase. However, democratic policymakers and civil society 
have more reasons to investigate the role of secret police in autocracies. Secret police are 
inextricably linked with political violence, human rights abuse, and suppression of democracy. 
Subsequently, secret police, besides guarding the regime from the military, terrorize political 
activists and civilians and enable the autocrat to consolidate power.  
  With regards to future research, an examination of the factors that determine the establishment 
of secret police in autocracies might be a fruitful academic endeavor. To this end, Greitens 
argues that when political actors decide on the levels of force fragmentation, they confront a 
trade-off between coup risk and popular unrest (2016, p. 32). However, high levels of force 
fragmentation are found to increase coup risk (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015). Hence, it is of vital 
importance to explore more thoroughly what type of security institutions actually contribute to 
regime survival and what other benefits secret police offer besides decreased coup risk. While 
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this study touched upon the effect of the secret police on civil-military relations, more research 
is needed to properly understand the role of secret police in autocracies. The findings highlight 
the tacit influence of the secret police over the autocratic security apparatus as its agents 
monitor military officers and other dissidents. On top of that, the study underscores the 
profound sway of secret police in autocracies as they control the flow of information through 
their ubiquitous intelligence networks. However, the extend of this influence eschews the 
existing literature. Going back to Greitens, it may very well be the case that secret police are 
popular because they counteract both coup risk and civil unrest.  Consequently, a large-n study 
on the structure of security organizations and their informant networks would be a very useful 
addition to the field of civil-military relations.  
  As a closing remark, the authority of intelligence services over politics is not limited to 
autocratic regimes. The influential role of intelligence services also extends to democracies, 
especially in connection with the War on Terror. As intelligence services join the public 
discourse it is imperative to properly address the modus operandi of the intelligence sector in 
democracies. Overall, this study explicates how secret police reduce coup risk, but more 
inquiry is required to fully understand how secret police function and why certain autocracies 
establish them while others do not. The recent Egyptian case demonstrates that autocrats are 
unwilling to abolish the secret police even when under substantial international pressure. As 
long as secret police exist in autocracies, not only civilians but also civil servants, military 
officers, and others, will be victims of the reign of terror. 
 
4.6 Chapter Three Appendix 
 
The appendix contains robustness checks for the logit models presented in the main text. Below I list 
those robustness checks in the order they are positioned in the appendix. 
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 Appendix Table 28 shows the results of an out-of-sample 4-fold cross-validation. 
 Appendix Table 29 presents year and region fixed effects models. 
 In Appendix Table 30 I use a country fixed effects model. 
 Appendix Table 31 includes a three-stage least-squares model to explore the possibility 
of reverse causality. 
 Furthermore, in Appendix Table 32 I control for the impact of the external and internal 
threat environment on coup risk. 
 Likewise, in Appendix table 33 I employ a country-specific random intercept model. 
 Accordingly, in Appendix Table 34 you can find models with additional control variables. 
 Continuing, I include a two-stage bivariate model in Appendix Table 35 and a Heckman 
sample selection model in Appendix Table 36. 
 In a similar manner, in Appendix Table 37 I omit countries that show no variation in the 
secret police variable. 
 Different lag versions of the secret police variable can be found in Appendix Table 38. 
 In Appendix Table 39 I control for the determinants of secret police. 
 In Appendix Table 40 I consider the effect of military academies on coup risk. 
 In Appendix Table 41 I examine the effect of secret police on senior and junior coup 
d’état. 
 In Appendix Table 42 I control for additional counterbalancing variables. 







Out-of-Sample 4-Fold Cross Validation 
I use a 4-fold cross-validation model to control for out-of-sample errors, such as data 
overfitting. In a 4-fold cross validation, the sample is divided into four approximately equal-in 
size groups (James et al., 2013). The first three groups operate as training sets in order to 
calculate the model parameters, while the fourth group is used to evaluate the performance of 
the model of interest. For the purposes of this research, I compare main text model 11 with a 
control only model. To determine the models’ out-of-sample predictive capacity, I use the ROC 
curve. “The area under the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve ranges from a low 
value of 0.5 if there is no improvement in predictive power over a random guess to 1.0 for 
perfect classifications of outcomes” (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2018, p. a2). Main text model 11 has 
an average ROC value of 0.7690 and thus outperforms a random guess. Furthermore, main text 
model 11 has a higher average ROC value than the control only model. Consequently, the 
inclusion of the secret police variable increases the model’s predictive ability. 
Appendix Table 28. Out-of-Sample 4-Fold Cross Validation 
 Cycle Run Main Text Model 11 Model without Secret Police 
1 0.7745  0.7688 
2 0.7745  0.7574 
3 0.7745  0.7688 
4  0.7745  0.7500 
5 0.7745  0.7688 
6 0.7745  0.7561 
7 0.7745  0.7688 
8 0.7745  0.7549 
9 0.7745  0.7688 
10 0.7745  0.7527 
Average Value 0.7745  0.7615 
 






Year and Region Fixed Effects 
The level of coup risk in a state is influenced by regional characteristics, like regional 
instability, ethnography, or a history of praetorianism. Additionally, secret police may be more 
attached to certain regions of the world, like Eastern Europe or Latin America, than others. 
Simultaneously, major political events such as wars, the fall of a great power, or oil crises may 
also have an impact on the stability of an autocratic regime in a given year. To control for 
regional characteristics and major political events, I run year and region fixed effects models. 
Despite year and region fixed effects, the secret police variable still has a negative and 





                                                Appendix Table 29. Fixed Effects 
                                     Model A39         Model A40 
Secret Police -0.915              -0.921              
 (0.276)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.283)***            
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure -0.006                 
0.194 
-0.055                  
0.194 
 (0.090)            
(0.0)* 
88          
(0.073)*** 
Change Mil Exp  235              
0.194 
 0.296               
 (0.366)            
(0.073)*** 
351           
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita - 136             
0.194 
-0.209               
0.194 
 (0.118)           
(0.073)*** 
13            
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita -2.199               
0.194 
-2.155               
0.194 
 (0.713)***            
(0.073)*** 
718          
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel -0.065                
0.194 
 0.051                
0.194 
 (0.106)          
(0.073)*** 
121            
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.099                 
0.194 
 0.083                  
0.194 
 (0.028)***            
(0.073)*** 
28            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.144 -0.139                 
0.194 
 (0.054)*** 55            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.005  0.004                  
0.194  (0.003) 0            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000                   
0.194 




Obs. 2,261 2,440 
Log Likelihood -383.725 -449.750 
LR c2 110.3 103.12 
Prob>c2 0.000 0.000 
FE Year Region 
Time Period 1951-2010 1951-2010 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Country Fixed Effects 
Country-level characteristics like religion, culture, political system, or the history of civil-
military relations have a profound impact on a state’s coup risk level. To control for country-
level characteristics, I employ a country fixed effects model. I thus exclude from the analysis 
countries that do not display a variation in the secret police variable. As a result, autocracies 
that have never established a secret police organization or that had secret police present for the 
entirety of the data set are not included in this model. In addition, country-years with perfect 
classification of outcomes are omitted from fixed effects models (Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and 
Pilster, 2019). Thereupon, autocracies that have never experienced a coup d’état are not 
included in the analysis. Hence, the model experiences a significant drop in observations 
compared to the main text model. Likewise, country fixed effects are not ideal when estimating 
the effect of variables that do not display strong fluctuation in their values across time, like the 
secret police variable (Plümper and Troeger, 2011). However, the effect of secret police on 
coup attempt is still statistically significant in the simple model. The effect becomes 
insignificant when the control variables are included, and the number of observations drops 
dramatically. Similarly, only change in military expenditure is statistically significant in this 
model. The effect becomes statistically significant once again when we remove the military 




Appendix Table 30. Country Fixed Effects 









(0.303)** (0.455) (0.314)** 
Military Expenditure  -0.306  
  (0.298)  
Change Mil Exp    1.278   
  (0.596)**  
GDP per capita    0.720 -0.081 
  (0.610) (0.337) 
Change GDP per capita  -0.944 -1.325 
  (1.395) (0.938) 
Years Since Coup -0.195  0.008 -0.204 
 (0.072)*** (0.133) (0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.009 -0.008  0.009 
 (0.004)* (0.011) (0.004)** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000  0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 996 420 969 
Log Likelihood -215.198 -101.025 -207.359 






Time Period 1951-2010 1951-2010 1951-2010 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
Three State Least Squares 
I use three-stage least-squares to explore the case of reverse causality between coup attempt 
and secret police. For the purposes of the 3LS model, I use different control variables in each 
stage. In the first stage with coup attempt as the dependent variable, I include the secret police, 
military expenditure and GDP variables, as well as the temporal control variables. The secret 
police variable once again has a negative and statistically significant effect on coup attempt. 
The second stage has secret police as the dependent variable, and I include coup attempt, 
military personnel, political instability, military regime, and state rivalry as the independent 
variables. I include the military regime variable in the analysis since qualitative evidence 
suggest that rulers in military juntas are likely to establish a secret police organization to spy 
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on other military officers (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018, p.161). In a similar manner, I 
expect authoritarian states that are engaged in a state rivalry to use the secret police to limit the 
influence of rivals in their internal affairs. While the military personnel variable is statistically 
insignificant, the coup attempt variable has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
secret police. This makes sense since in the event of a coup attempt the new government will 
abolish the secret police agency of the previous government since it was a tool of repression 
and control aimed towards the opposition and the armed forces. Likewise, authoritarian 
regimes that experience political instability are found to be more likely to have secret police. 
Finally, military juntas or authoritarian regimes participating in a state rivalry are found in this 
specific model to be more likely than other authoritarian regimes to have a secret police 
organization. 
 
                                      Appendix Table 31. Three Stage Least Regression 
                                     Attempt         Secret Police 
Secret Police -0.046                               
 (0.014)***            
(0.073)*** 
             
Attempt  -0.837           
  (0.155)***          
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure -0.000                 
0.194 
                    
 (0.003)          
(0.073)*** 
             
Change Mil Exp  2                 
0.194 
                   
 (0.021)           
(0.073)*** 
            
GDP per capita  00               
0.194 
 
 (0.006)           
(0.073)*** 
 
Change GDP per capita -0.070             
0.194 
 
 (0.045)           
(0.073)*** 
 
Military Personnel   0.009               
0.194 
  (0.013)         
(0.073)*** 
Instability   0.006                 
0.194 
  01         
(0.073)*** 
Military Regime   0.229              
  22         
(0.073)*** 
State Rivalry   0.129               
  21         
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.017                  
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 (0.003)***             
Years Since Coup2  0.000                 
 (0.000)***            
Years Since Coup3 -0.000                     
 (0.000)**              
Constant  0.179 -0.021 
 (0.044)*** (0.141) 
Obs. 1,956  
Time Period 1951-2000  
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Threat Environment 
As it was stated previously, internal and external threats may destabilize an autocratic political 
system and increase coup risk. More precisely, civil wars increase the probability of a coup 
attempt since they augment a government’s dependence to its armed forces or bring forward 
rival groups that challenge the supremacy of the government (Quinlivan, 1999; Böhmelt, 
Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2018). To control for the effect of internal and external threats on 
coup risk, I use the civil conflict and militarized interstate dispute variables from Böhmelt, 
Escribà-Folch, and Pilster (2018). In accordance with the literature, civil conflict is found to 
increase the likelihood of a coup attempt. Likewise, autocratic regimes engaged in a militarized 
interstate dispute are less likely to experience a coup. The rest of the results mirror the findings 
of main text model 11 and once more the secret police variable has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the probability of a coup attempt. 
 
                                        Appendix Table 32. Threat Environment 
                                     Model A44         
Secret Police -0.766            
 (0.284)***            
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure  0.051                  
136 
 
 (0.097)            
(0.073)*** Change Mil Exp  266             
 (0.315)           
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita -0.013                 
 (0.131)           
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita -1.910                 
 (0.631)***           
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel -0.158                
 (0.113)           
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.077              
 (0.035)**           
(0.073)*** 
Civil Conflict  0.774              
 (0.293)***           
(0.073)*** 
Militarized Dispute -0.420                  
 (0.146)***            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.179            
 (0.050)***        
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.006                    
 (0.003)**            
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000                    
 (0.000)           
(0.073)*** 
Constant -1.626                
 (0.789)** 
Obs. 2,481 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -478.144 
Wald c2 159.49 
Prob>c2 0.000 
Time Period 1951-2010 
  
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Country-Specific Random Intercept Model 
As it has already been discussed throughout the study, coup risk is influenced by various 
socioeconomic factors, such as wealth, economic growth, political development, or a state’s 
internal and external threat environment (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012; Böhmelt 
and Pilster, 2015, 2018). To control for the impact of country-specific characteristics on the 
likelihood of a coup attempt, I run a country-specific random intercept variation of main text 
model 11. The model has 106 set of groups with an average value of 23.4 country years. The 
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model’s results mirror those of main text model 11 and once more secret police have a negative 
and statistically significant effect on the probability of a coup attempt. 
 
Appendix Table 33. Country-Specific Random Intercept Model 
               Number of groups = 106, Observations per group: min = 1, average = 23.4, max 50 










Military Expenditure  0.024 
 (0.104) 
Change Mil Exp  0.291 
 (0.353) 
GDP per capita -0.136 
 (0.145) 
Change GDP per capita -2.217 
 (0.725)*** 
Military Personnel -0.119 
 (0.124) 
Instability  0.100 
 (0.029)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.117 
 (0.059)** 
Years Since Coup2  0.003 
 (0.003) 





Log Likelihood -484.784 
Wald c2 63.84*** 
 
Country Variance 0.307 
LR Test vs. Logistic Regression 3.58**        
Time Period 1951-2010 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 





Additional Control Variables 
In this set of models, I include additional control variables to the analysis in order to have a 
more comprehensive understanding of the factors that influence coup risk and to check if the 
effect of secret police on coup risk persists even with the inclusion of additional control 
variables. In the first model, I include a binary autocratic regime variable to distinguish 
between anocratic and other authoritarian regimes. However, autocracies are found to be 
equally likely to experience a coup compared to anocracies. Furthermore, colonial past is found 
to heavily influence the post-independence security forces. For instance, former colonies may 
have weak institutions of civilian control, they may suffer from severe ethnic stratification in 
the armed forces due to selective recruitment during the colonial era, and they may even have 
more counterbalancing opportunities (Horowitz, 1985; Ray, 2012, 2019; Geddes, Wright, and 
Frantz, 2018; Mehrl and Choulis, 2021). For these reasons, I control for the effect of British 
colonialism using the former British colony binary variable from Toronto’s data set on 
conscription (2017). Nevertheless, the effect of British colonialism on coup risk is statistically 
insignificant. In the third model, I control for external threats with the interstate rivalry variable 
from Toronto’s data set on conscription (2017). However, interstate rivalry does not seem to 
increase coup risk in autocracies. In the fourth model, I control for how many years a specific 
autocratic regime is in power. The variable exerts a negative and statistically significant effect 
on coup risk. In the fifth model, I control for the effect of military spending on coup attempt 
by dividing total military expenditure with military size. However, the new variable has a 
statistically insignificant effect on coup attempt. Finally, I distinguish among autocratic 
variants based on the GWF binary variables. Thus, monarchies and single party regimes are 
less likely to experience a coup compared to personalist autocracies whereas juntas are more 
likely. Overall, despite the inclusion of additional control variables, the negative and 
statistically significant effect of secret police on coup attempt persists. 
139 
 
Appendix Table 34a. Additional Control Variables 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 





                              Model A46                                   Model A47                         Model A48 
Secret Police -0.834                -0.912                -0.927               
 (0.279)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.262)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.269)***            
(0.073)*** 
Military Exp  0.022                     0.029                   0.027                 
 (0.100)           
(0.073)*** 
106            
(0.073)*** 
9            
(0.073)*** 
Change Mil Exp  0.279                  0.132                 0.136                
 (0.329)            
(0.073)*** 
320           
(0.073)*** 
32          
GDP per Capita -0.094               -0.019             -0.016                
 (0.127)          
(0.073)*** 
134            
(0.073)*** 
(0.120)            
(0.073)*** 
Change GDPpc -2.138                -1.853               -1.826               
 (0.702)***          
(0.073)*** 
654           
(0.073)*** 
6           
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel -0.111                -0.136                -0.152                  
 (0.119)          
(0.073)*** 
12           
(0.073)*** 
115           
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.097               0.109                  0.109                  
 (0.029)***           31            
(0.073)*** 
31            
(0.073)*** 
Autocracy -0.211                  
 (0.167)         (0.073)***   
British Colony  -0.111                  
  (0.264)           
State Rivalry    0.293                 
   (0.219)          
Years Since Coup -0.175 -0.151              -0.151                 
 (0.052)*** (0.054)***           
(0.073)*** 
(0.054)***          
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.007  0.004                0.004                    
 (0.003)* 0         0          
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000                    -0.000                    
 (0.000) (0.000)           
(0.073)*** 
00          
(0.073)*** 
Constant -0.924 -1.508                -1.610                
 (0.759) 812  7 5  
Obs. 2,454 1,956 1,956 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -479.422 -426.961 -425.996 
Wald c2 111.08 88.4 88.2 
Prob>c2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time Period 1951-2010 1951-2000 1951-2000 
140 
 
                               Appendix Table 34b. Additional Control Variables 
     Model A49                   Model A50         Model A51 
Secret Police -0.851            -0.813          -0.882            
 (0.264)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.269)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.272)***           
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure  0.057                  
0.194 
 0.125                
0.194 
 0.028               
0.194 
 (0.097)           
(0.073)*** 
(0.128)           
(0.073)*** 
102            
(0.073)*** 
Change Mil Exp - 266               
0.194 
 335               
0.194 
 0.357               
 (0.322)            
(0.073)*** 
(0.332)            
(0.073)*** 
320           
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita - 39              
0.194 
- 60             
0.194 
-0.032               
0.194 
 (0.123)           
(0.073)*** 
(0.124)           
(0.073)*** 
138           
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita -1 981            
0.194 
-2 29           
0.194 
-2.088            
0.194 
 (0.674)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.667)***            
(0.073)*** 
6 4            
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel - 146              
0.194 
- 339             
0.194 
-0.173              
 (0.115)           
(0.073)*** 
(0.205)*           
(0.073)*** 
136            
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.101                 
0.194 
 0.103                
0.194 
 0.097                
0.194 
 (0.029)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.029)***            
(0.073)*** 
27           
(0.073)*** 
Autocratic Variant Duration -0.023                
0.194 
  
 (0.012)*            
(0.073)*** 
  
Military Regime    0.429               
   (0.252)*           
(0.073)*** 
Monarchy   -0.673 
   391  
Single Party Regime   -0.650 
   (0.228)*** 
Spending per Soldier  -0.307              
0.194 
 
  (0.247)            
(0.073)*** 
 
Years Since Coup -0.142 -0.157 -0.129 
 (0.045)*** (0.048)*** (0.051)** 
Years Since Coup2  0.005  0.005  0.004 
 (0.002)* (0.003)* (0.003) 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.421 -0.585 -1.480 
 (0.744)* (0.901) (0.811)* 
Obs. 2,481 2,451 2,481 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -482.545 -482.772 -477.981 
Wald c2 105.06 119.0 123.36 
Prob>c2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time Period 1951-2010 1951-2010 1951-2010 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 





Bivariate Two Stage Model 
Since secret police are established in authoritarian states as tools of political repression or may 
be established in authoritarian states with governments that do not trust the armed forces,  there 
is an argument to be made that secret police are instituted in states with weak civilian control 
over the armed forces. On the other hand, a state needs to have a certain degree of institutional 
expertise and available resources to form a security organization. To control for sample 
selection bias, I use a bivariate two stage probit model in which secret police are the dependent 
variable of the first equation and coup attempt the dependent variable of the second equation. 
The latter is estimated spontaneously with the first while controlling for the correlation in the 
equations’ error processes (Beardsley, 2008, p. 731). For the bivariate two stage model to work 
properly one needs to have an instrumental variable in the first equation that is then excluded 
from the second stage (Beber, 2012). In the first set of models, I use the peace years temporal 
control variables as the instrumental variables. In the second set of models, I add to the 
instruments a variable that captures the presence of a secret police in a neighboring 
ideologically similar autocracy. In more detail, I assign a value of 1 if a neighboring autocracy 
established a secret police organization in the last five years. The coup proofing literature 
accentuates that leaders emulate the counterbalancing policies of their experiential peer group 
(Böhmelt, Ruggeri, and Pilster, 2015). Following the same logic, an autocrat is expected to 
emulate the coup proofing policies of neighboring autocrats that share similar ideological and 
regime characteristics (for instance, another junta or single party regime). Consequently, an 
autocrat is more likely to establish a secret police organization if a neighboring peer autocrat 
has a positive experience with his newly established secret police. To this end, the neighboring 
secret police variable would have a direct effect on the establishment of secret police and an 
indirect effect on coup risk.  
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 Regarding the findings, authoritarian states suffering from political instability are more likely 
to have a secret police organization to control the public. Wealthier states are also more likely 
to have secret police since they have a lot of resources to invest in the security apparatus. 
Likewise, authoritarian states with large armed forces are more likely to have secret police to 
monitor the extensive military apparatus. Additionally, the effect of military regimes on secret 
police is insignificant. Finally, secret police are more likely to be present in an autocracy, if a 
neighboring and ideologically similar state established a secret police organization in the past 
5 years. In terms of the results of the second equation, the secret police variable has a negative 





                                   Appendix Table 35. Bivariate Two Stage Model 
                                     Secret Police         Attempt Secret Police Attempt 
Secret Police                  -1.865                -1.665               
           (0.151)***           
(0.073)*** 
 (0.202)***           
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure -0.113               
0.194 
-0.062              
0.194 
-0.108             
0.194 
-0.041               
0.194 
 (0.029)***           
(0.073)*** 
34            
(0.073)*** 
(0.029)***           
(0.073)*** 
38            
(0.073)*** 
Change Mil Exp - 284             
0.194 
 0.002               -0.284            
0.194 
 0.051            
 (0.122)**           
(0.073)*** 
139           
(0.073)*** 
12           
(0.073)*** 
150           
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita  256          0.084              
0.194 
 0.246           0.046              
0.194 
 (0.038)***           
(0.073)*** 
49         
(0.073)*** 
39           
(0.073)*** 
54       
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per 
capita 
- 238              
0.194 
-0.866              
0.194 
-0.203                
0.194 
-0. 57                
0.194 
 (0.2 9)           
(0.073)*** 
301           
(0.073)*** 
252           
(0.073)*** 
321           
(0.073)*** 
Mil ry Personnel  556               
0.194 
 0.217              
0.194 
 0.571             
0.194 
 0.142             
0.194 
 (0.037)***            
(0.073)*** 
58          
(0.073)*** 
37            
(0.073)*** 
0         
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.031               
0.194 
 0.051                0.030              
0.194 
 0.056              
 (0.008)***            
(0.073)*** 
10           
(0.073)*** 
08            
(0.073)*** 
11           
(0.073)*** 
Military Government -0.117             
0.194 
 0.289               
0.194 
-0.1 9         
0.194 
 0.361              
0.194 
 (0.090)       
(0.073)*** 
96           
(0.073)*** 
94        
(0.073)*** 
104          
(0.073)*** 
Neighboring Secret Pol    0.398           
0.194 
           
   92        
(0.073)*** 
           
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup  0.071   0.077  
 (0.014)***  15  
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Years Since Coup2 -0.003  -0.003  
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
Years Since Coup3  0.000   0.000  
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
Constant -4.513 -2.074 -4.625 -1.817 
 (0.279)*** (0.336)*** (0.283)*** (0.369)*** 
Obs. 2,481  2,481  
Log Likelihood -1666.353  -1655.756  
Wald c2 954.01  854.76  
Prob>c2 0.000  0.000  







Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Heckman Sample Selection Model 
In the appendix below, I use a Heckman sample selection model to explore the impact of secret 
police on the probability of a successful coup attempt. To assess the effect of secret police on 
coup success, I run a Heckman sample selection model with Powell’s and Thyne’s (2011) coup 
success variable as the dependent variable of the outcome stage. The variable is assigned a 
value of 1 if a successful coup has taken place in a country in a given year or 0 otherwise. As 
the model’s exclusion restrictions, the years since coup variables are not included in the 
outcome stage42. In the second set of models, I replace years since coup with military regime 
as the exclusion restriction. Regarding the selection stage, the results mirror the findings of 
main text model 11, as the secret police variable has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on coup attempt in both sets of models. Nevertheless, the effect of secret police on coup 
success is statistically insignificant, same with all the control variables. We can thus conclude 
that there is no relationship between secret police and coup success.  This probably happens 
because if secret police have not intervened in the coup’s planning stage and the plot has gone 
                                                             
42 “Exclusion restrictions, like instrumental variables, are variables that affect the selection process but 
not the substantive equation of interest.” (Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum, 2007). 
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undetected then its agents have failed. Therefore, in accordance with previous studies that 
emphasize on the role of paramilitaries as a tool of general instead of immediate deterrence 
(Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015; Fearon, 1994), secret police operations may deter coup onset but 
have limited influence on the course of events after a coup outbreak. Therefore, secret police 
are expected to only affect the probability of a coup occurring and not the success of one.  
                          Appendix Table 36. Heckman Sample Selection Model 
                                     Attempt         Success Attempt Success 
Secret Police -0.379              -0.004            -0.378            0.134            
 (0.124)***            
(0.073)*** 
(0.357)           
(0.073)*** 
(0.129)***           
(0.073)*** 
(0.350)           
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure  0.022                  
0.194 
0.059                
0.194 
 0.007                
0.194 
 0.050               
0.194 
 (0.0 7)           
(0.073)*** 
100            
(0.073)*** 
49            
(0.073)*** 
112            
(0.073)*** 
Change Mil Exp  192               
0.194 
-0.1 6               
0.194 
 0.208              
0.194 
-0.228             
0.194 
 (0.169)            
(0.073)*** 
411           
(0.073)*** 
166           
(0.073)*** 
437           
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita - 56             
0.194 
-0.061              
0.194 
-0.0 9               
0.194 
-0.027               
0.194 
 (0.061)           
(0.073)*** 
125           
(0.073)*** 
67           
(0.073)*** 
155           
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita -1 10              
0.194 
 0.052               
0.194 
-1.082             
0.194 
 0.375               
0.194 
 (0.354)***            
(0.073)*** 
9 1            
(0.073)*** 
347            
(0.073)*** 
1 1 4            
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel - 66             
0.194 
-0.1 2               
0.194 
-0.079               
0.194 
-0.113             
0.194 
 (0.059)           
(0.073)*** 
115            
(0.073)*** 
66            
(0.073)*** 
129            
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.050                 
0.194 
-0.003                 
0.194 
 0.047                 
0.194 
-0.011                 
0.194 
 (0.014)***            
(0.073)*** 
42           
(0.073)*** 
1           
(0.073)*** 
42           
(0.073)*** 
Military Regime    0.334               
0.194 
                 
0.194 
   12           
(0.073)*** 
      
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.086  -0.074  0.074 
 (0.025)***         26 95  
Years Since Coup2  0.003                    0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)**             (0.001)* (0.006) 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000                  -0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)*            (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.653  0.538             -0.731             0.622           
 (0.369)* (1.289)            
(0.073)*** 
(0.402)*           
(0.073)*** 
(1.030)            
(0.073)*** 
Obs. 2,481  2,481  
Log Pseudo Likelihood -586.978  -581. 24  
Wald c2 2.75  7.09  
Prob>c2 0.907  0.717  
Time Period 1951-2010  1951-2010  
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 




Variation Only Sample 
For the purposes of this robustness check, I exclude from the analysis countries that do not 
display a variation in the secret police variable. To be more precise, I exclude countries that 
have never established a secret police or countries that had secret police active for the entirety 
of the data. As I include only states with variation in the secret police variable, the number of 
observations in this model drops significantly compared to the main text models. Nonetheless, 
the results remain the same and secret police once again have a negative and statistically 
significant effect at the 95% confidence level on the probability of a coup attempt. 
                                    Appendix Table 37. Secret Police Variation Only 
                                     Model A52         
Secret Police -0.940               
 (0.428)**           
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure  0.163                  
0.194  (0.160)           
(0.073)*** Change Mil Exp  1 229           
0.194 
 (0.416)***          
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita -0.025             
0.194 
 (0.223)          
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita -0.706              
0.194 
 (1.108)          
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel -0.126               
0.194 
 (0.215)         
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.029              
0.194 
 (0.057)     
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.290 
 (0.065)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.009 
 (0.003)** 





Log Pseudo Likelihood -141.315 
Wald c2 139.81 
Prob>c2 0.000 





Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Different Lag Structures for Secret Police  
In this robustness check, I use different lag versions of the secret police variable to estimate 
the effect of secret police on coup risk throughout the years. Since the secret police spy 
networks expand and become more effective with time, the organization’s coup proofing 
capabilities shall remain stable throughout the years. The results of the different lag structures 
emphasize this point since the secret police variable produces a statistically significant effect 
across all lag structures. 
Table 38. Different Lag Structures for Secret Police 
Coefficient Estimate 
Lag 2                      -0.808 (0.270)*** 
Lag 3                      -0.856 (0.312)*** 
Lag 4                      -0.936 (0.319)*** 
Lag 5                      -0.824 (0.311)*** 
Lag 6                      -0.776 (0.320)** 
Lag 7                      -0.504 (0.299) 
Lag 8                      -0.592 (0.274)** 
Lag 9                      -0.589 (0.296)** 
Lag 10                    -0.676 (0.284)** 
Lag 11                    -0.688 (0.292)** 
Lag 12                    -0.613 (0.291)** 
Lag 13                    -0.754 (0.326)** 
Lag 14                    -0.802 (0.305)*** 




Note: Table entries are coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 
percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Determinants of Secret Police 
In this robustness check, I examine the factors that determine whether secret police are present 
in an autocracy. To this end, I control for state capacity with GDP per capita as well as military 
expenditure. Additionally, I control for political instability since internal political turmoil may 
incentivize the establishment of a political police force. Most importantly, I control for the 
degree of autocratic consolidation and institutionalization. Single-party regimes are considered 
to be more institutionalized than other autocracies (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018; see also 
Magaloni and Kricheli, 2006), and as a result they might be more capable of establishing an 
omniscient and intrusive organization, like the secret police, since they have a very powerful 
position within the political system. Therefore, in appendix table 39 I examine how likely it is 
for single party regimes to have a secret police using the single-party regime variable from 
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018). Furthermore, secret police are strongly associated as a 
concept with the single party communist regimes in Europe during the Cold war, especially the 
Soviet KGB. To eliminate the possibility that the effect of secret police on coup attempt is 
confounded by a potential prevalence of secret police organization in communist regimes, I 
also control for communist regimes besides single party ones. Specifically, I control for the 
effect of communist regimes on the presence of secret police in appendix table 39 using Milan 
Svolik’s (2012) communist leadership variable to disaggregate single party regimes from 
communist regimes which can be predominantly found in the USSR-affiliated Eastern Europe. 
However, neither single party regimes nor communist regimes have a statistically significant 
effect on the presence of secret police in autocratic regimes. Subsequently, these models 
reaffirm the position that single party or communist regimes, namely USSR and its affiliates, 
are no more likely than other autocratic regimes to use a secret police. Besides regime type, 
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wealthier autocracies seem to be more likely to have a secret police than other autocratic 
regimes, presumably because they have the resources to establish paramilitary organizations. 
                                   Appendix Table 39. Determinants of Secret Police 
          Model A53            Model A54        
Single Party -0.367                          
 (0.339)            
(0.073)*** 
            
Communist   0.840            
  (0.718)            
(0.073)*** Military Expenditure  0.165              
0.194 
 105             
0.194  (0.121)            
(0.073)*** 
(0.1 0)            
(0.073)*** GDP per capita  365            390           
0.194 
 (0.171)**           
(0.073)*** 
(0.222)*           
(0.073)*** 
Instability -0.033                
0.194 
-0.021                
0.194 
 (0.048)            
(0.073)*** 
(0.056)            
(0.073)*** 
Secret Police Years -1.739 -2.405 
 (0.270)*** (0.349)*** 
Secret Police Years 2  0.068  0.135 
 (0.021)*** (0.030)*** 
Secret Police Years 3 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.000)** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.645 -0.488 
 (1.030) (1.344) 
Obs. 2,497 2,427 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -208.803 -166.330 
Wald2 188.22 252.15 
Prob>2 0.000 0.000 
Time Period 1951-2010 1951-2010 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Controlling for Military Academies 
Evidence suggest that military academies increase coup risk because they offer opportunities 
for officer networking (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2019). In more detail, military 
academies induce cohesive views in the officer corps and establish networks that facilitate 
coordination crucial for a coup against the government (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 
2019). The increased coup risk due to military academies is especially prominent in non-
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democratic regimes since democracies have more tools to combat praetorian tendencies 
(Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2019). Subsequently, it is necessary to examine whether 
the presence of a military academy neutralizes the effect of secret police on coup attempt since 
the secret police networks may be unable to penetrate these institutions thus offering vital 
opportunities for the organization and coordination of a coup against the government. To this 
end, I use Toronto’s (2017) military academies count variable to control for the effect of 
military academies on coup attempt in autocracies. Consistent with previous research 
(Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch, and Pilster, 2019), military academies increase the probability of a 
coup attempt in autocracies. However, military academies do not nullify the effect of secret 
police on coup attempt. Once again, the secret police variable has a negative effect on coup 
attempt and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
 
                                     Appendix Table 40. Military Academies 










Mil Academies  0.262 
 (0.087)*** 
Military Expenditure  0.025 
 (0.123) 
Change Mil Exp  0.501 
 (0.381) 
GDP per capita -0.023 
 (0.159) 
Change GDP per capita -2.967 
 (0.939)*** 
Military Personnel -0.164 
 (0.152) 
Instability  0.114 
 (0.032)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.162 
 (0.062)*** 
Years Since Coup2  0.005 
 (0.003) 







Log Pseudo-Likelihood -315.209 
Wald c2 115.45 
Prob>c2 0.000 
Time Period 1951-2004 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Junior and Senior Officer Coups 
In these set of models, I assess the effect of secret police on coups carried out by different 
officer ranks. Using data on senior and junior coups from Albrecht and Eibl (2018), I 
distinguish between coups from the higher echelons of the military and those from the lower 
ranks. It is worth mentioning that the Albrecht and Eibl 2018 data set has information only for 
coups in the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, the sample size is significantly lower in 
this set of models than the rest, dropping to as low as 537 observations when control variables 
are included. Consequently, it would be unwise to generalize the findings of these models since 
they focus on a very specific region of the world and the number of observations is low for a 
probit model. Nevertheless, the effect of secret police on junior coups is negative and 
statistically significant even after the inclusion of control variables. To the contrary, the effect 
of secret police on coups by the senior military leadership is insignificant, although the same 
is true for the control variables. Hence, it appears that secret police in the Middle East and 
Maghreb region tend to be more effective at decreasing the probability of a coup attempt by 
junior officers than senior ones. It will be interesting to see whether this distinction holds true 
outside of the Middle East when more data on coup d’état by officer rank becomes available. 
At the meantime, the findings suggest that the effect of the coup proofing operations of the 
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secret police in the Middle East and Maghreb region is more pronounced on junior than senior 
officer coups. 
           
                                     Appendix Table 41. Junior and Senior Coups 
                                     Junior Coup         Junior Coup         Senior Coup Senior Coup 
Secret Police -0.733               -0.796              -0.222               -0.034             
 (0.178)***           
(0.073)*** 
(0.372)**           
(0.073)*** 
(0.143)           
(0.073)*** 
(0.492)          
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure                 -0.116              
0.194 
                -0.204              
0.194 
            
(0.073)*** 
120           
(0.073)*** 
           
(0.073)*** 
137           
(0.073)*** 
Change Mil Exp                 0.782                              -0.707               
            
(0.073)*** 
128           
(0.073)*** 
           
(0.073)*** 
1 216           
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita            -0.055              
0.194 
           -0.215              
0.194 
   180         
(0.073)*** 
  242         
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per 
capita 
                
0.194 
 0.274              
0.194 
                 -0.335              
0.194 
           
(0.073)*** 
509           
(0.073)*** 
           
(0.073)*** 
5 8           
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup - 25 -0.0 9 -0.009  0.072 
 (0.011)** 19  1  27
Years Since Coup2  0.000  0.000  0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)** 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** 
Constant -1.108  0.180 -1.903 -0.459 
 (0.208)*** (1.063) (0.293) (1.357) 
Obs. 893 537 893 537 
Log Likelihood -164.836 -68.67 -85.86 -32.614 
Wald c2 28.90 173.64 3.57 20.64 
Prob>c2 0.000 0.000 0.467 0.000 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Additional Counterbalancing Variables 
In the following models, I further control for the effect of counterbalancing paramilitaries on 
coup risk and their different coup proofing functions compared to the secret police. 
Specifically, models A56-58 include the three De Bruin (2018) counterbalancing variables that 
capture the number of counterweights against the regular military present in a country. The 
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counterbalancing variables consist of a counterweight count variable, the logged count number 
of counterweights, and a dummy variable that is assigned a value of 1 if a new counterweight 
was established in a country that year. Regarding the count counterweight variable, 974 
(32.71%) country-years do not have counterweights, 1,008 (33.85%) have at least one 
counterweight, 722 (24.24%) have two counterweights, and 222 (7,34%) have three 
counterweights. Both variables are not correlated with the secret police variable since they have 
a collinearity degree of 0.222 and 0.195 respectively. Furthermore, in the dummy iteration of 
the counterweight variable, a new counterbalancing institution is established in 96 (3.22%) of 
cases and the rest receive a value of 0. Mirroring De Bruin’s (2018) findings, the count 
counterweight variables have no effect on the occurrence of a coup attempt whereas the 
establishment of a new counterweight is found to increase coup risk. On the other hand, the 
effect of the secret police variable on coup risk is positive and statistically significant across 
the three models. Therefore, once again the evidence indicate that secret police operate in a 
distinct manner from other paramilitaries and they decrease coup risk unlike their counterparts. 
Secret police intervene in a coup’s planning stage with their intelligence operations while other 
paramilitaries act as a deterrent through brute force. This might also explain why paramilitaries 
do not affect the occurrence of a coup but its outcome since they are combat-oriented and can 
counterbalance the regular army with their military means if the latter moves against the 
government. To the contrary, the intelligence operations of the secret police are tailored to 
impede the organization of a coup and if the armed forces successfully overcome these 








Appendix Table 42. Additional Counterbalancing Variables 
     Model A56                   Model A57        Model A58 
Secret Police -0.977            -0.987            -0.962            
 (0.423)**            
(0.073)*** 
(0.424)**            
(0.073)*** 
(0.420)**            
(0.073)*** 
Military Expenditure -0.162                 
0.194 
-0.168                 
0.194 
-0.130                 
0.194 
 (0.079)**           
(0.073)*** 
(0.082)**           
(0.073)*** 
9           
(0.073)*** 
Change Mil Exp - 169              
0.194 
- 1 6             
0.194 
-0.077              
0.194 
 (0.357)            
(0.073)*** 
(0.359)            
(0.073)*** 
345            
(0.073)*** 
GDP per capita  39             
0.194 
 41             
0.194 
 0.012              
0.194 
 (0.162)           
(0.073)*** 
(0.160)           
(0.073)*** 
160           
(0.073)*** 
Change GDP per capita - 296            
0.194 
- 294           
0.194 
-0.126            
0.194 
 (1.389)            
(0.073)*** 
(1.376)            
(0.073)*** 
1 110            
(0.073)*** 
Military Personnel - 10              
0.194 
 04             
0.194 
-0.029              
0.194 
 (0.129)           
(0.073)*** 
(0.133)           
(0.073)*** 
134           
(0.073)*** 
Instability  0.098                 
0.194 
 0.099                 
0.194 
 0.094                 
0.194 
 (0.042)**            
(0.073)*** 
(0.042)**            
(0.073)*** 
41            
(0.073)*** 
Counterweight Count  0.098               
0.194 
  
 (0.105)           
(0.073)*** 
  
Counterweight Logged   0.252               
0.194 
 
  (0.262)           
(0.073)*** 
 
New Counterweight    1.270               
0.194 
   (0.480)***           
(0.073)*** 
Years Since Coup -0.121 -0.121 -0.110 
 (0.067)* (0.067)* 68  
Years Since Coup2  0.006  0.005  0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Years Since Coup3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.521 -1.606 -1.394 
 (1.113) (1.104) (1.118) 
Obs. 1,260 1,260 1,260 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -294.786 -294.637 -292.376 
Wald c2 52.53 53.13 92.63 
Prob>c2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time Period 1960-2010 1960-2010 1960-2010 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent, 
** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Secret Police Organizations 
The list below includes all the secret police organizations that are registered in the original 
secret police variable. For the purposes of this variable, I used, to the best of my efforts, the 
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available literature on secret police organizations. I include the literature that I used for the 
creation of the variable in the appendix references below. I register an internal security 
organization as secret police if it was referred by one of the authors as such and if the 
organization fulfilled certain criteria. I used as criteria for the secret police those that were most 
commonly used in the literature. To be more precise, an internal security organization was 
listed as secret police if the organization performed the role of a political police force, if it 
operated in secrecy and the identity of its members was secret, if it used intelligence operations 
and violent policing practices, and if it acted independently from other internal security 
agencies, like the regular police. After I applied these criteria in the literature, I ended up with 
54 authoritarian regimes that have established a secret police organization at least once between 
1950 and 2018. Finally, I recognize that regional experts and other academics may have 
excellent suggestions of security agencies that could be classified as secret police and I am 
looking forward to hearing for any agency that I might have missed and should be on the list. 
 
Appendix Table 43. List of Secret Police Organizations 
 
Country                    Years Organization 
Cuba                                 1952-1957 Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities  
                                             1961-2018   State Security 
Dominican Republic       1957-1962 Military Intelligence Service 
Mexico                                 1947-1985 Federal Security Directorate 
Nicaragua                    1980-1989 Directorate of State Security 
Venezuela                    2009-2018 Bolivarian Intelligence Service, DIM/DISIP 
Brazil                                 1964-1984 DOI/CODI 
Paraguay                    1954-1989 Technical Division for the Repression of Communism 
Chile                                 1973-1990 DINA/CNI 
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Argentine                    1976-1982 Battalion 601 
Uruguay                    1973-1984 Anti-Subversive Activities Co-Ordination Organization 
Spain                                 1941-1977 Political-Social Brigade 
Portugal                    1945-1974 PIDE/Directorate-General of Security 
East Germany                    1950-1989 Stasi 
Poland                                 1945-1989 UBP/SB 
Hungary                    1948-1956 State Security Department 
Czechoslovakia                    1945-1989 State Security/StB 
Albania                                 1946-1991 Directorate of State Security 
Yugoslavia                    1946-2002 State Security Administration/State Security Service 
Greece                                 1967-1974 Greek Military Police-Special Investigative Unit 
Bulgaria                    1947-1989 Committee for State Security 
Romania                    1948-1989 Department of State Security 
USSR/Russia                    1934-1991   NKVD/MGB/KGB 
                                             1995-2018 FSB 
Belarus                                 1991-2018 State Security Committee 
Nigeria                                 1976-2018 Nigerian Security Organization/State Security Service 
Chad                                 1982-1990 Directorate of Documentation and Security 
Congo                                 1960-2018 Directorate for State Security 
Democratic Rep of Congo   1969-1997 CND/AND 
Uganda                                 1971-1979 State Research Bureau 
Somalia                    1970-1991 Hangash 
Ethiopia                    1975-1991   Public Security-Central Investigation Unit  
Angola                                 1975-1979 Directorate of Information and Security 
Mozambique                    1975-1991 National Service of Popular Security/SNASP 
Zimbabwe                    1980-2017 Central Intelligence Organization 
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South Africa                    1969-1980 Bureau of State Security 
Algeria                                 1990-2015 Department of Intelligence and Security 
Sudan                                 1999-2018 National Intelligence and Security Service 
Iran                                 1957-1979 Savak  
                                             1984-2018   Ministry of Intelligence  
Iraq                                 1973-2003 Mukhabarat 
Egypt                                 1954-2018 Mabahith Amn El Dawla 
Syria                                 1969-2018 Political Security Directorate/ Mukhabarat 
Jordan                                 1952-2018 General Intelligence Directorate/Mukhabarat 
Saudi Arabia                    1924-2018 Mabahith 
Afghanistan                    1978-1992 KHAD 
                                             2002-2018 NDS 
Turkmenistan                    1991-2018 Ministry for National Security 
Tajikistan                    1991-2018 State Committee for National Security 
Uzbekistan                    1991-2018  National Security Service 
Kazakhstan                    1992-2018 National Security Committee 
China                                 1983-2018 Ministry of State Security, Office 610 
Mongolia                    1936-1991 Internal Security Directorate 
Taiwan                                 1950-1992 Sigurimi 
North Korea                    1973-2018 Ministry of State Security  
South Korea                    1961-1987 KCIA 
North Vietnam/Vietnam      1945-2018   People's Public Security 
Cambodia                    1975-1978 Santebal 
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5 Conclusions and Contribution 
 
As I write this section, resurgent military regimes in Myanmar and Sudan continue to repress 
pro-democracy protests, once again accentuating the timeless threat of coups d’état to 
government survival and underscoring the importance of studying coups and civil-military 
relations in general. In order to fulfil this objective, the study highlights the previously 
unrecognized influence of conscription and secret police on civil-military relations. 
Specifically, the study furthers our understanding on civil-military relations by examining two 
essential aspects of the field: public support for the armed forces and coup risk.  
  To briefly summarize the thesis’ key findings, conscription is found to increase public support 
for the armed forces in European democracies and the probability of a coup attempt in 
anocracies. Therefore, the study draws attention to the fact that conscription not only affects 
the military apparatus itself due to the constant influx of cheap labor. It also has a profound 
impact on a state’s overall civil-military relations since it affects how the military interacts with 
society and the political system altogether. Conscription influences society’s stance towards its 
armed forces and improves the ties between society and the military thus increasing public trust 
to the armed forces. Essentially, the study’s main takeaway with regards to conscription is that 
the interaction between a society and its armed forces differs when the military is conscription-
based compared to an all-volunteer one. The increased links between society and its armed 
forces due to conscription are consequently found to increase public support for the armed 
forces in democracies and coup risk in anocracies.  
  To the contrary, autocracies with secret police are found to be less likely to experience a coup 
attempt compared to autocracies without secret police. Unlike conscription, secret police 
organizations are exogenous to the armed forces and are used by autocrats to assert their control 
over society and the military apparatus through elaborated intelligence operations. The study 
stresses the need to further disaggregate paramilitary organizations. The secret police’s 
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prominent position in the autocratic regime and its potent intelligence capabilities highlight the 
existence of distinct types of paramilitary organizations with unique operational traits that all 
work to ensure  regime survival. 
  Accordingly, I have put into use extensive, large-n data sets, such as the Autocratic 
Breakdown and Regime Transitions data set by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), the 
Eurobarometer (2005), or the Military Balance data set (2019), to properly assess and 
generalize the relevant hypotheses. However, the study’s contribution to the literature on civil-
military relations is not limited to its findings. Instead, I expanded existing data widely used in 
the research on conscription. Notably, I expanded Toronto’s conscription variable based on 
information from the CIA Factbook data (2021) on conscription. Additionally, utilizing the 
rich body of literature on security agencies, I constructed a new large-n variable on secret police 
organizations to disaggregate secret police from other paramilitaries and evaluate the coup-
proofing capacity of secret police organizations in autocracies.  
  Overall, the thesis offers a systematic examination of the study on civil-military relations, 
especially on coup d’état, and underlines the decisive yet previously unrecognized influence of 
conscription and secret police on civil-military relations. In what follows, I will briefly go 
through each chapter’s key findings in addition to suggesting avenues for future research before 
speculating on the implications of data limitations. Finally, I will present the thesis’ concluding 
remarks and main takeaways. 
  In chapter one, my co-authors and I presented substantial evidence that public trust toward 
the armed forces is higher in European countries with conscription compared to those with an 
all-volunteer army. We argued that this is done directly; personal involvement with the armed 
forces tends to be linked to more support for the military and conscription increases the social 
reach of the armed forces, as well as indirectly; a spill-over effect from conscripts to their social 
circle. The findings have important policy implications with regards to the military’s ability to 
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influence the defence budget or military operations abroad. Despite the study’s significant 
contribution to the civil-military relations literature, future research on the relationship between 
conscription and public support for the armed forces is very much desirable. In more detail, 
qualitative research based on case studies would better highlight how the direct or indirect 
pathways introduced in this study lead increase public support for the armed forces in states 
with conscription. Likewise, data limitations restrict the study’s scope, but future researchers 
could incorporate non-European democracies in the analysis with additional data collection 
efforts. Future data collection efforts may also overcome the issue of the binary nature of the 
conscription variable. The study does include models with non-binary estimators of 
compulsory military service, however, more information on the number of conscripts in the 
armed forces, duration of service, quality of training, selective recruitment, or the existence of 
alternative forms of service would greatly benefit not only this study, but the entire academic 
literature on conscription. In particular, more advanced measurements of conscription would 
add significant nuance on the operationalization of conscription and academics would be able 
to study in more depth how conscription affects civil-military relations thus offering more 
elaborated policy recommendations. 
  Regarding the second chapter, I claim that conscription increases the probability of coup 
attempt in anocracies, especially when compared to non-anocracies, and the empirical analysis 
along with several robustness checks confirms this thesis. The findings do not dispute the 
democratizing effect of conscription in democracies or the importance of conscription as a 
national security policy but highlight a previously unobserved negative side effect of 
conscription in anocratic regimes. This is a significant finding since in the third decade of the 
21st century numerous democracies and anocracies around the world plan to re-establish 
conscription or increase the duration of service to combat growing threats in the international 
system. Similar to the previous chapter, the current unavailability of data on conscription 
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practices around the world creates numerous avenues for future research. Toronto’s binary 
operationalization of conscription is very useful, but large-n studies and data collection efforts 
on the number of conscripts in the national armed forces, duration of service, or quality of 
training  would help us better understand the role of conscription in the armed forces and apply 
existing theoretical concepts to non-European states. Additionally, qualitative studies that 
examine how members of social and ethnic groups cluster within the armed forces during their 
compulsory military service would give us valuable information on social and ethnic dynamics 
in the military and how these affect its operations and internal competition. Finally, the 
literature on coup d’état would greatly benefit from a large-n data set on coup d’état by officer 
rank. Albrecht and Eibl (2018) data set on senior and junior coups is unique and certainly useful 
but its regional focus on the Middle East and Maghreb limits our ability to generalize findings. 
It would be beneficial for the study of coups to have a large-n data set on coup attempts based 
on officer rank to examine whether the effect of the explanatory variables varies between senior 
and junior coup attempts. Such a development would greatly improve the validity of our 
findings and accuracy of policy suggestions. 
  In the third and final chapter, I argue that secret police in autocratic regimes decrease the 
probability of a coup attempt by the armed forces. Secret police decrease the willingness and 
opportunity of military officers to execute a coup d’état in autocracies by intervening in the 
coup’s preparation stage. Secret police officers penetrate the military apparatus and establish 
spy networks and surveillance operations to limit the opportunities of military officers to go 
undetected while planning a coup. Additionally, the threat of detection and sanction by the 
secret police decreases the willingness of individual army offices to participate in plots against 
the government or even associate themselves with dissent. Using smaller-n studies, I 
constructed a new variable on secret police organization with data from 1950 to 2018 and 
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present substantial evidence that autocracies with secret police are less likely to experience a 
coup compared to autocracies without secret police.  
  Consequently, the chapter contributes considerably to the literature on authoritarian stability 
as major autocratic states, like Iran, still use the secret police to pacify the internal political 
system. Autocrats are then free to enforce their political agenda without strong opposition or 
they may invest in the state’s military capabilities without fearing a coup since the secret police 
keep the military in check. Besides monitoring military officers, the secret police are also 
involved with political repression, violence against civilians, and overall perpetrate 
considerable human rights violations. Exactly because the secret police have an integral part in 
political repression in autocracies, it is imperative for future researchers to study rigorously 
how different secret police organizations operate, how they affect mass repression levels, what 
kind of training do secret police officers receive, and which autocratic regimes are more likely 
to establish secret police. A shortcoming of this study is that due to data limitations I was unable 
to measure the size of the informant network of each secret police organization or to quantify 
the effect of extreme violent acts of repression, like civilian disappearances or torture, on the 
willingness of military officers or other dissidents to plot against the government. Future 
studies must double down on the link between secret police organizations and state repression 
in autocracies, especially with information on the size of informant networks or spies per 
citizen, to investigate whether autocracies with secret police organizations are more likely to 
repress the population or the presence of secret police leads to a shift towards silent repression. 
  Subsequently, the study illuminates the previously unrecognized influence of conscription on 
civil-military relations. Particularly, the study highlights the positive effect of conscription on 
public opinion for the armed forces in European democracies and calls attention to the 
increased coup risk in anocracies when conscription is present. Simultaneously, the study 
introduces a new variable on secret police organizations to set them apart from other 
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paramilitary forces and to examine how their specific operations affect autocratic survival. As 
such, secret police were found to employ distinct coup-proofing operations compared to 
conventional paramilitaries and coup risk was lower in autocracies with secret police compared 
to others, even when controlling for other paramilitaries. Therefore, the study makes a 
significant contribution to the civil-military relations literature by demonstrating that the 
disaggregation of core features of the security apparatus, like conscription or paramilitary 
organizations, can give unique insight on how and under which circumstances these features 
affect civil-military relations.  
  As a final note, the study also suggests many avenues for future research as the literature on 
civil-military relations continues to expand to accommodate old and new security challenges. 
On that account, I sincerely hope that this thesis attests to the fact that the re-evaluation or 
further examination of essential features of civil-military relations, say conscription, may 
provide valuable insight on major security issues, like a military coup. 
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